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Abstract
This dissertation develops structural models for analyzing shipping invest-
ment decisions, namely ordering, scrapping and lay-up decisions in the tanker
industry. We develop models, based on a microeconomic specification, that
allow us to understand the dynamics of shipping investment decisions under
uncertainty and test interrelated economic assertions with aggregate data.
The main framework is a three-party model with a structural specification
of the time charter rate process, based on market clearing conditions. Struc-
tural estimation of shipping investment decisions is performed by using ad-
vanced econometric methods consistent with the Real Options and Market
Microstructure literature. Several statistical tests are employed, in order
to evaluate alternative specifications. Once the aggregate models have been
identified and estimated, some of the early hypotheses in maritime economics
are addressed and re-evaluated.
Finally we integrate the three different investment modules and reconstruct
the structural transportation supply function that deternines the equilibrium
time charter rate. System identification techniques and advanced economet-
ric methods are employed separately and then combined, resulting in an
exceptional "within-sample", as well as "out-of-sample" performance of the
integrated model.
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1 Objective and Project Statement
In this Chapter the basic problem and motivation for this research are dis-
cussed. Before describing the problem, existing research and methodology
is reviewed and potential extensions are considered. This section is a broad
description of the problem and the complications that arise when using aggre-
gate data to infer individual actions, as well as the implications of heterogene-
ity of agents and some convenient shortcuts, that yield tractable solutions.
Finally, it is a general introduction for the non-specialized reader.
1.1 Aggregate Shipping Investment Decisions
There are two main goals when evaluating investment decisions. On the one
hand, a good understanding of the mechanics of the formation of decisions
may provide a more efficient decision support system for managers and in-
vestors. On the other hand, it is crucial for policy makers and legislators to
have a clear-cut understanding of the dynamics of the investment process.
Furthermore, due to its competitive nature and fairly simple payoff structure,
the shipping industry provides a very interesting framework for testing some
of the main assumptions of Economic Theory.
In this thesis we shall consider three basic investment decisions, which
are clearly interrelated. The first one is the investment in new vessels, or
newbuildings. The second is the decision whether to charter or lay-up a
vessel for a given time charter rate and the third one is the decision whether
to scrap an existing vessel or not. The main difficulty with analyzing these
decisions and the impact of different policies on the dynamics of the industry
is that the researcher cannot match specific actions to specific persons and all
the analysis has to be carried out on aggregate data. There is also a fourth
decision that exists due to the dual nature of vessels as both consumption and
capital assets: this is the decision to sell a second hand vessel in the second
hand market, which is clearly an asset play decision that does not affect the
other three decisions and markets. In her recent paper, Strandenes [57] makes
a very interesting characterization of the first three markets and the market
for second hand vessels. She considers the first three as real markets,
that determine the transportation capacity supply through their structure,
whereas the market for second hand vessels is considered as an auxiliary or
secondary market with no profound impact on the transportation supply
and the formation of the time charter rate. Although the transactions in
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the second hand market do not affect the transportation capacity supply or
demand, there could be some indirect effects on the prices of vessels and
the time charter rate. To the knowledge of the author no research has been
done on the effects of trading volumes in the second hand market on the
dynamics of prices in the real markets.
In his pioneering work, Devanney [20] used Dynamic Programming to
characterize optimal marine decisions under uncertainty and irreversibility
and offered a complete specification for optimal individual actions. The de-
rived policies depend on personal attributes towards risk and assessment of
future uncertainty. The main drawback of this methodology is that it cannot
be applied to aggregate data and only to individual specific data. Since data
are available in aggregate form and individual actions are usually undisclosed,
it is impossible to construct a model based on micro-foundations.
Adland [3] sets the Dynamic Programming problem in continuous time
and considers the scrapping and lay-up or charter decisions simultaneously.
He implicitly adopts the assumption that the value of these payoffs are
spanned in financial markets and are tradable. However, he does not solve
the full optimization problem. As stated "given the complexity and scope
of the problem, only a special case is considered below and the solution to
the general optimization problem is left for future research." Adland [3] also
adopts the assumption of rational expectations and separates the charter or
lay-up decision from the scrapping decision. This will be the core of this
model, but instead of using non-parametric methods to specify the dynamics
of the time charter process, economic structure will indicate the specification
of the functional form of the transportation supply function. This approach
might shed some light on the empirical findings of Adland [3], namely that
the time charter rate displays some non-Markovian dynamics.
Another implicit assumption introduced by Adland [3] is the assump-
tion of independence of actions. Theoretically, every shipowner solves
a complicated Dynamic Programming Problem that pins down his optimal
investment, scrapping and charter versus lay-up policy. Following Adland [3]
we shall consider these three actions independently. In this setting, the mar-
ket for new vessels (newbuilding market hereafter) will be determined by the
demand for new vessels, the scrapping of old vessels will be determined by
the decision to exit and finally, the time charter rates will be determined by
the decision to charter or lay-up a vessel. These three actions will comprise
the core of the three modules of the model presented in this thesis.
Aggregate investment functions that specify the amount of deadweight
10
(dwt hereafter) ordered for a prevailing time charter rate, or the price of a
new vessel, are similar to supply and demand functions for consumer goods.
Considering investment decisions in assets, as supply and demand functions
is a major step towards the understanding of investment in a market mi-
crostructure framework. Despite the significant similarities with consumer-
production theory that arise in this setting, there is one main difference: In
consumer theory, the main determinant of individual choice is consumer's
positive definite utility, whereas in our case the sufficient statistic will be the
value function. Whether this arises from each agent's Dynamic Program-
ming problem or is uniquely determined in financial markets, depends on the
level of market completeness. Aggregating all these different actions of het-
erogenous individuals, forms the "demand" function for new vessels by the
potential investors, the "supply" of transportation from existing owners and
the "supply" of new vessels by the shipyards. Even when using the aggregate
data specification, which mainly consists of specifying the appropriate func-
tional form between the demand and supply functions and their explanatory
variables, finding the correct specification is not an easy task. If we assume
that markets are in equilibrium and supply equals demand, we only observe
the equilibrium prices and we can only separate supply from demand func-
tions (since we only observe their intersection) by using appropriate cost
shifters. For an excellent discussion of identification and estimation of simul-
taneous equations see Hausman [37]. One of the main contributions of this
thesis is be the treatment of investment decisions in a market clearing supply
and demand framework. Using the advances in modern financial economics
and economic intuition we try to identify the correct form of the aggregate
demand function for new vessels, transportation supply function by existing
carriers, supply function of new vessels by the yards and finally scrapping
supply of old and obsolete carriers.
After the preliminary analysis of the performance of this three-party
equilibrium (new investors, existing owners and yards) with an exogenously
driven demand for transportation capacity, the main focus will be on the
construction of a model that will be consistent with optimal individual ac-
tions. The methods employed to aggregate these actions will be the main
topic of the next two sections.
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1.2 Endogenous Time Charter Models
In the classical Devanney model [20] for optimal marine decisions under un-
certainty, it is assumed that each agent has different preferences towards risk
and the future state of demand. This implies that each agent has a different
value function (the value of the Bellman equation [9]) and therefore different
responses. However, if a set of risks is spanned in financial markets, then the
value of each action spanned in these markets is a sufficient statistic for the
characterization of optimal actions and exists in a closed form. If a subset
of risks is spanned in financial markets and we can replicate the project by
existing trading strategies, then we do not need to solve the dynamic pro-
gramming policies or specify payoff functions in the micro levels. We can use
directly the results of the Real Option literature as in Goncalves [30] and in
the pioneering book of Dixit and Pindyck [28].
Given an exogenously specified process, we can calculate the value of
each action explicitly. Investment dynamics may then be attributed to op-
erating cost differences among operators and variations in the number of
agents present in the industry, which depend on finance availability and par-
ticipation fees. The assumption of complete markets, where namely all risks
can be priced by combination of traded assets like futures, shares or bonds,
allows us on the one hand to have a closed form for the value of each action,
which is common for all agents and on the other hand it allows the usage
of this unique value as an explanatory variable for the investment supply
and demand functions. This assumption was first introduced in Maritime
Economics by Goncalves [30].
If we assume that not all risks are spanned in financial markets, but all
agents agree on the dynamics of the underlying process, the value function
will only differ due to preferences towards risk. Using the existing literature
on simulation methods [48], we may aggregate the different value functions
into the aggregate investment supply and demand functions. Using economic
theory and intuition allows us to gain some knowledge on the appropriate
specification of the functional form and not assume an ad hoc specification
of the functional form.
All the analysis of optimal marine decisions under uncertainty and the
derivation of the associated value function is based on the prevailing spot rate.
As noted already in 1971 in Devaney's pioneering work [20] "the charter rates
are not the driving forces in this market. Rather they are determined by the
underlying demand and supply of the type of shipping services." Agents
12
perceive the underlying process, form their optimal actions, they act and
service the existing demand for transportation. The underlying process is
determined in equilibrium when demand equals supply. This is due to the
dual nature of the ship as capital and physical good. Assumptions on the
existence of financial markets allow us to derive closed form optimal decision
rules; however these actions affect the underlying process. As noted in Dixit
and Pindyck [28] "each firm takes as exogenous the whole stochastic process
of the price. So we start with a price process, let all agents respond to it,
and then find the process that clears the market at each instant." This is a
function or a mapping that takes us from one stochastic process to another.
We have an equilibrium if we get the same price process that we started with
or a fixed point. It is very difficult to construct fixed point theorems or
laws of large numbers for entire processes. The derivation of optimal actions,
with an endogenously specified process, under uncertainty and irreversibility
is one of the main contributions of this thesis, from a theoretical point of view.
Specifying the rates endogenously will also lead to the correct specification
of the transportation supply function.
In the basic three-party model, discussed in the previous section, the time
charter process may be perceived as exogenous for the characteriza-
tion of investment decisions in new vessels. This is due to two main
reasons:
1) There is a construction lag between the investment order and the time
when the ship is delivered and affects the investment process.
2) The amount of new tonnage is very small compared to the existing
tonnage and therefore the time charter rate is determined exogenously for
the investors.
This second assumption of no feedback, coupled with the indepen-
dence of actions assumption allows us to study the entry, exit and waiting
decisions in an independent framework, without considering any feedback ef-
fects.
Even though the above reasons allow us to forego endogeneity issues re-
garding the time charter rate (tcrate) for the investment demand function,
the time charter rate has to be determined by market clearing conditions in
the second hand chartering market, in a rational expectations general equilib-
rium framework. This framework, combined with the interaction of financial
markets will provide the required structure for determining the transporta-
tion supply function of second hand vessels (already existing vessels). Having
specified the functional form of the transportation supply function allows the
13
derivation of the general equilibrium time charter rate. Finally, uncertainty
and irreversibility will clearly affect the functional form of the supply side
and generate a different specification than the classical "step function" intro-
duced by Devanney [20]. This observation has been made also by Adland [3],
who demonstrated with Monte Carlo simulations that the short-term supply
function in bulk shipping is determined not only by the lay-up option, but
also by other unemployment risk factors.
If the time charter rate is specified by the dynamics in the second hand
market, then potential investors will invest in new vessels only if technological
progress provides a significant technical advantage that justifies investment
in new vessels, given the discounted expected profit flow from the structural
time charter rate process.
However, there is a third party that interferes with the dynamics of in-
vesting in new ships and this is the party of the shippers. The role of this
party has not been taken into consideration in the existing literature, but
has a significant impact on the demand for new vessels. In a frictionless
market, shippers with a vertical demand function would operate the vessels
themselves and would not purchase transportation services. Due to reasons
of risk sharing, shippers are willing to offer a premium (rpr hereafter) for
purchasing a long term contract for the services of a new vessel. Contingent
on this contract, the shipowner will acquire finance for the new deal and go
to the shipyards to launch the construction of a new vessel. At this point we
can assume the rpr is an unobservable and we can either assume a stochastic
process for rpr, which then will lead to an incomplete market specification
for the objective value function and account for investor heterogeneity, or we
can consider rpr as endogenous unobserved heterogeneity. This last observa-
tion provides the motivation for adding a stochastic term to each investor's
policy rule that makes econometric estimation non-degenerate. Finally, we
can do semi-structural estimation by modelling rpr as the outcome of an
auction between shipper and investor.
The above discussion allows us to separate the investment process in new
vessels from the endogenous formation of the time charter rate and consider
the time charter rate as exogenous, for both the "demand" function for new
vessels, as well as the "supply" function of shipyards. This assumption will be
crucial, since it simplifies the specification of a model with dynamic feedback
from the new vessels to the existing ones.
From the above discussion and without using our economic reasoning to
impose more structure on the functional forms of the investment demand for
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new vessels, the supply and demand equations for the above model, are as
follows, with new being the price of new vessels and dwt the tonnage ordered:
dwt = f1(tcrate, rpr, new, other f actors) (1)
new = f2(tcrate, dwt, productioncosts) (2)
rpr = f3 (tcrate, dwt, f inanceavailability) (3)
Finally, the demand for transportation and services of new vessels is ex-
ogenous, as well as the total demand for transportation that determines the
time charter rate in the second hand market:
tcrate = g1 (demand) (4)
This is a full structure model that specifies the time charter rate endoge-
nously, with the supply function determined as a fixed point mapping. Once
the process or the level of the time charter is specified, the prices of new
vessels, the ordered deadweight and the paid premia to new investors are
fully determined.
1.3 Modelling Investment in Incomplete Markets:
Structural Estimation
Shipping markets are incomplete markets. This implies that it is not clear if
all risks can be taken away by appropriate portfolios (e.g. a combination of
second hand vessels, shipping shares, junk bonds). This question is a very
interesting topic for further research and may have important implications
for risk management in this industry. Furthermore, trading continuously is
not straightforward in these markets, on the one hand due to transaction
costs and on the other due to absence of liquidity. Finally, the objective
value that determines optimal actions is not a positive definite utility that
results in always positive values, but a value maximizing function that takes
negative values for some sub-optimal actions. This is consistent with the
observation that the aggregate "demand" investment function in new vessels
is censored, with many periods where zero investment is observed and then
large investment orders. The same crucial observation applies to scrapping
decisions.
In an environment with heterogenous agents and shippers, each agent
solves for his optimal investment rule. Instead of solving the full problem
15
we specify a reduced form for the policy rule. Using simulation estimators
we may then aggregate all these different preferences and actions, in order
to fit the actual data. In order to perform structural estimation we assume
that the system is in equilibrium and that the observed tcrate, new and
dwt are formed in a general competitive equilibrium. In this context, we do
not need to care about the mechanics of the formation of the time charter
rate. We perceive it as endogenous and use it as a variable in our estima-
tion. The rpr is then the unobservable correlated effect that determines the
probability of investment for each agent. We shall go one step further and
address some other methods that will allow us to forego the rational expecta-
tions approach and the interrelated endogenous formation of the mechanics
of the time charter rates. Using Laws of Large Numbers for discrete events
(entry, exit) performed by agents with heterogenous value functions and a
competitive model from evolutionary biology, we may avoid the complicated
derivation of rational equilibria. These alternative approaches will allow us
to employ the estimated models for the exante estimation of the equilibrium
time charter rate, which will be assumed exogenous (or an input) for the
estimation of entry and exit decisions.
The simulation method was introduced by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes
[7] for analyzing discrete choice models of differentiated products demand.
In their analysis, the objective function is consumer's utility, whereas in
this analysis the objective function is the outcome of each agent's Dynamic
Programming problem. Specifying a generalized form for the value function
of each agent and accounting for individual heterogeneity, allows the usage
of structural estimation, for the first time in investment theory. Simulation
estimators allow the estimation of investment (entry - exit) decisions without
any binding assumptions on market structure and the process of the time
charter rate; however, they will not yield closed form solutions. Introducing
market completeness is a binding assumption; however it reduces the
complexity and dimensionality of estimation, since it yields a unique reduced
form for all agents. The price we pay for the reduction of dimensionality is
that we have to specify the mechanics of the underlying process, which either
limits our analysis to partial equilibria, or makes the computation of a full
equilibrium model very difficult. Finally, the econometric error appears only
as a form of risk premium offered by the shipper and is necessary in order to
make statistical estimation non-degenerate.
Furthermore, assuming complete markets reduces the dimensionality of
complexity by implying a unique reduced form for the value function that
16
determines the actions of agents. In a setting with heterogenous agents any
attempt to identify the structural function has to rely on Laws of Large
Numbers or a strong restriction on the form of heterogeneity.
1.4 Existing Research and Methodologies
There has been a lot of theoretical and empirical research for optimal ship-
ping investment decisions. In discrete time, Devanney [20] is the first to
characterize optimal marine investment decisions on a "Bottom - Up" indi-
vidual specification. In continuous time and in a complete market framework,
several theoretical models for the valuation of ships, like any other real as-
set, have been developed over the years. Beenstock and Vergottis [6] take
the approach that ships are demanded by investors who seek to earn a re-
turn on their wealth. Because the returns are risky, theory suggests that the
proportion of wealth that investors wish to hold in tankers depends on the
difference between the expected returns and the returns on competing invest-
ments. The return on tankers consists of profit from operation and capital
gains. Capital theory then leads to a suggested equilibrium price. Tvedt [61],
Martinussen [45] and Goncalves [30], regard the ship as a risky security that
is a claim to the earnings process from ship operation. These authors use
variations of parametric stochastic models to model the underlying freight
rate. Furthermore, the value is calculated based on rational exercise of the
option to scrap the vessel prior to expiration at a maximum age. Finally
Dikos and Marcus [22] consider ship valuation in a two-risk factor frame-
work, extending the seminal "Buy Low - Sell High" [44] in continuous time
and in a stochastic environment.
Several weaknesses are inherent in the existing research: All the above
are partial equilibrium models with an exogenously specified time charter
process. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to endogenize the time
charter process as a fixed point of the system.
The pioneering "Top-Down" approach based on aggregate data is the
classic work by Zannetos.[64], who not only specified the form of aggregate
supply and demand functions, but also identified the role of expectations in
the formation of investment decisions.
In this thesis we will use the advances of "Bottom - Up" individual type
models to form the aggregate functions that we will bring to the data in
a general equilibrium framework. Economic theory, intuition and advanced
econometric methods will be the main artillery, to perform this full equilib-
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rium exercise.
1.5 Review, Critique and Discussion of the Basic Un-
derlying Assumptions
Before proceeding with a more detailed analysis of the assumptions and the
methodology to be used we review some of the basic facts, that are industry
specific and make the estimation of investment decisions very challenging.
It is clear that our main model consists of three equations, which are
interrelated to each other. Beyond the issues of determining the functional
form of the aggregate equations, important issues of endogeneity might arise
in such systems, that may complicate estimation significantly. It is therefore
important to discuss the assumptions made on the potential endogeneity of
some variables, before proceeding with a more detailed description of our
estimation techniques.
As discussed in the previous section, we assume independence of the
reduced form of the optimal rule of each action as well as exogeneity of the
time charter process for the determination of investment and (disinvestment)
scrapping decisions. The main intuition for this assumption is the following:
1) There is a construction lag between the investment order and the time
when the ship is delivered and enters active supply.
2) The amount of new tonnage is very small compared to the existing
tonnage and therefore the time charter rate is determined exogenously for
the investors.
3) The amount of vessels scrapped is very small compared to the existing
tonnage.
The assumption of market completeness will determine the "tools" we
will employ in order to "aggregate" individual decisions and determine the
structural functional form of the equations of our system. Under complete
markets and having specified a process for the time charter rate, the opti-
mal action - inaction thresholds are sufficient to characterize the investing -
scrapping decisions. Under this specification the functional forms of the three
party model exist in closed form. However, some statistics of the time charter
process have to be specified and this complicates estimation significantly. If
one wants to avoid the above assumptions, the time charter is taken as exoge-
nously specified in a rational expectations framework, with the risk premia
rpr a random error that allows the usage of econometric estimation. After
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having discussed the key underlying assumptions, a more detailed road-map
will follow, where the methodology employed will be presented in details,
contingent on the prevailing assumptions.
Another crucial observation for our model and equations, is that the num-
ber of investment decisions does not affect the action - inaction rule. There-
fore, the number of firms entering or exiting this market does not affect the
entry - exit thresholds. The bulk shipping industry is perfectly competitive,
which implies that agents cannot affect the underlying process and that the
number of entering or exiting firms does not affect potential profitability as
in the airline industry [8]. The underlying economic structure of this market,
simplifies our analysis a lot since it does not require any assumptions on Nash
equilibria. A similar analysis in the container industry would be totally dif-
ferent and would require the characterization of an oligopolistic equilibrium,
in order to carry out this analysis (see Berry [8]).
Another potential source of endogeneity is the presence of the price of
new vessels in both the "demand" function for new vessels, as well the supply
function by shipyards. Since the price of new vessels appears as a dependent
variable in the yards' supply function and as an explanatory variable in the
demand function, there is an issue of endogeneity, which has to be restored.
This requires the selection of valid instruments whose validity shall be tested
by employing the Hausman test.
Finally, the last potential source of endogeneity is the associated risk pre-
mium rpr that appears in both the demand for new vessels equation, as well
as the shippers demand. Either a full functional form has to be specified,
by assuming it is determined in a two party auction between shippers and
investors, or it may be considered as a random error that will introduce indi-
vidual heterogeneity and make the econometric estimation non-degenerate.
Having discussed the basic underlying assumptions we proceed with the
following question: Even if the time charter rate is exogenous to the invest-
ment and scrapping process, how can we effectively determine the appropriate
form of the time charter dynamics?
A structural process that is a result of all aggregate "lay-up or employ"
decisions and simultaneously clears the market, can be determined in a Ra-
tional Expectations framework. In market equilibrium, supply of transporta-
tion is equal to demand. This equality provides a functional relation between
freight rates and ship prices, and once correctly estimated it may be used
to predict the impacts of policy, accidents and demand shocks on shipping
cycles. The above observations are in line with the critique by Dixit and
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Pindyck [28]. The sum of individual's agent responses to the time charter
rate constitutes the industry's transport supply function. The equilibrium
price is then determined by market clearing conditions that equate demand
and supply. Following Lucas' critique, under uncertainty and irreversibility
the transportation supply function depends on the underlying process and
changes dynamically. A significant simplification arises from the perfectly
competitive nature of the shipping industry: on the one hand the number
of firms does not affect the transportation supply function and on the other
hand demand for transportation services may be taken as vertical. The last
observation takes away the implications of simultaneity, since the demand
for transportation capacity does not depend on the prevailing freight rate,
for the short term at least.
Specifying a structural time charter rate can result in highly non-linear
processes with stochastic volatility, that make the associated Dynamic Pro-
gramming Problem i ntractable in closed form. This implication, as well as
the assumption of complete markets are foregone, once we adopt a Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes [7] full structural estimation approach for entry-exit
decisions, which does not require a closed form derivation of the optimal
action thresholds, by simply assuming an ad hoc specification of the individ-
ual value function. To avoid the burden of increased computation we shall
introduce threshold and factor models in a semi-structural framework.
Having discussed the basic assumptions underlying this structural three-
party model we now provide a road map to the different techniques to be used
and the contributions on the modelling of investment decisions, generally.
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2 Road Map
In this section we revisit the assumptions that appear essential for estimating
the proposed three party model. The discussion in this section is for the spe-
cialized reader who wants to understand the economic intuition that allow us
to adopt each assumption. The economic terms used are tied to the specifics
of the tanker industry and a preliminary road map of model estimation is
proposed.
2.1 Investment Models in Complete Markets
Under the assumption of complete markets the Real Option value [28] is a
sufficient statistic for characterizing investment decisions under irreversibil-
ity. However, since data for the number of tanker ships ordered in each period
are available in aggregate form, a model that will make the parameters es-
timable, needs to be specified. Even in the 'Bottom - Up' approach, where
estimation is based on the actions of a particular agent or a set of agents, the
estimation of the objective function or the sufficient statistic that character-
izes the behavior of the agent, is part of the problem. If we take the approach
that part of the underlying project and the associated risks are traded in the
financial markets, then the objective value function is uniquely determined,
up to the market price of risk, which is determined in equilibrium by the
market.
Structural Estimation with complete markets allows the usage of the value
function determined by "arbitrage" arguments, which simplifies the analysis
a lot, and does not require the solution to each agent's Dynamic
Programming problem. However, the problems of aggregation are still
open. In the first part we shall consider three different models, which will
allow us to work with aggregate data. Our approach is similar to the pioneer-
ing work of Berry [8]. Berry, considers profits as a sufficient statistic for the
characterization of entry and exit in airport hubs. He accounts for unobserv-
ables both in the profit function as well as in the error term, which represents
characteristics of the market that are observed by the firms, but not by the
econometrician. The basic motivation for including an error term in decision
variables is to obtain statistically non-degenerate econometric models. Fur-
thermore, if this error term was not present, direct investment could not be
observed, since agents could replicate the payoff of the projects by existing
traded securities. Structural Estimation with complete markets does not re-
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quire the modelling of equilibrium choices over entire networks. Especially
in the shipping industry, that is considered as a paradigm for a perfectly
competitive market, the interactions of firm decisions may be disregarded. It
requires however a market imperfection that will make the value function in
a complete setting higher than the cost of the investment; under no arbitrage
any value function should be always equal to the cost of the project since
prices would adjust dynamically, in order to eliminate any arbitrage oppor-
tunities. To make the above argument more concrete, in a complete market
setting, the value of the project spanned in financial markets (the value of
the new vessel) should always equal the cost of the project (the price of a
new vessel). The price quoted by the yards should reflect the discounted ex-
pected payoffs the owner will receive by operating this vessel. In order to use
the "excess" or "arbitrage profits" as a sufficient statistic for characterizing
investment decisions we need to introduce market imperfections or an econo-
metric error for unobservables (the premia offered by the shippers in our
case) that will make the estimation feasible. As noted in Strandenes [57] the
market imperfection in this industry, is due to the overcapacity of production
by the shipyards, that does not allow the adjustment of newbuilding prices
to satisfy the "no arbitrage" condition, whereas the error term premium is
either due to the term structure of time charter rates, or due to the premia
offered by shippers. As Strandenes [57] notes "labor unions have been strong
in shipbuilding, which traditionally has led to lower flexibility in the labor
market." This has led to systematic governmental intervention that has had
significant effects on ship values and the functioning of the newbuilding mar-
ket. Subsidization implies that new vessels are sold at lower than the market
clearing or "no arbitrage" price that corresponds to a zero Real Option value.
This imperfection, coupled with the presence of shippers, makes the usage of
the Real Option value statistically non-degenerate.
In the first model we shall consider firm heterogeneity in the operating
costs and an identification condition on the "most efficient operator" will be
imposed. In the second model we shall consider equally efficient operators,
as a result of the perfect competition in the industry and in our third model
we shall consider the interaction and correction terms imposed by the supply
side of shipyards. In ModelIV we shall consider the exit decision for equally
efficient operators, whereas ModelV will be a description of aggregate exit
decisions of heterogenous agents and finally ModelVI will be a search model
of exit. We shall then proceed with the derivation of a structural time charter
process. The term Semi Structural Estimation is used, because on the one
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hand there are no requirements on Game Theoretical Equilibria and on the
other hand, the objective value function is determined by the Real Option
Theory. There is still space for unobservables in the above specifications that
appear in the "risk premia" or the real option markup. If the econometrician
gets the aggregate model right, then the "unobservables", the "risk premia"
or the option markup, are parameters of the estimation and the proposed
models consist a new framework for identifying the effects of time varying
unobservables in direct investment decisions and what Spyro Skouras [56]
named "Decisionmetrics".
Before proceeding with testing simultaneously both the significance of the
Real Option value rule as well as the aggregation specification there are two
final observations. First, the different assumptions imply that identification
is not only a matter of functional form and second, we cannot develop a
theory of investment independently of the market structure in which the
firm operates, as well as the ability to span the under maximization value in
financial markets.
2.2 Incomplete Markets
There has been one main assumption underlying the previous analysis: Mar-
kets were assumed complete and the potential investors could span the value
of the project in financial markets. The presence of the econometric error was
due to unobservables (and made the specification non-degenerate). However,
the assumption of complete markets does not hold and in general, real assets
are illiquid, and this makes it difficult to find replicating portfolios and there
are huge transaction costs in this market.
Under the assumption that all agents have the same expectations regard-
ing the underlying time charter process, heterogeneity arises due to differ-
ences in operating costs, as well as the market price of risk of each individual.
Individual heterogeneity cannot be easily aggregated to elegant closed form
solutions and estimation has to be conducted by using simulation techniques,
unless we impose some restrictions on the heterogeneity. A prominent ex-
ample is the one considered by Berry [8]; in our case however it has to be a
dynamic analysis, rather than Berry's static approach.
To give an example let us assume that the value of investing in a new
vessel for agent j at time t is given by:
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Then the number of observed investments in each period is:
Shipsordered,t = (nt : V]jp > 0, nt <; N) (6)
Nt= p o Nti1 + et (7)
with et ~ P(At) and p the thinning operator as defined in Cameron and
Trivedi [17].
Although the problem is solved in "static cases" (for N constant, [8]), it
is a promising candidate for explaining dynamic investment decisions and a
very interesting topic for further research.
2.3 Rational Equilibrium Time Charter Rates
Given the exogenously specified demand our three party model fully de-
termines the equilibrium rpr, tcrate, dwt. For our analysis of investment
decisions the time charter rate process is considered exogenous. In order to
close our model we want to specify the dynamics of the charter rate from
market clearing conditions. Furthermore, economic analysis will allow us to
gain efficiency by improving the functional form specification of the estimated
relations. Thus we are faced with a philosophical inconsistency: on the one
hand the time charter process is used as exogenous for the estimation of in-
vestment decisions and on the other hand we aim to employ these models,
in order to determine the time charter rate. We have achieved a rational
expectations equilibrium, once the assumed and the actual process turn out
to be equal.
In classical economics a Rational Expectations equilibrium is a convenient
framework for estimating a structural time charter rate. Existing owners
decide whether to charter their ship or lay it up and wait. If there was
neither uncertainty nor irreversibility, then the operator would charter the
vessel as long as the net operating profits would exceed fixed costs. Under
uncertainty and irreversibility this rule has to be modified in order to account
for the implicit option value of waiting. Once the value of each action has
been calculated the aggregate supply of transportation for each prevailing
rate may be derived.
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It turns out the solving for a rational equilibrium with entry, exit and
lay-up decisions simultaneously is almost impossible. We therefore consider
each action independently (independence of actions assumption) and derive
aggregate entry and exit models in a partial equilibrium framework. As-
suming that the demand is exogenous we may then derive a structural time
charter process in this Rational Expectations framework.
s(tcratet) = demandt (8)
tcratet = s-1 (demandt) (9)
Following Dixit and Pindyck [28] we shall consider competitive market
equilibria under market uncertainty and firm specific uncertainty. Market
uncertainty implies that the structural process has an upper reflecting barrier,
whereas firm specific uncertainty has strong implications for the tonnage in
Lay-Up and the dynamics of transportation capacity.
2.4 Sections and Model Estimation Review
Before proceeding with model estimation let us restate the basic assumptions
and shortcuts as well as the plans for model estimation:
" Agent Heterogeneity and Dynamic Programming for Entry, Exit, Lay
Up and Chartering actions.
" Assumption 1: Each action is separated from the other ones. (Separability
of actions).
" Assumption 2: Entry and Exit actions perceive the time charter as
exogenous. (No feedback effects).
" Assumption 3: The market is perfectly competitive: the number of
entering and exiting firms does not affect profitability.
* Assumption 4: Agent heterogeneity arise from cost heterogeneity and
shipper premia.
* Model 1: Rational Expectations and Complete Markets yield a unique
entry-exit statistic.
25
* Model 2: Rational Expectations and Incompleteness yield heterogene-
ity in the discount factor. Each agent solves his own dynamic program-
ming problem.
" Model 3: Heterogeneity in Expectations and Incompleteness yield a
Market Microstructure Equilibrium with "wait and see" or "search" op-
tions.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as following:
In Chapter 3 we proceed with the analysis of the first module, namely
the investment decisions in new vessels. We assume complete markets with
rational investors. The time charter rate will be exogenous and the market for
new vessels will be considered perfectly competitive. In the proposed models,
the Real Option Value will be the unique sufficient statistic for characterizing
investment decisions.
In Chapter 4 we analyze the scrapping data (exit decisions), which con-
sists of the second module. We employ the same techniques and assumptions
as in the first module; however due to the low quality of the data available
in this market, we can only make qualitative observations on the scrapping
dynamics. We finally include two more models: a model of heterogenous
agents and a search model.
In Chapter 5 we consider structural time charter rates. As noted already
in 1971 in Devaney's [20] pioneering work "the charter rates are not the driv-
ing forces in this markets. Rather they are determined by the underlying
demand and supply of the type of shipping services." We start with market
uncertainty and firm specific uncertainty and derive competitive equilibria
in line with the models derived in Dixit and Pindyck [28]. We then pro-
ceed with a model of transportation capacity with switching costs, as in the
classical 1983 Townsend model [60], in order to take the effects of speed
adjustment on the formation of rates. This model has strong implications
on the time charter rate dynamics; however it does not require the Lay-
Up data. Furthermore, it provides an elegant structural framework for the
Generalized Autoregressive Heteroscedastic (GARCH) [29] type models, as
well as a structural interpretation for the coefficients of the GARCH spec-
ification, that have prevailed the last decade in the time charter literature
by the pioneering work of Kavussanos [42]. Using robust control equilibria
the Townsend [60] model may generate even more interesting dynamics. We
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then relax the derivation of rational expectation price process and adopt the
System Dynamics approach to price modelling. Finally, we work towards a
synthesis of the mechanism that determines price formation in this market.
By assuming myopic actions in the competitive equilibrium [28] we employ
the estimated equations simultaneously, in order to determine the time char-
ter process. We discuss several stabilizing mechanisms that are inconsistent
to the market clearing approach, but sympathetic to the real data.
In Chapter 6 we derive a model for the valuation of second hand vessels
in a partial equilibrium framework by employing the Real Options literature.
Finally in Chapter 7 we derive our conclusions and address topics for
further research in this area.
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2.5 Specification and Estimation: Empirical Limita-
tions and the Decisionmetric Concept
Before starting with the specification and estimation of our model we discuss
the empirical limitations imposed by the data, as well as the choice of inputs.
Finally we define the Decisionmetric Concept and discuss issues of model
selection and order.
2.5.1 Comments on the Empirical Data
Throughout this thesis, several different sets of data will be employed for
the estimation of the different modules which constitute the transportation
supply function. The economic reasoning for choosing a particular set of data
in the model specification and estimation process is discussed explicitly for
each module and differs significantly. However, even after economic reasoning
and intuition have determined the required data, empirical limitations can
impose significant restrictions on the magnitude of our results. In this section
we address such issues.
All sets of data employed in our analysis are explicitly analyzed during the
presentation of the models and consistently defined in the Glossary. In this
section we will discuss a priori the limitations of our data, as well as some
necessary transformations we had to apply, in order to carry out the pro-
gram. Finally, we discuss the selection of categories for different tanker sizes.
The main source of the data on maritime investment (orders for new vessels,
scrapped tonnage, existing fleet and aggregate demand) has been Marsoft,
(Boston) Inc., who has been very supportive and encouraging throughout
this project. However, since data in Maritime Economics differ across dif-
ferent consulting firms, we have used various sources, in order to check the
consistency and accuracy of our data, which in general has been of high
quality.
Three key data series constitute the transportation supply function: The
number of the vessels ordered in each period (ship), which determines the
new entrants in each period, the tonnage scrapped (scr), which determines
exit and finally the prevailing time charter rate (tcrate) that is determined
in the market by the interactions between supply and demand (dmd). For
the number of vessels ordered in each period we are in possession of quarterly
data for five different categories, as defined by Marsoft, (Boston) Inc. in their
data set. The five categories introduced in our analysis of orders for new
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vessels in tonnes of deadweight (10000-60000, average 30000; 60000-80000;
average 70000, 80000-120000; average 90000, 120000-200000; average 140000,
and 200000+) have been directed by Marsoft and the particular nature of
the data. In the relevant chapter (Chapter 3) we account for the individual
effects of each category by estimating the model with Fixed Effects (FE) and
Random Effects (RE), which correspond to fixed or random dummy variables
across categories. In Chapter 5 we go one step further and estimate the time
charter rate models separately for each category, as well as the Full Model.
Performing this task we fully exploit throughout our analysis, the impact of
size on decisions of entry and exit, as well as on the dynamics of the price
process.
Our ability to account for size heterogeneity is limited, when perform-
ing the analysis of exit decisions (Chapter 4), since scrapping data are not
available for each category. Although it turns out that the tonnage scrapped
each period does not have a first order effect on time charter rates, the lack
of scrapping data for each category, limits significantly our ability to address
questions of Economic Theory related to exit decisions. We are therefore
forced to forego size heterogeneity effects and estimate our scrapping models
with aggregate data. In order to account for some source of heterogeneity
without overparametrizing the model, we construct tonnage weighted indices
of the time charter prices and operating expenses, denoted (tci) and (opi),
respectively. Another significant complication is that data on scrap prices
are not available in a consistent way for the entire period 1980-2002. As we
will discuss in the relevant Chapter, the lack of scrap price data forces us to
use instruments, whose validity we are not able to check.
Fortunately enough, price data for new vessels and for the key input
(which is our ultimate target, too), namely the time charter rate process, are
available for the entire 1980-2002 period and on a monthly basis. Therefore,
for the price for new vessels (newprice), which is a key input for the demand
for new vessels and the time charter process (tcrate) we have aggregated
monthly data to quarterly data. In some sense we have not fully employed
all available information and one could argue that we could try to use monthly
data. One more crucial empirical limitation, which hinders any such attempt
is the fact that the demand data (dmd) are only available quarterly.
Interrelated to the time charter (price) process are operating expenses.
Operating expenses (opex) vary significantly across vessels, operators and
age. However, since they are a crucial factor, especially for decisions of en-
try, we may focus on the operating expenses of new vessels, which anyhow
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are a valid instrument for the operating expenses of any vessel. Our series on
operating expenses have been constructed from different sources and this spe-
cific data set is complicated and is the outcome of averaging several different
estimates.
All other variables that appear in the analysis are consistently defined in
the Glossary and have been fully available from independent sources. Most
of them are publicly quoted indexes (air is the Standard and Poor's trans-
portation index, oil is the price of crude oil quoted by the Chicago Board of
Trade, irate the FED lending rate, etc.) and there is no ambiguity on their
definition and quality.
Before concluding with this section there are some significant issues, which
may account for the poor performance of different specifications and are
therefore worth mentioning. Most of them are related to the limitations of
our data that stem from the particular illiquid nature of shipping markets.
Throughout this thesis, the time charter freight rate refers to an arithmetic
average of time charter rates on the major routes for a particular vessel. In
order to get consistent series the time charter rates are usually published
for a representative vessel and since it is published in United States Dollars,
the estimates quoted by different sources as the time charter rate include
the effects of inflation and technological innovation. Furthermore, as the
time series will represent averages (given the process has finite moments) the
data will possess less volatility than the actual market price process. Finally,
the market for long term contracts virtually disappears during poor freight
markets [3]. The low number of fixtures makes it particularly difficult to de-
termine accurate empirical measures of the time charter price in a depressed
market. In our analysis we specifically choose the one year time charter rate,
since it is the median of charter durations in this market ([3], p.28).
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2.5.2 Decisionmetrics: Model Selection and Specification
Before proceeding with the estimation and specification of each module we
provide a description of what our interim and ultimate targets are, as well
as how we proceed pursuing them. Our final goal is to determine a model
for the patterns of freight rate prices in the tanker industry, which is mainly
a problem of System Identification. This system consists of agents who
undertake dynamic decisions of exit, entry and temporary suspension and
through these actions they fully determine the process, on which they base
their actions; namely the dynamics of freight rates. Therefore, it is a very
complicated system where the inputs of the system (the expectations on the
price process) have to be consistent to the output.
The orthodox strategy according to Economic Theory is to solve the gen-
eral Rational Expectations Problem and a simple version of this approach
will be employed in 5.3 and 5.4. In his philosophical paper "Dealing with
the Complexity of Economic Calculations" [53], John Rust, the pioneer of
the large-scale computation "Bottom - Up" approach to economic modelling
poses two questions:
Does the computational complexity of economic calculations (i.e those re-
quired to implement various economic concepts such as optimization, equi-
librium) place inherent limits on the ability of economists to model the be-
havior of economies and economic agents?
Does the computational complexity of economic calculations place inher-
ent limits on the ability of economic agents to behave according to existing
economic theories of optimization and equilibrium?
For both questions Rust gives a negative answer and in some sense, most
of the "empirical tests" of Economic Theory in this thesis will be totally
supportive to his perception of complexity and economic behavior. In our
analysis we use the term Structural, because we exploit the special struc-
ture of this particular industry, as a device that allows us to reduce the
complexity of the system, without placing limits on the ability of economic
agents to perform rationally and optimally. In Chapter 3 we use the "my-
opic equivalence" of the competitive equilibrium [28] and in Chapter 4 we
demonstrate that under mild assumptions heterogenous agents converge to
rationality and optimality by "cancelling out" sub-optimal policies. Our only
deviation from the neoclassical theory doctrine is our Evolutionary approach
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derived in 3.10; the main motivation is that the Evolutionary approach im-
poses minimal requirements on the price process.
However, our approach to the first question differs from the parallel com-
puting schemes Rust suggests in his paper and subsequent work. By using
the assumption of independence of actions we "break down" the Dynamic
Programming Problem to the three submodules of entry, exit and temporary
suspension. By the assumptions on the exogeneity of demand for new vessels
with respect to vessel prices, the exogeneity of demand for transportation
capacity with respect to the freight rate and finally, the absence of feedback
effects from the new orders and scrapped vessels on the underlying process
we proceed by isolating each sub-module. In a sense our strategy is a Divide
and Concur strategy that is suitable only for this specific market and the
specific assumptions. For each sub-module we simultaneously perform two
interrelated tasks: We derive aggregate models based on modern Economic
Theory and then test the validity of these models, as well as the validity of
the underlying assumptions. The first term in the title, Decisionmetrics
[56], refers to the performance of the estimation in a model selection frame-
work, once market assumptions, Economic Theory and specific structure have
helped us identify a family of inputs, outputs and models. Our "practical"
needs to produce estimates that will help policy makers and agents make
robust decisions, open the way to an engineering type approach, regarding
the identification of the mechanics of the system. Economics will be used
to derive models on structural assumptions and reduce the complexity of
the system, whereas our ultimate goals remain to design a device that will
produce robust measures of investment decisions in this market.
As discussed in the previous section, the choice of an input is performed
on the basis of economic reasoning and the choice of order on the basis of
advanced econometric methods. Besides choosing the data inputs and esti-
mating the statistical significance of each parameter, we are faced with the
essential problem of model specification and selection. Namely, we have to
identify an "appropriate" functional form between our inputs and outputs.
Although Economic Theory and special structure may reduce the complex-
ity of the estimation process, whilst allowing us to address efficiently issues
of aggregating individual actions into aggregate data, testing the specifica-
tion of each model is a necessity. The Decisionmetric concept, as defined
by the pioneering work of Spyro Skouras [56] is aimed at developing a pos-
sibly misspecified econometric model that will be used for making decisions
under uncertainty. In order to limit the impacts of misidentification on the
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robustness of our model, we thoroughly employ combinations of specification
tests and choose those models that survive most of the tests. Following this
approach, even if the structural assumptions of the model are non-testable or
questionable, we still accept those classes of models that are very supportive
to the data and reproduce an "equivalent class" of reality. Most empirical
studies in economics are undertaken in order to test a hypothesis or identify
parameters of economic significance on the basis of a priori knowledge. In
the first case a structural model is formulated and estimation methods are
employed to test the hypotheses and assertions of the model. Any test is
then a joint test on both the hypotheses and the aggregate model; however,
statistical evidence is used only to justify and characterize the validity of the
economic hypotheses under question. In the second case, a priori knowledge
on the actions of economic agents (Rust [53], economic agents behave ratio-
nally and optimally, whilst solving their Dynamic Programming problem) is
imposed and advanced econometric methods are employed for the estimation
of implied parameters (such as risk-aversion). Our approach is in some sense
the opposite and this stems from our main objective, which is not the direct
test of economic theory or underlying assumptions of economic behavior, but
the identification of functional relationships. Although some of our interim
goals are interrelated to testing some of the economic hypotheses that have
dominated maritime economics, our ultimate goal is to construct estimates
of the price process. Therefore, we derive our models on a "Bottom - Up"
approach and accept those classes of models that are not rejected within a
parametric class of families, we accept these models that "squeeze out" the
utmost information from the data.
Instead of testing economic theory and assumptions, we employ economic
theory in order to reduce the dimensionality of the problem and identify
appropriate functional forms within parametric families, that survive certain
tests. As it will turn out, economic intuition will contribute with utmost
precision to the reduction of the dimensionality of the problem and provide
valuable insights. Having completed the presentation of our assumptions and
main identification strategy, let us now carry out the programme.
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3 Module 1: Investing in New Vessels
" ... why should he order a replacement if the prospects for employment of the
new vessel when it appears in the market are not promising? Would he not
naturally wait until he is somehow assured about the immediate future?",
(Zannetos [64], p.120).
The objective of our first Module is to propose models for aggregate
newbuilding investment decisions, under the Real Option markup hypothesis.
Due to uncertainty, irreversibility and significant construction times, there
is a significant value in the option to wait, before constructing a new vessel.
This is the motivation for using the Real Option Markup hypothesis, instead
of traditional Net Present Value (NPV) criteria.
In the last years option theory has been important for economics and in-
vestment decisions. After the introduction of the "real option" value, implicit
in investment decisions ([46]), uncertainty has played a key role in investment
[28]. However, very few applications to specific investment models have been
derived in this framework and therefore, it has been very difficult to test the
Real Option theory. Pindyck and Solimano [50] tested the impact of uncer-
tainty (volatility) on movements in investment, and they found supportive
evidence for the theory. Serious problems of aggregation still have not made
it easy to test the Real Option markup hypothesis on specific markets based
on aggregate data.
Following Rust [51], there are two approaches one can follow in order
to model investment behavior: The first is the 'top down' approach, where
investment is computed by using a measure of a hypothetical continuous ag-
gregate capital stock K and optimal investment policies arise as a result of
value maximization, subject to convex costs of adjustment for capital. A
significant benefit from this approach is that it allows us to use aggregate
data to test the results of the models and the validity of 'q-type' investment
decisions. Important testing of 'top down' models has been done by Jor-
genson and his collaborators without significant success ([40], [13], p.301).
At this point we should stress that optimal investment policies are derived
with respect to value maximization. As discussed in [13] (p.291-293) "we
cannot develop a theory of investment independently of the market structure
in which the firm operates". The ability to span the under maximization
value in financial markets is also crucial for the connection between 'q-type'
sufficient statistics and market value. If this is the case and the market
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completeness assumption is adopted, then the value maximization objective
function will be unique. This observation will turn out to be crucial even
in the "bottom up" approach that will be described right now. Since the
payoff of operating a ship is fairly straightforward (it is determined by the
time charter rate minus the operating costs (fuel costs)) and an organized
futures market exists (Baltic exchange) the assumption of complete markets
in this case, is a realistic assumption. Under this assumption we do not need
to solve a discrete time dynamic programming problem in order to determine
the value function of the optimal investment policies. This value function is
determined by the assets traded in financial markets. This takes the burden
of estimating the parameters of the value function as in [52].
The contributions of our analysis in this section will be twofold: On the
one hand we will test how well the real option 'benchmark value' suffices
for entry decisions in a perfectly competitive industry. On the other hand,
partial equilibrium assumptions and count data methods, as introduced in
the seminal paper by Hausman [36] will allow us to test the theory by using
aggregate data.
There is finally one more benefit from this approach. By observing in-
vestment decisions and using discrete choice econometric methods we can
derive the values of unobservable parameters such as the real option markup
in the tanker market industry.
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3.1 Model Specification: Semi-Structural Estimation
We have discussed how the Real Option value is a sufficient statistic to char-
acterize investment decisions under irreversibility. However, since we will
use aggregate data for the number of tanker ships ordered in each period,
we have to specify a model that will make the estimation feasible. Even in
the "Bottom - Up" approach, where estimation is based on the actions of
a particular agent or a set of agents, the estimation of the objective func-
tion or the sufficient statistic that characterizes the behavior of the agent,
is part of the problem. If we take the approach that part of the underlying
project and the associated risks are traded in the financial markets, then the
objective value function is uniquely determined, up to the market price of
risk, which is determined in equilibrium by the market. As we will discuss
later, this approach seems reasonable in this market: An organized freight
rate market (Baltic Exchange) exists, as well as many tanker companies are
traded publicly.
This assumption allows the usage of the value function determined by
"arbitrage" arguments, which simplifies the analysis. However, the problems
of aggregation are still open. In our first Module we shall consider three
different models, which will allow us to work with aggregate data. Our
approach is similar to the earlier work of Berry [8]. Berry, considers profits
as a sufficient statistic for the characterization of entry and exit in airport
hubs. He accounts for unobservables both in the profit function, as well as
in the error term, which represents characteristics of the market that are
observed by the firms, but not by the econometrician. The basic motivation
for including an error term in our decision variables is to obtain statistically
non-degenerate econometric models and account for the structural errors
arising from some level of market incompleteness. Furthermore, if this error
term was not present, we would not observe direct investment, since the
agents could replicate the payoff of the projects by existing traded securities.
Complete markets and perfect competition do not require the modelling of
equilibrium choices over entire networks. Especially in the shipping industry,
that is considered as a paradigm for a perfectly competitive industry, we may
disregard the interactions of firm decisions.
In the first model we shall consider firm heterogeneity in the operating
costs and we shall impose an identification condition on the "most efficient
operator". In the second model we shall consider equally efficient operators,
as a result of the perfect competition in the industry and in our third model
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we shall consider the interaction and correction terms imposed by the supply
side of shipyards. There is still space for unobservables in the above specifi-
cations that appear in the "risk premia" or the real option markup. If the
econometrician gets the aggregate model right, then the "unobservables", the
"risk premia" or the option markup, are parameters of the estimation and
the proposed models consist a new framework for identifying the effects of
time varying unobservables in direct investment decisions.
Before proceeding with testing simultaneously, both the significance of the
Real Option value rule, as well as the aggregation specification, there are two
final observations. First, the different assumptions imply that identification
is not only a matter of functional form and second, we cannot develop a
theory of investment independently of the market structure in which the
firm operates, as well as the ability to span the under maximization value in
financial markets.
3.2 The Efficient Operator Specification
The shipping industry has some unique characteristics that allow us to con-
duct empirical tests. On the one hand it is well known that it is one of the very
few examples of a perfect competitive industry, and on the other hand, freight
rates are a sufficient statistic for the risky payoffs of operating a ship. Fur-
thermore, the shipping industry is always suspect to unexpected regulation
and pollution bills that affect directly the operating costs of vessels. Payoff
uncertainty, as well as regulation and policy uncertainty imply that agents
commit themselves to large-scale irreversible investments, when ordering a
ship. From this point of view this industry has some unique characteristics
that allow us to test the importance of irreversibility and uncertainty on the
birth of investment decisions.
Perfect competition and the simple structure of the payoffs still do not
resolve the issue of aggregation for firm heterogeneity. Firm heterogeneity
may arise from the different running costs of different operators, preferential
finance terms to credible investors and finally from the ability of the man-
ager to achieve a long term time charter rate for the ship, before placing the
order to the shipyard'. In this paper we shall tackle aggregation following
the count data econometric specification, introduced by Hausman [36]. In all
'This method was introduced by Aristotle Onassis: He first agreed on a long term fixed
rate from the shipper and then ordered the ship. In some sense this was one of the earliest
collateralized debt obligation structures.
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three models we shall specify that the total number of investment decisions
follows a generalized poisson process P(At) with intensity depending on a
set of factors Xt. This parametric model will be estimated using the con-
ditional Poisson model introduced in the seminal paper by Hausman, Hall,
and Griliches [36]. The same model was used by Becker and Henderson [5]
with a very intuitive discussion on the micro-econometric foundation of such
aggregate type models.
Following the "bottom-up" or "decisionmetric" approach to investment
decisions, Becker and Henderson [5] argue that at each point in time, there
is a supply of agents willing to place orders for new vessels. They argue
that this supply relation is upward sloping in positive NPV values. Since
it it well established that NPV is NOT the appropriate maximizing value
under uncertainty and irreversibility, we shall assume that the supply of
agents willing to commit themselves to shipping investment decisions is a
positive function of the optimal value under uncertainty, as derived by Dixit
and Pindyck [28] and Hausman [38]. As one moves up the supply curve,
the higher this critical value, the more agents will place orders for new ships.
Furthermore, the curve may shift outwards in periods where sources of finance
are more accessible than in other periods. In the case where the underlying
risk factors depend on unobservables (stochastic volatility), then the value
function will depend on unobservables, too and this will shift the supply
curve. The demand curve, or the number of shipyards willing to commit
capacity in order to construct a ship within a pre-specified period, depends
on the magnitude of government subsidies and uncertainty.
Total births of investment orders are then determined by the intersection
of supply and demand, in birth-Viticai space. This gives a reduced form
equation:
By = B(Xjt, fj + ejt) (10)
where Bjt are the orders placed for ship type j at time t and Xjt is a vector
including the critical Real Option investment rule, the accessibility of finance
sources and other macroeconomic variables and fj are ship type fixed effects
of unmeasured time invariant features. At this point we should note that
since the underlying asset, namely the spot rate is non-tradable, the critical
value function shall depend on the market price of risk, that will be estimated
as a parameter of the model. Regarding the above specification of the model,
there are two issues of concern as discussed in Becker and Henderson [5]. The
first issue regarding the type of equilibrium this model does not apply in this
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market, due to perfect competition prevailing in this industry. The second
issue regarding the nature of our data, namely discrete, with many zeros in
periods of stagnancy and positive numbers makes the choice of the Poisson
model a natural choice.
In order to make aggregation feasible and to impose more structure in the
form of the intensity of the birth model, the following observation is made.
At each point in time the most efficient operator has a known value, denoted
by V, if proceeding with placing an order for a new vessel that will cost him
I. This value V, will be fully determined by the optimal investment rule that
takes into account irreversibility and the option to wait. This rule is derived
by Dixit and Pindyck [28] and is used in his discussion of telecommunications
industry regulations by Hausman [38]. The value of this project V, will be
a function of the offer I,, by the shipyard, the depreciation rate of the asset,
the current price of the underlying risk-factor, which is the time charter rate,
and the first two moments of this process, as well as the market price of risk.
Later on we will introduce uncertainty regarding the life time of the ship
and the associated depreciation. Given this unobserved value the probability
that the most efficient operator will not undertake investment will be given
(assuming an extreme type-I error distribution) by the following formula:
1
Pef f = 1-ex(V)(11)Pff-1 + exp(Vn)
This probability is then equal to the probability of the event "no birth of
investment decisions is observed in this period". Since this probability corre-
sponds to the most efficient operator, if he doesn't undertake investment, no
other operator will be expected to do so.2 If we now impose the additional
restriction that the probability specified above should be equal to the prob-
ability of zero investment births, implied by the Poisson specification, then
we have imposed a structure to the intensity of the count model, consistent
with the Real Option literature.
From our count data specification, the probability that no births will be
observed at time t is given by:
PObirths = exp(-At) (12)
2 The same argument is used by Berry [8] in his study of entry decisions in airport
hubs, where he defines the structural error that generates this specification as "ordered
heterogeneity".
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Equating these two equations we now obtain the following parametric form
for the intensity of the birth model:
I
At = I-n( ) >At =-In(Peff) (13)
1 + exp(Vn)
Since Pffg is the probability of the binary logit model, it is always restricted
between zero and one, and as a consequence its negative logarithm is always
positive, which is a necessary restriction for the intensity of the Poisson
model. Furthermore, as discussed in Becker and Henderson [5], in order to
have a stable equilibrium of supply and demand for new ships, the sign of
Zt, with Xt all the parameters that determine the value function, should
be positive, which is the case indeed for the above specification. Thus, the
larger the value implicit in investing in a new vessel, the higher the probability
investors will proceed, and the larger the number of observed orders (births
in our model).
The above model is simple, tractable, makes estimation identifiable and
corresponds to a partial Nash equilibrium. It is similar to the "observed
heterogeneity" model introduced by Berry ([8], p.899), where the probability
that N agents invest is equal to the probability that N agents have a positive
investment rule. However, there are two significant defects of this model. As
noted by Berry, on the one hand it places strong restrictions on possible
combinations of entering firms and on the other hand it assumes an infinite
supply of the vessels at the given price, without interaction and adjustment
from the shipyards to supply and demand shocks. In our calculations this
model will be denoted as ModelI.
3.3 A Perfect Competition Model
The tanker sector is a paradigm for perfect competition. We may there-
fore make the assumption that all operators are equally competitive and the
probability that each of them will invest is the same, and is fully determined
by the value of the investment minus the value of the option to wait. This
probability, under the assumption of type I structural errors, is given by:
exp(Vope)
7rinvest = 1+ exp(Vopt) (14)
The total number of ships ordered in each period is then given by the
count variable:
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Y = Z Bi (15)
i=1,n
,where Bi is the outcome of each agent, and the total number of agents is
n. If the total number of agents is given by a Poisson process P(An), since
the outcome of each agent is an identically distributed Bernoulli trial, the
total number of ordered ships will follow a Poisson process, with intensity
An ' lrinvest. This specification allows a more flexible parametrization of the
aggregate poisson count model, since the number of operators, may depend
on other variables, too.
If we model the intensity of the number of operators as
An = exp(a+0-x)-(1+exp(Vpt)) # An *rinvest = exp(a+0-x+c-Vopt) (16)
where x are some exogenous variables. This model provides us a very straight-
forward parametrization of the Poisson model, and it is the familiar expo-
nential specification of the mean, which is the main common practice in
most empirical studies that deal with count data. This model of perfect
competition will be named ModelI. As far as all operators being equally
competitive and the value of the project is uniquely spanned in financial
markets, the probability of action is unique and the same for each agent.
Once the spanning assets are not enough, then each agent has a different
probability and the Poisson aggregation argument breaks down.
3.4 A Simple Auction Equilibrium and the Supply Side
A more complete specification would result from considering the supply dy-
namics of the shipyard. Once a yard offers a ship at a given price It it commits
itself to an irreversible process and occupies capacity for this specific ship.
Thus, there is an option to wait for each shipyard, before committing produc-
tion capacity to a specific project for a price It. Following the same threshold
rule but from the yard's point of view, the probability that the most efficient
operator will not offer the ship for It is given by:
1
Pejiy 1 + exp(I - PC - Wpt) (17)
In the above equation PC stands for the associated production costs and
Wjpt for the option to wait, before committing capacity to the production
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of a ship. If uncertainty and irreversibility have to be taken into account
for the shipyard, too, then the probability that no investment birth will be
encountered takes the following form:
PObirths - Pej f(Vn) + (1 - Pef f)(V) - Pef f,y (I, PC, Wopt) (18)
This implies that there is an additional correction term for the intensity
that is the cross-product of the event the efficient operator is willing to pay
I for a ship, but no yard produces at this price. The interaction between the
investors and the shipyards may result into endogeneity of the ship prices,
and as a consequence, endogeneity of the real option calculated formula.
This result is familiar from the literature on simultaneous equations. In the
special case where the shipyard supply is inelastic this correction probability
becomes zero. In our third model we will take into consideration the effects
of any potential endogeneity of the price of new vessels.
Having discussed our model we may now proceed with the description of
the data, the estimation of our model and the hypotheses to be tested.
3.5 Data and Results
The tanker sector has always been considered as a paradigm of perfect com-
petition. Investing in a new tanker requires a significant amount of capital,
whose main source is bank finance. Shipping cycles exhibit significant vari-
ability and no individual has ever gained enough market power in order to
control freight rates.
Regarding the data, the main source is Marsoft, (Boston) Inc. 3 and it is
the same source used by Dixit and Pindyck [28] in Chapter 7, p.238. Marsoft
provided the orderbook (the orders placed for the construction of new vessels)
for tanker ships (crude oil carriers). This data set is accurate and precise.
The data set is in quarters from 1980 until 2002. This implies that we are
given 91 observations for each type of tanker carrier. Given the five different
types of ships we have 455 observations. For this time period the data on
Time Charter Rates are fully available and precise, as well as the prices of
new vessels. The operating costs are fairly straightforward. A drawback is
that the data on operating costs contain errors from 1980-1991. After that
period they are known exactly.
3I thank Dr. Arie Sterling, President of Marsoft, and Kevin Hazel for providing the
data.
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The second source is Clarksons, (London) Inc. The available data are
from 1993 until 2002 and are monthly. They are consistent quarterly with
the Marsoft data. However, there is strong evidence that on a monthly basis
there are errors.
If there are enough spanning assets, then the value of investing in a new
tanker is uniquely determined and the correct investment rule is: "invest only
when the value of this asset exceeds the option to wait". I will name this
excess value, the Real Option Value ( Vt hereafter) and it will be derived
in line with Dixit and Pindyck [28]. Vp depends not only on the underlying
process for the time charter freight rates (which will be the lognormal, in line
with Dixit and Pindyck), but also on the presence of bubbles. If all risks are
traded, then this value is unique.
Regarding the calculation of the Real Option Value we follow closely
Dixit and Pindyck [28], Chapter 7, p. 23 8 and their discussion on tankers.
The "dividend" rate J is taken equal to 0.02 (since the growth of time charter
rates a is closer to 0.02 than 0 in their analysis and the risk adjusted return to
shipping p is closer to 0.04) and the depreciation rate A is taken equal to 0.03,
since ships have a life time of 30 years. There is however significant evidence
that depreciation rates depend on market conditions in this industry. They
use a real option markup of m = 2.5 in their discussion, but this markup
is correct only if depreciation is omitted. As pointed out in their table in
page 204, the existence of depreciation lowers the markup. Therefore, for
a =0.2 and the above parameters, the correct choice for the markup mup
seems to be mup = 1.30. Finally regarding the 'dividend' payout rate 6,
a value of 0.02 is mainly consistent with the dividend ratios of most listed
shipping companies. Later on, we shall not impose any specific values on
these parameters and instead we shall estimate the implied parameters. If
the Real Option markup hypothesis holds, the implied parameters have to
generate a mup at least higher than 1.
Then the excess real option value which appears as a regressor is:
P
Vopt = -mup -I (19)
In the above formula I is the price of the new vessels and P is the revenue
per year obtained from the One Year Time Charter rate minus operating
expenses. The calculation of the above formula for ships is accurate, since
the value I is known and the revenue from employing the ship from one year
is known from the one year employment rate. The above formula imposes a
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linear restriction on the revenue (that equals the time charter rate minus the
operating expenses) and the price of a new vessel. What we really have to
test is the robustness of this linear restriction, implied by the Real Option
Theory. This will be our last task, after we have specified our structural
model.
Before testing the first model we should note that the number of ships
ordered from 1980 until 2002 is split in five different categories. Handymax,
Panamax, Aframax, Suezmax and VLCC's are the five different categories,
classified on the transportation capacity of each category. Now let us test
the first Model.
3.6 Model I
Given the efficient operator identification condition
1
At = -ln( ) -> A, = -ln(Pej)f At = ln(1 + exp(Vpt) (20)
1 + exp(Vn)
the number of ships ordered in each period are
Y ~ P(A) (21)
or
P(Y = k I A(x)) = exp(-A(x)) (A(X)) (22)
with
A = At -a => A = n( + Vpt) -a - A exp(ln(ln(1 + Vpt)) + a) (23)
since we observe quarterly data and we do not know the decisionmaking
frequency of the most efficient operator, we have to add a constant term in
the exponential specification. This model is very restrictive since it imposes
a coefficient of unity for the logarithm of the probability of zero investment,
which is not the case in the specification of Model II We shall now esti-
mate this model by doing pooled maximum likelihood estimation, in line
with HHG 36]. The data on new ships ordered contain 455 observations
with 65 zero counts and a maximum value of ships ordered 66 (small size
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Table I Dependent Variable Y Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ships 455 7.559471 9.296905 0 66
dwt 455 .7106032 .9347692 0 7.44
Table II Model I (Conditional Mean: Eq.23)
Model NLLS (25) PQMLE (24) NB [36] OLS
Inp .3239 (.012) .2901 (.028) .3461 (.040) 2.691 (.352)
const 1.553 (.027) 1.622 (.067) 1.520 (.071) 4.468 (.380)
Log likelihood -2413 -1623 -1358 n.a.
PseudoR2 0.1267 n.a. 0.0258 0.1451
60-DWT). Although our data set contains a significant number of zero or-
ders, the average of ordered ships is 7.55 and the associated DWT is 0.71
million tons. There are two crucial observations at this point: On the one
hand, the larger the tonnage category of the ship, the less the order counts
observed in each period, and on the other hand once in the two periods of
high freight rates investment "counts" appear to be high. This is the main
reason why, despite the big number of zero counts (15 percent) the average
number of ships ordered is 7.55 . Another crucial fact is that for all our ob-
servations, time charter rates are always significantly higher than operating
costs. However, only in periods when they are significantly higher, invest-
ment counts are positive. These observations are indicative, that on the one
hand investment in large vessels and uncertainty affect investment decisions
and intuitively they provide supportive evidence for choosing the real option
value as an investment statistic.
We now proceed with the estimation of the model and display the results in
Tablell. We do pooled Poisson maximum likelihood using the negative loga-
rithm of the "no-investment most efficient operator" probability 4 , which we
4
Y ~ P(At . A,.), At -A, = exp(X' -0 ) (24)
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then compare with the Non Linear Least Squares (NLLS) 5 estimates under
the exponential specification and with robust standard errors. Although it
is well known from the Quasi Maximum Likelihood Estimation (QMLE) lit-
erature that maximum likelihood is still consistent, provided the conditional
mean is correctly specified, a significant difference would indicate severe mis-
specification.
A significant improvement of the fit of the likelihood has been gained and
a Hausman type test [35] yields 1.65. We then get the Negative Binomial
(NB) estimates 6 , which improve the likelihood even more. Thus we find ev-
idence for significant heterogeneity among operators. Finally, the predicted
counts are compared with the actual data and there is clear evidence that
the Poisson specification fails to capture not only the zero counts, but as well
the excess counts observed for high real option values. To verify this obser-
vation the following diagnostic tests are conducted. The Pearson statistic
normalized for the 454 degrees of freedom yields a value of 74.92313, which
is supportive for the excess overdispersion of the data set. Furthermore, the
"Goodness-of-fit" chi2 statistic is 3447.149, and rejects the Poisson specifi-
cation with Prob > chi2(452) = 0.0000. Finally, the likelihood ratio for the
parameter of overdisperion of the negative binomial, rejects the HO : 0 = 0
with probability one and a = 1.080348.
Before proceeding with testing the second model, we consider fixed and
random effects models. 7 The fixed effects model introduces a constant term
for each of the five categories of ships. Intuitively, this implies that the fre-
quency of investing orders differs among tonnage. The random effects model
assumes heterogeneity among tonnage. Following [36], a Beta random effect
specification is adopted, that leads to a closed form formula for the maxi-
mum likelihood. The introduction of multiplicative effects across different
categories is equal to an intercept shift, which holds only for the exponential
mean specification and corresponds to different frequencies of decisionmak-
ing. The results are displayed in Table III and standard errors are reported.
For a more formal derivation of the Fixed and Random Effects Specification
see Cameron and Trivedi, [17] 1998, p. 2 7 5 .
5
Yt = exp(X' -0) + Et, Et - N(0, oa2 ) (25)
'The Negative Binomial specification allows for overdispersion, since it does not impose
equality of the conditional mean and the conditional variance [36].
7For a detailed discussion of fixed and random effects see HHG, [36], 1984.
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Table III Model I with Fixed and Random Effects
Model I NB Fixed NB Random Poisson FE Poisson RE
Inp .3802 (.0273) .3799 (.0273) .3859 (.0137) .3857 (.0137)
const .2142 (.1075) .2124 (.1074) n.a. 1.473 (.3070)
Log likelihood -1201 -1237 -1491 -1528
The coefficient of inp is now slightly higher than in the previous specifica-
tion and the Log-likelihood is significantly higher. All estimated coefficients
are still statistically significant. The Hausman test between Poisson Ran-
dom and Fixed effects does not reject the random effects specification since
it yields a X2 (1) = 0.23 and the same result is verified for the Negative Bi-
nomial Random versus Fixed effects Hausman test with X2 (1) = 0.03. The
Likelihood Ratio test of the Negative Binomial Random Effects specification
versus the pooled estimates follows a X2 (1) with value 223.30, which indi-
cates that the NB specification is far more suitable. Finally, by inspecting
the predictions of the model it is clear that it captures successfully the low
and zero counts, but it fails severely to predict the excess counts observed at
the peak of the shipping cycle. Let us therefore proceed with Model II.
3.7 Model II
We now assume that the probability of a positive count is the same for all
operators, which is a fairly good assumption for a competitive market like
the market of crude oil carriers. As a consequence, the specification of the
Poisson model has the following form:
(A(x))k (6
P(Y = k I A(x)) = exp(-A(x)) k! (26)
with
A(x) = exp(a + / - x + -yVopt) (27)
Given our previous analysis the model should yield a y = 1 if the "struc-
tural errors" have an Extreme Type I distribution. However, if there are
bubbles in the market, then the real option value is a power function of the
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Table IV Model II (Cond. Mean: Eq.27)
Model I PQMLE (24) NLLS (25) NB(RE) [36] OLS
shipi .0362(.0051) .0240(.0057) .0611(.0067) .6212(.0806)
Vop .0135(.0021) .0149(.0050) .0130(.0029) .0724(.0210)
Vp -2.57(0.645)e-05 -2.66(0.100)e-05 -2.64(0.653)e-05 -1.189(0.433)e-04
newprice -.0158(.0037) -.0291(.0131) -.01114(.0027) -.0551(.0172)
accident -. 1517(.1483) .0854(.1617) -. 3551(.1757) 1.405(1.720)
Irate -.02349(.018) .00602(.019) -. 0325(.0207) .0619(.132)
Voyptlag -.002072(.00118) -.002129(.00150) -.0008354(.00206) -.0290(.0129)
const 2.444(0.203) 2.787(.401) 2.097(.2351) 4.734(1.541)
PseudoR2  0.3623 n.a. 0.0980 0.5278
Log L -1758 -1497 -1255 n.a.
real option value vtt. 8 Since it is difficult to identify the correct distribution
of the errors, as well as a closed form solution of the option to wait, values
less than one will be interpreted as evidence for the presence of bubbles.
Regarding the exogenous variables x that determine the expected number
of investors, we use the following in the estimation of Eq.(27):
* shipl a lag of the number of ships ordered one quarter before
* Vft the squared value of Vpt
* accident a dummy variable for the accident of Erika in December 1999
" newprice the price of new vessels
" irate since the predominant source of ship finance is the bank we also
include the lending rate in the regressors
* Vopt,iag a lag of Vot
We now run Poisson likelihood estimation Eq.(24) (with robust standard
errors), NLLS Eq.(25), Negative Binomial ([36]) with Random Effects and
Ordinary Least Squares with robust errors. Results are reported in Table IV.
8For a derivation of the real option under the presence of bubbles, see the discussion
in Dixit and Pindyck. [28]
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It is clear that the real option value appears statistically significant for
all the above specification. Conducting some diagnostic tests the Poisson
O(n - k) has a value of 2140 and rejects the Poisson specification with
probability one. The Pearson statistic normalized for the degrees of freedom
has a value 44.3 that indicates severe overdispersion and the likelihood ratio
test on the overdispersion parameter of the negative binomial rejects the
HO : a = 0 with probability one. By inspecting the predictions of the negative
binomial, the model fails to predict the zero counts as well some excess
counts, especially for the lighter categories, where the most "excess events"
are observed. Before proceeding with random and fixed effects specifications,
we shall relax the real option calculations. The real option value is calculated
as the profits from the one year time charter rates minus the operating costs
discounted by the "dividend payout ratio" and the depreciation rate minus
the newbuilding price, times the "real option" markup. We will re-estimate
the parameters of the above model, including the one year time charter rate,
the operating costs and the newbuilding prices in the regressors. It will
then be checked if the implied estimated parameters are consistent with the
real option specification Eq.(19), before proceeding with more complicated
models.
The results of the four different specifications are presented in Table V
and it is clear that for all these specifications the one year time charter
rate, the operating expenses and the price of the new vessel are statistically
significant. The tcrate is always positive and the other two variables are
negative as expected. What is even more impressive is that the magnitude
of the coefficient of the operating expenses is of the same significance and
slightly higher than the corresponding coefficient of the time charter rates,
which is as expected, since costs incur, even when the ships does not earn
revenue (in the port, dry-dock, etc.). Furthermore, the tcrate and opex are on
a per - day basis. Thus if we calculate the difference of these two coefficients
and multiply it by 365 days, the number we get is of the same significance as
the coefficient of the newbuilding price, but almost three times less, exactly
as predicted by the real option literature. In order to make this point
clear the estimation is repeated and instead of using tcrate and opex as
regressors we use the value of the project Val, which is given by the formula
V = tcrate355opex-365 and then the coefficient of this variable is compared
with the coefficient of the newprice. (Table VI) If the real option literature
is correct, the coefficient of newprice has to be higher than the coefficient
of Va, which is exactly the case. As observed by the results, the real option
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Table V Model II with Vp in reduced form
Model NLLS (25) [ PQMLE (24) NB(RE) [36] OLS
shipi .0277.(0047) .0393(.0054) .0491(.0034) 0.6196(0.0800)
tcrate 3.47(0.897)e-05 4.37(0.880)e-05 3.58(0.543)e-05 2.65(0.83)e-04
opex -3.83(1.87)e-05 -2.68(1.83)e-05 -2.65(1.50)e-05 -1.755(1.091)e-04
newprice -.0293(.0082) -.0230(.0046) -.0166(.0032) -.1127(.0300)
Irate -. 0013(.019) -.0361(.017) -. 0589(.017) .0252(.1281)
accident .2157(.2142) -. 1898(.1682) -.3952(.1917) .4585(1.700)
const 2.642(.288) 2.390(.208) 1.122(.261) 4.702(1.783)
PseudoR2 n.a. 0.3398 n.a. 0.5195
Log L -1515 -1820 -1257 n.a.
Table VI Model 1I with a semi-parametric form for Vpt
Model I NLLS (25) PQMLE (24) NB(RE) [36] OLS
shipi .0276(.0049) .0396(.0054) .0491(.0034) .6226(.0800)
Va .0049(.0012) .0060(.0012) .0049(.0007) .0354(.0112)
newprice -.0294(.0084) -.0223(.0046) -.0161(.0032) -. 1078(.0293)
Irate -.00149(.01910) -.03602(.01771) -.0602(.0175) .0081(.1230)
accident .2127(.2078) -.1630(.1638) -.3741(.1881) .6510(1.672)
const 2.632(.270) 2.478(.192) 1.175(.249) 5.351(1.529)
PseudoR2 n.a. 0.3387 n.a. 0.5189
Log L -1515 -1823 -1258 n.a.
markup implied by the data indicates a value close to 4, which corresponds
to an implied volatility for the underlying profit flow process of 0.40! For
the exponential mean specification the Akaike criterium indicates that the
model performs better when the real option value is used as a regressor
(with a markup of 1.3 for the excess option value) than using tcrate, opex
and newprice as regressors. It is now clear that on the one hand the optimal
combination between the variables that determine the value of the project
and the option to wait, is the one predicted by the real option literature
and on the other hand, not much can be gained by assuming a time varying
markup specification.
51
However, the X2 still rejects the Poisson specification in favor of the Nega-
tive Binomial, since the Likelihood ratio test yields a statistic of 20.33. The
Pearson statistic is lower than before (47.78), indicating that to some extent
the problem of overdispersion has been corrected. Before going on with fixed
effects and random effects models, we will add some non-linear variables and
check the robustness of the previous findings.
It is argued that if the underlying process does not follow a lognormal
distribution, or if bubbles are present, then the excess option value is a non-
linear function of the variables of the project. To account for non-linearity
we include in the exogenous variables x in Eq.(27):
* VV the square of Vt
" shipk the k - th lag of ordered ships
" tcs the sqaure of tcrate
" tcrate and opex
* newprice the price of new vessels
" accident and irate
Finally, in order to account for category-specific effects we repeat our
estimation and include a dummy variable for the "weight category" (dwg).
The dummy takes a value of one if the data of the related category are used
for estimation and zero otherwise. The results of the estimation of Eq.(27),
with different constants across categories, are displayed in Table VII and
reconfirm the robustness of our previous findings. The intuition for including
the lags of ordered ships is the following: Previous lags (one quarter and four
quarters ago, respectively) of orders are an indicator of the transportation
capacity demanded by shippers. Although the demand for transportation
capacity is a derived demand from the demand for oil (and therefore it is
inelastic with respect to the time charter rate) we consider lags of orders as
a proxy for demand growth in this market.
Diagnostic tests still reject the Poisson specification, due to overdispersion.
The Pearson statistic is significantly lower (33.96) and the Likelihood Ratio of
the Negative Binomial Random Effects versus the pooled is still in favor of the
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Table VII Full Model "Free Parametrization"
Model NLLS (25) PQMLE (24) NB(RE) [36] OLS
shipi .0090(.0064) .0200(.0057) .0269(.0034) .4727(.1006)
ship4 .0042(.0036) .0134(.0035) .0229(.0039) .1669(.0551)
tcrate 11.2(9.72)e-05 7.19(3.16)e-05 4.58(1.39)e-05 55.93(30.33)e-05
opex -10.82(3.28)e-05 -7.43(2.14)e-05 -4.20(1.45)e-05 -42.37(16.6)e-05
newprice -.0286(.0240) -.0118(.0056) -.0102(.0049) -.0437(.0316)
VV -3.85(5.88)e-05 -4.93(1.80)e-05 -2.11(1.68)e-05 6.59(1.338)e-04
tes 4.32e-10(2.34e-09) 8.89e-10(7.61e-10) -1.89(6.45)e-10 -6.00(6.50)e-09
accident .0296(.2041) -.1753(.1538) -1.185(.1913) .4540(1.693)
irate .0285(.0139) -.0017(.0164) -.0755(.0171) .1105(.1515)
dwg -.0147(.0025) -.0101(.0020) -.0068(.0014) -.0345(.0131)
cons 2.872(.3673) 2.304(.3072) 1.553(.3242) 3.320(2.761)
Pseudo R2 n.a. 0.4270 n.a. 0.5626
Log L -1426 -1568 -1232 n.a.
Markup 1.90 1.26 1.57 n.a.
NBRE model. However, all Likelihood Ratio tests are supportive to the pres-
ence of these additional variables and the relationship between time charter
rates, operating expenses and newbuilding prices is exactly the one predicted
by the real option theory and with the implied markup being close to 1.35.
9 Finally the fourth lag of ships ordered (one year ago) and the dummy for
deadweight category appear very significant, as well as the square of the real
option value. The significance of the weight dummy is counterintuitive, since
it implies that carrier capacity has a negative impact on the demand for new
ships and it is against the "economies of scale" principle. Having derived
these encouraging results for the different re-parametrizations of the under-
lying theory, we go on with the negative binomial specification and random
versus fixed effects tests. We assume a time varying multiplicative effect for
the expected mean, which is the same for all categories. However, to account
for the impact of deadweight on the number of ordered ships, a deadweight
dummy is included, although as discussed previously, such a variable should
have no statistical significance, theoretically at least.
9 The implied markup for the full parametrization is time varying and is calculated as
following: mup = t newprice efollwin: p =tcrate -timecharter+opex -op. costs
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Table VIII Full Model II Negative Binomial
Model NB Random Effects NB Fixed Effects
shipi .0269(.0034) .0324(.0047)
ship4 .0229(.0039) .0291(.0050)
tcrate 4.58(1.39)e-05 8.33(3.22)e-05
opex -4.20(1.45)e-05 -4.89(1.61)e-05
newprice -. 0102(.0049) -. 0043(.0070)1o
VV -2.11(1.68)e-05 -4.36(1.96)e-04
tes -1.89(6.45)e-10 3.62(7.87)e-10
accident -1.185(.1913) -1.267(.4115)
Irate -. 0755(.0171) -.0281(.0503)
dwg -. 0068(.0014) -.0081(.0020)
cons 1.553(.3242) .9513(.6672)
Log L -1232 -821
Average Markup 1.57 0.611
Before commenting on the results we do a Hausman test between the NB
Fixed and NB Random effects specification, displayed in Table VIII. If the
RE model is correctly specified, then both FE and RE models are consistent,
while if the RE are correlated with the regressors, the RE loses its consis-
tency. The difference between these two estimators can be used as a basis for
a Hausman test. " The statistic is X2 (6) distributed and has a value 34.84
and we reject the RE specification. The FE NB specification implies that
there is a time varying effect, which accounts for the overdisperion of the
data. The previous lags of ordered ships are statistically significant, as well
as the time charter and operating expenses coefficients. The dummy for the
Erika accident appears statistically significant and negative. This implies
that the new regulation bill for the construction of new tankers, negatively
affected investments in new tankers. Regulators and analysts expected that
the new regulations would have a positive effect on the construction of new
double-hull vessels, since all older vessels, past a certain age were not allowed
to operate in U.S. ports any longer. What appears statistically insignificant
and makes the real option specification questionable, is the coefficient of the
price of new vessels (newprice). There are two explanations for this fact.
"iThis test was introduced in Hausman ([35] and [36] 1984, pp.9 2 1 and 928)
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On the one hand it is possible that newprice has errors in variables. The
price reported by the agencies is the average price of the ships ordered and
it is reported by the shipyards. Since shipbuilding is heavily subsidized, it
is possible that the reported prices do not include rebates or other "under
the table" agreements. Another potential explanation is the endogeneity of
newprice and autocorrelation in the errors. Both would lead to inconsis-
tent estimates for the RE Negative Binomial specification. In order to test
for endogeneity we use a set of instruments for the log of the price of new
vessels and we then include the prediction error from this regression in the
NB FE specification. Finally we shall test for both endogeneity as well as
autocorrelation. More formally:
linn = -Z + vres (28)
and for the NB RE specification:
shipsit = E[shipsitlxit] + 0Z -vresit + Cit (29)
with E(Et - vresit) = 0.
Z is the set of instruments, which in this case are the following: the Standard
and Poor's Oil Price index spoil, the crude oil price oil, the Standard and
Poor's Air Transportation Index air and all other exogenous regressors. To
ensure that we do not have a unit root in the regressors (especially for the
time charter rate) we do unit root tests, which are all rejected. The reason
we include the transportation air index is the following: on the one hand it is
correlated with economic, trade growth and their associated transportation
networks, but uncorrelated with the demand for new vessels and on the other
hand it is a proxy for alternative modes of transportation.
We then repeat the estimation of the model under the NB FE specification
and we include the error vres of the projection of the price of new vessels on
the instruments and the exogenous variables in the regressors. The results
are displayed in Table IX.
In order to account for autocorrelation we also include the lag of the
predicted error. Under the hypothesis of non-autocorrelated errors, the lag
of the estimated residuals is included in the regressors; a non-significant
coefficient implies that the null should not be rejected. Results are displayed
in Table X.
Since both the residual of the instruments, as well as the lag of the pre-
dicted residuals appear statistically insignificant, endogeneity is rejected. Al-
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Table IX NB FE
Table X Model II NB FE - Exogeneity Test [36]
ships I Coef. Std.Err. z p-0
shipi .0328 .0088 3.73 0.000
ship4 .0302 .0049 5.99 0.000
tcrate 8.12e-05 3.21e-05 2.53 0.009
opex -4.32e-05 1.92e-05 -2.22 0.027
newprice -.0096 .0101 -0.96 0.344
vres .0038 .06305 0.06 0.007
ul -.0008 .0091 -0.10 0.924
VV -5.08e-05 2.10e-05 -2.41 0.016
tcs 6.36e-10 8.40e-10 0.76 0.449
accident -1.346 .4160 -3.24 0.001
Irate -.0298 .0541 -0.55 0.582
dwg -.0071 .0023 -3.01 0.003
cons 1.030 .6821 1.51 0.131
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ships Coef. Std.Err. z p-
shipi .0329 .0047 6.92 0.000
ship4 .0290 .0049 5.85 0.000
tcrate 8.39e-05 3.21e-05 2.61 0.009
opex -4.25e-05 1.92e-05 -2.22 0.027
newprice -.0087 .0102 -0.86 0.391
vres .0035 .0256 0.14 0.891
VV -4.82e-05 2.09e-05 -2.30 0.021
tcs 5.44e-10 8.40e-10 0.65 0.517
accident -1.319 .4197 -3.14 0.002
Irate -.0180 .0543 -0.33 0.740
dwg -.0073 .0023 -3.17 0.002
cons .8888 .6825 1.30 0.193
Exogeneity Test
Table XI Model II NB FE-RE [36] Real Option Model Eq.(19)
Model NB FE NB RE
shipi .0327(.0047) .0267(.0041)
ship4 .029(.0050) .0231(.0046)
Vopt .0069(.0017) .0088(.0018)
tes 1.24e-09(2.85)e-10 1.41e-09(2.82)e-10
VV -6.27(1.18)e-05 -7.11(1.12)e-05
accident -1.281(.4034) -1.195(.2168)
lrate -.0468(.0460) -.0744(.0205)
dwg -.0068(.0012) -.0065(.0013)
cons 1.476(.4818) 1.518(.2305)
Log Likelihood -822 -1271
though the coefficient of newprice has increased significantly and the markup
has been restored above one, the price of new vessels still appears statistically
insignificant. We will now estimate NB models using Vpt as an exogenous
variable, instead of the price of new ships, time charter rates and operat-
ing expenses. This will allow me to compare the performance of these two
parametrizations.
Now that we have derived the NB RE and FE specification with Vrt as
an exogenous variable we conduct a Hausman test, that clearly rejects the
NB RE specification. We now conduct the final test, in order to compare the
estimates of the full model with the above estimates. Since we have specified
the NB FE both with the Vpt, as well as with the full parametrization of
tcrate, opex and newprice, we will use a "norm" to compare the deviation of
the estimates. It is known from econometric theory, that if Vopt is correctly
specified (in other words we have the correct relationship between tcrate,
opex and newprice) the estimates are efficient. The full parametrization
is consistent under the alternative parametrization, where Vt is not the
optimal combination. We therefore conduct a Hausman test and the statistic
is X2 (6) and 1.62. We therefore accept that the optimal combination is the
one derived by the real option literature.
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3.8 Explaining Capacity Orders
In the previous analysis the coefficient for transportation capacity (dead-
weight) turned out statistically significant, implying that lighter ships have a
higher demand. Although "economies of scale" tell us nothing about the sup-
ply and demand for this category, investing in larger vessels implies a higher
degree of uncertainty and irreversibility. The observation that the number of
investment counts depends on the specific ship category is something that has
to be further examined. In order to account for the interaction between ship-
yards and investors we will adopt a more flexible model, that may account
for the zero counts in a different sense than the previous specification.
We will use a Tobit I model for the deadweight (the net tonnage capacity
ordered in each period). If the more efficient operator or the most efficient
shipyard do not agree on a specific contract price for a ship, zero deadweight
is ordered in this period and dwt = 0. If there is investment, then we
observe the total (aggregate) deadweight ordered and dwt = f(x; 6), where
x are the exogenous variables. In this case the identification condition is
that the probability of zero investment is equal to the probability that the
auction between the most efficient operator and the most efficient shipyard
is unsuccessful.
Formally the model has the following form:
dwtit = max(3 - xit + eit, 0) (30)
and
Eit ~ N (0, o, ) (31)
It is a standard Tobit I model and it can be estimated by pooled max-
imum likelihood estimation. It is well known that maximum likelihood is
efficient if the specification of normally distributed errors is correct, but in-
consistent if this assumption fails. From the above model the probability of
zero investment is well defined:
P(0, invlxit) = P(eit < -13. Xit) (32)
The following results of the estimation of Eq.(30) are displayed in Table
XII, where the set of exogenous variables xit are the first and fourth lag of the
dependent variable dwt, the first and fourth lag of the real option value (19),
the price of new vessels newprice, the square of the real option value VV,
the lending rate Irate, the accident dummy and the price of oil oil. Finally,
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Table XII Pooled Tobit I Eq.(30)
we include a deadweight category dummy to capture the impact of different
categories on orders.
The results are similar to the results obtained in the previous section. The
value of the project Vai is statistically significant, as well as the price of the
new vessel. The previous first and fourth lag of the ships ordered is significant
as well as the lag of the real option value. The price of oil, the lending rate
and the accident dummy are insignificant. The deadweight coefficient is sta-
tistically insignificant and restores the previous findings. The high number of
counts observed for smaller ships, that accounts for the severe overdispersion
with the count data specification, is not present when investment is measured
in terms of transportation capacity.
A negative finding is that the coefficient of newprice is less than the co-
efficient of Vai, which contradicts the real option markup assumption. By
performing diagnostic tests on the residuals it becomes clear that the "struc-
tural errors" Ect are not normally distributed, which implies that the reported
statistics are too high. Median regression is far more robust to departures
from the assumptions of normality and only requires that med(Elx) = 0. We
perform censored median regression and the derived estimates are displayed
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dwt Coef. Std. Err. t p-0
dwtl .3878 .0459 8.45 0.000
dwt4 .2180 .0472 4.62 0.000
Vopti -.00397 .00151 -2.62 0.009
Vopt4 -.00194 .0010 -1.83 0.067
Val .01216 .00171 7.07 0.000
newprice -.0100 .0038 -2.63 0.009
VV -10.3e-06 5.33e-06 -1.93 0.054
accident -.2174 .1530 -1.42 0.156
Irate -.0217 .0159 -1.37 0.172
oil .0088 .0069 1.27 0.204
dwg -.00047 .00091 -0.52 0.604
cons .0682 .1638 0.42 0.677
Log Likelihood -451
Pseudo R2 0.2729
Table XIII Median Regression
in Table XIII. The coefficient of newprice divided by Vai has a value close to
the one predicted by the real option literature and the previous shortcoming
of the Tobitl is now restored.
Median Regression is not efficient if the errors are normal, but it is still
consistent. This fact allows the performance of a Hausman test, that clearly
rejects the Tobitl specification in favor of the median regression. Median
regression is far more robust to "extreme type structural errors" and diag-
nostic quantile regression reveals that the real option markup is high for low
quantiles, whereas for quantiles close to one the only significant variable,
appears to be the passed lag of the order counts.
3.9 Conclusions
In this Module we have demonstrated that the value of a project as spanned
in complete financial markets is a sufficient statistic for characterizing in-
vestment decisions. In the case of irreversibility and uncertainty the correct
specification for this value is the one expected by the real options literature.
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dwt I Coef. Std.Err. t p-O
dwtl .3782 .0307 12.32 0.000
dwt4 .2379 .0313 7.59 0.000
Vopti -.00197 .00102 -1.93 0.054
Vopt4 -.00336 .00071 -4.73 0.000
Val .00772 .00113 6.80 0.000
newprice -.009200 .00252 -3.65 0.000
VV -1.60e-06 3.56e-06 -0.45 0.653
accident .1007 .1019 0.99 0.323
Irate -.0151 .0103 -1.46 0.144
oil .0081 .0046 1.76 0.080
dwg -.00035 .00060 -0.59 0.559
cons .1068 .1057 1.01 0.313
Min. Sum. Dev. 167.9
Pseudo R 2 0.3269
The value of the project not only has to exceed the investment cost, but also
the option to wait. In the case of the perfect competitive market for new
tankers, the statistical results for the last 22 years have verified both these
hypotheses.
What is more interesting is that there is not much to be gained by as-
suming a time varying real option markup (or equivalently a time varying
"option to invest" value). This implies that new observations on the underly-
ing risk process do not change the market's sentiment on the basic underlying
parameters. Another important observation is the stickiness observed in the
responses of all players in this market. Although economic theory suggests
that shipyards should respond with significant price increases to the demand
for new ships, this is not the case. The volatility of the prices quoted by
the yards is far less than the volatility of the time charter rates and the
value of the project. This imperfection is crucial for our analysis and will be
thoroughly investigated in Paragraph 5.8.
The excess counts and subsequently the significant number of zero counts
are explained by large deviations in the evolution of the V,t variable. In
a perfect competitive market and with frictionless markets, investment op-
portunities with Vpt positive, indicate an arbitrage opportunity that theo-
retically should not exist. Arbitrage opportunities should lead to an excess
demand for new vessels and the shipyards should respond immediately with
high prices for the demanded vessels. However, this is not the case revealed
by our data and the price of new ships is the less volatile variable.
From this point of view the observed "count orders" could correspond to a
dynamic game, where agents in a market react to an "arbitrage opportunity",
subject to the constraints imposed by lenders (bankers) and producers, or
where different type of agents (noise traders, rational investors and interme-
diates) react to different information. The response to these different actions
could result in the observed investment process and a dynamic Markov chain,
or even a Markov chain with regime switching, that could account for the
more "excess" characteristics of our data. Integer valued ARMA models and
pure time series models like the Poisson INAR(1) model (that still correspond
to a Markov chain) could be used in future research. 1
Under the assumption of perfect competition and complete markets the
slow adjustment of the shipyards to the investment process is still a puzzle.
The key explanation to this action is irreversibility and uncertainty, exactly
"For a more detailed discussion see Cameron and Trivedi, p.236
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as predicted by the real options literature. In periods of low time charter
rates and less demand for new vessels, shipyards do not offer investors much
lower prices, because they do not want to exercise the option to wait before
committing capacity. In periods of higher rates they try to keep the produc-
tion rate constant and commit capacity to long term contracts. With this
action they "hedge" their cash flows against periods of very low production
rates. Furthermore, the shipbuilding industry has been heavily subsidized,
due to political implications. Especially in Asia, shipyards have been used
as "instruments" to attract U.S. dollars. This has led to accumulated excess
capacity, which has resulted in the exogeneity of the price of new vessels
and an inelastic supply function. The argument of the exogeneity of prices
of new vessels is not new in Maritime Economics and has been addressed
in the seminal monograph by Zannetos [64]. Due to its central role in the
specification of our newbuilidng module, as well as its effects on the stability
of the system, this issue will be explicitly addressed in Paragraph 5.8.
Under the assumption of frictionless markets agents should respond im-
mediately to positive Vpt. After periods of low rates and negative project
values the response to positive opportunities is not as strong as theory ex-
pects. Since the main source of ship finance is bank finance and long term
charter rates offered by shippers, after periods of long depression, finance is
not always available for indirect investment and occurs only when lenders
have a high real option markup on their collateral.
Irreversibility, uncertainty and intermediaries account for the time lags
between action and response and the slow adjustment to equilibrium, ob-
served in direct investment. Using the value of projects spanned in finan-
cial markets, investment actions are the responses of agents, noise traders,
bankers and suppliers to expected arbitrage profits (or expected positive
Vp). The value of the project as predicted by the real option specifica-
tion is a sufficient benchmark of investment actions for heterogenous agents,
with the structural error accounting for heterogeneity. Integer Valued Count
Models and Simulation Estimators with heterogeneity in the "market price
of risk" in incomplete markets, might shed some more light on the evolution
of the investment process. We shall now proceed with addressing an alterna-
tive framework for the derivation of structural models of entry that will not
rely on the specification of the underlying process. This is necessary, since it
will allow us to employ the estimated models, in order to determine the time
charter rate.
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3.10 An Evolutionary Approach to Entry Decisions
In this section we discuss aggregate newbuilding "birth" models that do not
rely on the specification of the underlying time charter process.
The models of entry proposed in this section are implicitly derived in
a partial equilibrium framework. Agents form their decisions based on an
exogenous time charter rate, that is determined from optimal Lay-Up and
chartering actions. This assumption implies that newbuilding decisions have
no impact on the time charter process, since the newbuilding tonnage is
relatively small compared to the existing tonnage. Furthermore, they pro-
hibit us from employing the derived equations for the determination of the
capacity supply function and the endogenous determination of the equilib-
rium time charter rate. In order to estimate the newbuilding equations in
a structural framework, we have implicitly assumed that the time charter
rate is, loosely speaking, an "input" to the demand for newbuildings. If we
then employ the estimated demand for newbuildings, in order to determine
the transportation supply function and the equilibrium time charter rate,
this is a "philosophical" inconsistency, unless we get the same time charter
rate process, or unless "system input equals output". This is the concept of
a rational expectations equilibrium. In order to avoid the complications of
a rational expectations equilibrium we have to propose alternative schemes
of aggregation. Although the estimation and specification of the model of
orders remains intact, we cannot use the model to determine the equilibrium
time charter rate, unless we introduce an alternative structural framework.
In this section we shall propose some potential "exit strategies" that will
allow us to use the estimated model, without relying on partial or general
equilibrium assumptions.
One way to avoid the cornerstone of the necessary consistency between the
expectations on the underlying process and the actual "outcome", once all
agents have exercised their optimal action plans, is to derive the structural
equations as a function, not of the whole stochastic process, but of
today's value. In order to achieve this goal, we have to avoid the conventional
path of agents who form optimal decisions under uncertainty. The simple
way to get around this problem is to assume rational myopic actions and
aggregate with Laws of Large Numbers.
More specifically let us assume each agent has a value function V (xt) that
depends on some exogenous parameters xt. Let us assume N agents. Agents
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enter once their value function is positive and the process of new orders in
each period is given by:
N
Bt= Z l(V (xt) > 0) (33)
j=1
And if we decompose the value function Vj(xt) = V(xt) + ej then the
process of births becomes equal to:
N
Bt= E l(- < V(xt)) (34)
j=1
If the reduced form V(xt) is a function of the number of agents N it
can be shown that under some regularity assumptions on the distribution of
the structural errors cj, the process Bt converges to a Poisson process, whose
intensity is determined by xt and the distribution of the structural errors. In a
partial equilibrium framework, this approach generates count data models for
the entry decision, consistent with the models we estimated in the previous
sections. One significant drawback of this model is that it does not allow for
convergence to equilibrium and assumes an adhoc specification of the value
function.
A more revolutionary approach is to observe that newbuilding orders
correspond to "births" of new vessels and determine the population dynamics.
Thus, concepts from Evolutionary Biology seem particularly promising for
providing us with an alternative framework for the derivation of structural
equations, that will not depend on the specification of the entire
process, but only on the value of the relevant statistic prevailing
today. Newbuilding orders correspond to "births" of new vessels by the
existing population of agents. The "birth rate" or fertility rate depends on
the available resources for reproduction, which in our case are profits.
Another significant observation, supportive to the evolutionary approach,
is that the number of new orders depends crucially on lags of orders, which
is indicative for the existence of some form of strategic behavior. This ob-
servation violates our frictionless perfect competition assumption. Strategic
behavior in the ordering process may be imposed by shipyards not due to
price competition, but delivery dates of the under construction vessel.
Let us introduce a continuous evolutionary game theory framework for
the analysis of newbuilding decisions. The number of vessels ordered in each
period may be understood as the number of births and the type of each
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new ship, as the body size. Continuous games are those where each player
can choose from an infinite set of strategies over some range; the choice
in our case are the characteristics of the vessel. On the assumption that
the profits earned by the contract that corresponds to each category (the
food consumed is proportionate to body size, coevolution of competition is
often modelled by assuming investors vary ship size as a strategy to escape
competition. Loosely speaking, they choose the size they believe will result
in less competition and consequently higher returns. Ship size is a continuous
strategy since it can take on any value over some reasonable range. The game
of ship choice is played over many generations of investors.
There are three type of factors that influence vessel type choice or the
biology analogy of fitness:
1. Frequency dependent: My frequency depends on what other individuals
are doing. In competition for example if everybody has a draft of 20m
and I come along with a draft of 10m I will be able to access ports
(food) that no else can.
2. Density dependent: My fitness depends on population size.
3. Intrinsic: Fitness (ship size and characteristics) varies purely as a func-
tion of regulation, development and the environment.
Using Hammerstein's streetcar theory of evolution [16] the change of
strategy (for example the strategy is ship tonnage category) is given by the
equation:
aA U = r-W(u, U, Ni) (35)
In the above equation u is the strategy of one individual, U is the strategy
of the rest of the population and N is the evolution of the population. Once
the system reaches an equilibrium the concept of an individual that invests
in ship type u versus the rest of the population who choose U is eliminated.
In equilibrium U* is the dominant strategy and there is no more evolution
of fitness (or different types). Although this approach does not provide any
particular insight into the modelling of the birth and evolution of fitness
(ship choices) it suggests that category effects and previous category choices
should have a significant impact on the evolution process, which is in line
with our findings in the the empirical analysis.
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In a similar framework, models of interacting Metapopulations [16]
seem convenient for modelling the evolution of the population of new vessels
and provide us with some insight into the specification of the process. Con-
sider a large number of K contracts (potentially habitable sites in population
biology), each of which is occupied or unoccupied by an individual investor.
Then we may assume that agents compete to "occupy" the contracts and
the effects of competition result to periods of low orders (lower colonization
rates or higher extinction rates). Huffaker [16] performed some experiments
in order to test the Theory of Metapopulations. His data are very similar
to the data of new orders (births), where periods of very low or even zero
population presence is followed by periods of very high peaks.
The same argument is made by Tong [59] in his classical treatment of
non-linear time series. In his analysis of ecological data, he introduces an
exponential specification for the birth rate, namely b(x) = b - xexp(!),
where x is a physiological condition such as nutrition state (or potential
profits in our case). The exponential specification verified by experiments
in ecology is similar to the specification we derived in our estimation of the
model. The crucial feature of this type of curve is that when population
and resources reach a critical point Nc, the competition for food (profits
and time charter contracts in our case) reduces the average adult fecundity
and the birth rate begins to fall of. Loosely speaking, periods of high rates
(availability of food) result in an increase of the birth of new vessels (fertility).
Newborns consume resources and the availability of food goes down causing a
drop in the fertility rates. Human populations seem to contradict this simple
cycle, since low income populations have higher reproduction rates. But this
is because there are other social issues interrelated with human reproduction,
which are irrelevant in our simple birth model for ships.
This critical threshold type characteristic for the birth curve is preserved
with our exponential Poison specification that assigns a positive probability
of zero reproduction, especially in periods of low availability of resources
(time charter rates in our case). The evolutionary approach to the modelling
of birth rates in a competitive environment is a promising alternative, that
does not require convergence of expectations to the underlying stochastic
process. Future research in this area could provide some valuable insight
into the derivation of birth rates in competitive environments, without the
stringent assumptions of rational equilibria and myopic actions [28] in the
competitive equilibrium. The case of new orders in tanker vessels and the
associated choice of ship type (fitness in the biology framework) reveals some
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striking similarities to the evolution of births observed in biological systems,
especially once we replace physiological variables (available nutrition) with
variables that determine profitability.
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4 Module 2: Exiting the Market and Scrap-
ping Dynamics
Are scrapping decisions exit or capital replacement decisions? In this
section we provide additional motivation to count data models for aggregate
exit decisions with heterogenous agents. In a partial equilibrium framework,
we address the impact of relevant investment variables on the exit process.
4.1 Introduction and Data Analysis
In his influential work "The Theory of Oil Tankship Rates" [64] Zannetos
discusses the factors that result in contraction of transportation supply and
characterizes them as permanent or temporary. In this section we will an-
alyze permanent actions, namely scrapping actions, whereas in the next
section we will analyze temporary contraction of supply, which occurs due to
slowdowns, extended repairs and lay-ups.
Zannetos contradicts Koopman's earlier assertion "that the conditions
which simulate new investment also favor replacement" ([64),p.119). Accord-
ing to his argument "there is no theoretical reason requiring sale or retirement
of a vessel only after an order for its replacement has been placed or the re-
placement itself has been received.. .there is no reason why the placing of an
order or the receipt of a presumed replacement should cause the economic
value of an existing vessel to vanish". Zannetos' argument is in line with the
postulates of neoclassical economics; an agent will exit the market only when
the value of remaining active is below a threshold, which implies that exit
decisions are not necessarily capital replacement decisions. One of
the main aims of this section is to test this assertion.
Zannetos goes one step further and concludes: "We are confident that
data would have refuted such a hypothesis.. .At low rates, when most of the
retirements will take place because of the expiration of the economic value
of vessels, retirements may only reduce existing surpluses." Once we have
derived models for aggregate scrapping data we will formally test the above:
we will namely test the statistical significance of pending orders, which is
expected to be zero and of time charter rates, which should be negative.
Finally, one implication of the above discussion is that age of the fleet has
only an indirect effect on scrapping dynamics. In periods of low rates older
vessels are more likely to be scrapped, since they have a lower economic value,
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due to higher operating costs. In periods of high rates, age is not expected
to have a significant effect on scrapped tonnage. Since the age of the fleet is
not directly observable, we will not be able to test formally this hypothesis,
but only indirectly through the impact of pending orders.
Our main goal is to derive aggregate structural models of scrapping ac-
tivity and test whether scrapping decisions are capital replacement or exit
decisions. Finally we estimate models for aggregate scrapping data with
agent heterogeneity under uncertainty and irreversibility and identify the
relevant variables for decisions of exit. Before proceeding with the aggrega-
tion exercise and model estimation, let us discuss the data in this market.
Regarding the data, the main source is Marsoft, (Boston) Inc.1 3  and
it is the same source used by Dixit and Pindyck [28] in Chapter 7, p. 23 8 .
Marsoft provided the scrapping data (the tonnage scrapped) for tanker ships.
This data set is accurate and precise. The data set is in quarters from
1980 until the third quarter of 2002. This implies that we are given 91
observations for all types of tanker carrier. For this time period the data on
Time Charter Rates are fully available and precise, but NOT the scrapping
prices. The operating costs are fairly straightforward, once the age of each
vessel is known. Since the average age of the fleet is not known, we will
use as a proxy for the operating expenses the same variables we used in the
previous section.
One main characteristic that clearly differentiates the scrapping observa-
tions from the newbuilding observations is that the data set appears to have
threshold-type characteristics, due to the interactions and adverse effects
of the three different forces that drive scrapping decisions. After the 26th
observation the dynamics of the process appear to change and the intuition
behind this pattern is very clear. For the first 26 observations time charter
rates are at historically low levels and economic returns are significantly low
(the market is in a recession; later on we shall make this selection argument
more formal and give a quantitative justification in Appendix D). Low re-
turns indicate that it is more profitable to exit than to remain in the market
and therefore the "exit" effect dominates the scrapping data. Once returns
become significant the pattern of scrapped tonnage dynamics changes signif-
icantly; the "exit effect" becomes less predominant compared to the capital
replacement effect, as well as natural depreciation. However, both series
131 thank Dr. Arie Sterling, President of Marsoft, and Kevin Hazel for providing the
data.
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Figure2: Tonnage Scrapped 1980-2002(q)
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have a natural scrapping trend clearly interrelated to the obsolescence
of the fleet. In the bear-market regime the trend is higher and decisions
due to the exit effect exhibit higher volatility, whereas in the bull-market
regime the trend is lower and exit decisions are less volatile, or outbalanced
by capital replacement decisions. Our main task will be to develop structural
models that will be sympathetic to the empirical facts demonstrated by the
data.
4.2 Model IV: A Model of Heterogenous Agents
We now proceed with the presentation of aggregate models for exit deci-
sions or scrapping decisions in the tanker industry. Staying in line with
our previous analysis we assume perfect competition, which implies that the
number of exits has no impact on profitability and the exogenous time char-
ter rate is explicitly determined by the charter and lay-up decisions agents
undertake. Our analysis is similar to Module 1; however, one important
complication is that scrapping data and prices do not exist for each cate-
gory and therefore we are forced to work with aggregate data across cate-
gories. The limitations imposed by the data will not allow us to perform
an empirical test on the Real Option markup hypothesis; however based on
the proposed aggregate models we shall address issues of economic behavior
with homogenous and heterogenous agents. Besides proposing alternative
structural models of exit, based on the "Bottom-Up" approach, we will test
the relevance of "q-type" explanatory variables on decisions of exit and the
Zannetos' assertion.
In order to remain consistent to our previous analysis we shall work within
the same framework. The number of scrapped vessels in each category is
assumed to follow a Poisson process and consequently the sum across all
categories is the sum of Poisson processes and follows a Poisson process, too
(Appendix B). We shall now derive the dynamics of the aggregate scrapped
tonnage and then we shall discuss the structural specification of the intensity
of the Poisson process, which depends on the level of market completeness
we adopt, the expectations of agents and the law of motion for the popula-
tion of agents. For the five different categories we use the following Poisson
specification, namely:
5
Dsc,(t, t + T) E Dj,(t,t+T) P(At)
j=1
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In the above specification Dscr(t, t + T) denotes the number of vessels
scrapped for all categories between t and t + T and At denotes the intensity
of the Poisson process (22).
We now proceed with the structural framework that determines the in-
tensity of the process. In both models we shall assume complete markets
that span the Real Option threshold value of exit. The main drawback in
this specification is that we do not have quoted prices for scrapped vessels.
This implies that we cannot derive the Real Option value, neither use the
scrapping price in the explanatory variables. Instead, we are forced to use
instruments for the scrapping price, whose validity we cannot test, since
scrapping prices are unavailable. This complication reduces the structure
of the specification; however, we shall provide additional motivation for the
count data models we introduced in the first module.
Staying in line with the partial equilibrium model we developed for the
characterization of entry decisions, we assume n agents, whose probability of
exiting or staying in the market is fully determined by the structural error,
the value of staying in the market under a charter rate (Vtay) and the value of
scrapping the vessel (V1exit) and foregoing the revenues from the spot market
and the option to wait. This probability of remaining in the market, under
the assumption of type I structural errors, is given by:
exp(Vstay)
Sexp( Veit) + exp(Vtay)
We now proceed with the following aggregation scheme that will provide
us with additional motivation for the count data models with homogenous
intensity. Let us now consider a somehow different approach with heteroge-
nous agents, that under the assumption of complete markets, will result to
the same multiplicative specification of the intensity in the number of agents.
We assume n heterogenous agents with exponential utility and we supress
the index j hereafter. We assume that each agent has a value Veq for which
he is willing to sell his vessel in the second hand market. The utility from
this value is then equal to the expected utility from remaining in the market
and operating the vessel:
- exp(-Veq)= EU(V) = 7rexitU(Vexit) + irstayU(Vtay) -> (37)
Furthermore, we assume that the number of vessels each agent scraps
follows a Poisson process with intensity A and the probability of no exit,
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which equals the probability of staying in the market for each agent, is given
by:
7rstay = exp(-A) (38)
exp(-Ve)exp(Vexit) exp(-Vexit)+ exp(-ptay)(-V
exp(Vxit) + exp(Vtay) exp(Vexit) + exp(Vtay) stay) #
(39)
exp(-Ve) = 2 -exp(-A) exp(-Vstay) =>
A = ln 2+ Veq - Vtay (42)
The intensity of the scrapping process is equal to the difference between
the price of the vessel and the value of operating the vessel under a long term
contract, whilst foregoing the option to scrap1 4 . Since there exist organized
markets for the second hand price of vessels, we assume that Veq is the price
of the vessel in the market and it is the same for all agents. Furthermore, the
value from staying in the market under a long term contract and foregoing
the option to scrap is fully determined by the long term contracts. Under the
exponential specification and these mild assumptions on market complete-
ness, we obtain the same specification for the aggregate intensity; namely
the conditional mean is multiplicative in the number of agents without
imposing the homogenous probability Bernoulli assumption.
The key conclusion of this simple model of heterogenous agents is that un-
der the existence of organized markets and convergence of beliefs, investor
heterogeneity does not have a significant impact and the intensity remains
multiplicative in the number of agents. In this section we stay in line with
our previous module of entry and assume that agents considering scrapping
decisions, arrive with a Poisson process P(An). In the next section we shall
demonstrate that unlike investor heterogeneity, the evolution of the popula-
tion of the number of agents n is crucial to the specification of this model.
4The intensity determined by an agent with an exponential utility coincides with the
intensity we derive in Appendix D by using a first order approximation. The exponential
utility assumption is replaced by convergence of expectations.
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Before proceeding with the estimation of our count data models, let us
discuss the motivation behind the choice of the exogenous variables in the
specification of the intensity. The tanker sector has always been considered
as a paradigm for perfect competition with three main incentives to exit the
tanker market: The first and most important is the pure exit decision, where
the value of exiting the market exceeds the value of staying and operating,
as well as the option to wait. The second reason is capital replacement,
whereas the third reason, which is clearly interrelated to the "demographics"
of the fleet, is physical depreciation and technical obsolescence. The impact
of these three different forces on the dynamics of scrapped tonnage will not
be uniquely determined.
We now proceed with the estimation of the model, with Y the aggregate
number of vessels scrapped at period t and Xt the set of the exogenous
variables. We estimate the Poisson specification by Maximum Likelihood,
namely:
Y ~ P(At -A,), At - An = exp(Xt -4) (43)
The Poisson specification implies that the conditional mean (which is E[Yt|Xt =
exp(Xj - 0)) is equal to the conditional variance, which is a restrictive as-
sumption. The therefore estimate the model with Non-Linear Least Squares,
namely:
Y = exp(X - #) + et, Et ~ N(O, a2 ) (44)
We now perform the estimation of the the model, which is a Poisson
model with the standard exponential specification for the intensity and we
include the following exogenous variables for Xt:
" tci and opi (deadweight weighted indices of the time charter rate and
operating expenses for each category) from the reduced form of Vtay
" the existing tonnage fleet, as a proxy for the rate of physical depreci-
ation
" new the pending tonnage on order, as proxy for capital replacement
decisions
* scrk lags of the dependent variable scr
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Table XIVa: Model IV
* oil, spoil as instruments for the unobserved market price of scrap and
an index for air transportation air, for the same reasons we explained
in Paragraph 3.8. Finally we include a time trend.
We shall now include one more "q-type" variable which will turn out
to be a proxy for the prices of second hand vessels, especially in Chapter
6. According to the Marshallian rule of investment[281, under certainty the
ratio tcrate-opex is the yield of the investment and investment should only be
undertaken, if this yield exceeds the risk free rate. The inverse of this yield
is a proxy for the time needed to recover capital and it is similar to the P/E
ratio used in finance. This ratio will be named capital replacement ratio (crt
hereafter) and will be included in the set of regressors. We now proceed with
estimating (43, 44) and display the results in Table XIVa-b.
The Likelihood of the Quasi Maximum Likelihood Estimate has a value
of LPQMLE = -145.9 and a Pseudo - R2 = 0.2495, which is particularly low,
whereas the Wald statistic for the joint statistical significance of the coeffi-
cients is 221.04 and accepts the specification with probability one. For the
Non - Linear Least Squares model the Log Pseudo - Likelihood is LNLLS =
-157.1 and the Pearson statistic is 2.31, which is relatively close to one.
Before analyzing and discussing the results we perform additional specifica-
tion tests. We perform a Hausman [35] test between the two models and
the test has a X 2(9) = 0.44, which implies we should not reject the model.
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Model PQMLE Eq.(43) NLLS Eq.(44)
scri .0204 (.030) .0090 (.0407)
scr2 .1069 (.025) .0770 (.0239)
tci -.0000214 (.0000126) -.0000268 (.0000149)
opi .0002094 (.0001052) .0001714 (.0001123)
crt .00815 (.00457) .00674 (.00397)
new -.0488 (.0320) -.0552 (.0396)
fleet .000942 (.0063) -.000899 (.0080)
oil .00837 (.0152) .01248 (.0193)
spoil -.00596 (.0043) -.00649 (.0046)
air .00168 (.0014) .00162 (.0018)
time -.00396 (.0114) -.00237 (.0137)
cons -.4063 (1.527) .5927 (1.992)
Table XIVb: Model IV
However, by inspecting the residuals, the model clearly fails to fit the data
and it systematically underpredicts the scrapped tonnage, especially for the
first 26 observations, where tonnage activity is really high. What is even
more puzzling is that the model predicts the correct sign of the innovations
scrt - scrti for 24 out of the 26 first observations, whereas it clearly fails to
predict the scrapped tonnage. For the subsequent observations, the model
does much better in predicting the scrapped tonnage, but clearly fails to
assign the correct sign to the predicted innovations.
In our previous results we included two lagged endogenous variables in
the regressors, which under autocorrelated errors will lead to inconsistency.
To account for this source of endogeneity we include the two lags of the
estimated residuals in the regressors and repeat the estimation of Eq.(43)
and Eq.(44). Results are displayed in Table XIVb.
Only in the Poisson Quasi Maximum Likelihood estimation the second
lag of the residual appears statistically significant; however we perform a
Hausman [35] test and the test has a X'(9) = 0.44, which still implies we
should not reject the model. Although the model is incapable of fitting the
data, all coefficients have the right sign; it fails to account for the volatil-
ity displayed by the data, especially for the first 26 observations. In order
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Model [PQMLE Eq.(43) NLLS Eq.(44)
scri -.0277 (.2151) .0747 (.2669)
scr2 .3939 (.1534) .344 (.2771)
uresi .0272 (.2348) -.0952 (.2910)
ures2 -. 3215 (.1611) -.3018 (.3042)
tci -.0000218 (.0000116) -.0000184 (.0000152)
opi .0002208 (.0001132) 0002096 (.0001132)
crt .00564 (.00454) .00530 (.00403)
new -. 0536 (.0359) -.0675 (.0530)
fleet .00259 (.0055) -.00051 (.0073)
oil .00234 (.0140) .0086 (.0172)
spoil -. 00841 (.0050) -.00998 (.0058)
air .00142 (.0014) .00162 (.0017)
time -. 00384 (.0110) -.00578 (.0129)
cons -. 6741 (1.329) .4333 (1.684)
Table XV: Model IV
Model NBQMLE OLS
scr .0204 (.0301) -.0111 (.1116)
scr2 .1070 (.0252) .3556 (.0925)
tci -.0000214 (.0000126) -.0000731 (.0000386)
opi .000210 (.000105) .0003771 (.000358)
crt .0082 (.0046) .0546 (.0215)
new -.0488 (.0320) -.1039 (.0665)
fleet .00094 (.00623) .0002 (.0239)
oil .0084 (.0152) .0296 (.0467)
spoil -.0060 (.0043) -.0156 (.0109)
air .0018 (.0014) .0048 (.0050)
time -.0040 (.0114) .0116 (.0437)
cons -.4063 (1.527) -.4864 (5.629)
R2 .2145 .6660
to allow for overdispersion of the data we estimate the Negative Binomial
Model that does not impose equality between the conditional mean and the
conditional variance1 5 , as well as Ordinary Least Squares.
Although the Negative Binomial model does not improve our results sig-
nificantly, what seems encouraging for the exponential specification is the
fact that all regressors have the right sign, in line with Investment Theory:
The tcrate has a negative effect on exit decisions (low rates result in higher
exit rates), opex has a strong positive effect, implying that operating costs
are far more significant for the exit decision than income, crt has a posi-
tive effect, since higher capital replacement periods make the industry less
attractive and finally pending orders new have a negative impact, which im-
plies that exit decisions in this industry are not due to capital replacement.
Finally, the constant appears statistically insignificant for all specifications.
Having completed specification and estimation let us now discuss our re-
sults. Although the count data models survive the various specification test,
we are still facing two significant drawbacks: On the one hand the models
seem unable to predict the large exit decisions, especially in the periods of
low rates. On the other hand, one structural implication of the above specifi-
"
5In the Negative Binomial specification, the conditional variance is equal to the condi-
tional mean times a factor greater than one.
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cation is that the coefficients of tci and opi have to be equal, which is clearly
violated by the results presented in Table XIV. We shall now try to relax
some of the assumptions of our model, in order to induce more volatility and
avoid the restrictive assumptions on the process of agents.
78
4.3 Model V: Equilibrium Models of Exit
In this section we assume heterogenous agents with a different distribution
for the evolution of the number of agents n.
We remain now in line with our previous analysis; namely heterogenous
agents who scrap their vessels according to a Poisson process. We adopt one
simplification and assume that the difference between the second hand value
of the vessel and the value of staying in the market and fixing it under a
long term contract (this difference is equal to the option to wait) is constant
and does not vary with time. This implies that the aggregate Poisson (22)
intensity is constant and will be denoted A hereafter. We go one step further
and assume the following reduced form specification for the endogenous
evolution of agents in this industry:
dNt = Nt - N (Nt)dt + Nt - UN(Nt)dWt (45)
And in a simpler form, the above population equation admits the factor
representation:
1
N= exp(C -Xt) (46)
A
where Xt is the state vector of all exogenous variables and summarizes all
the uncertainty regarding the dynamics of the population. We assume that
Xt evolves according to the following Stochastic Differential Equation:
dXt = px(X) -dt + ax(X) - dWt  (47)
Then we can express the terms PN 0, UN() in terms of px and ox simply
by applying Ito's Lemma [28]. Our heterogenous agents model can now be
written in compact form:
E[YtINt] = exp(C -Xt) (48)
with Xt the Markov process that summarizes all the factors that determine
the evolution of agents:
dXt = px(X) -dt + ax(X) -dWt  (49)
We consider estimation of the model:
Y = exp(C -Xt) (50)
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where Xt is an Ito process that admits a discrete time Markov process ap-
proximation:
Xt = A -Xt-1 + B - vt, vt ~ N(, o,2) (51)
At this point we should note that Dixit and Pindyck ([28], p.268) derive
this specification in a general equilibrium framework. They assume that the
state variable Xt is firm specific uncertainty and any one firm's inverse de-
mand curve becomes P = XD(Q). They then construct a two-stage general
equilibrium model with Q active firms, N new entrants and an exogenous
exit rate A. In equilibrium the exit flow of firms is multiplicative in N ([28],
p.276):
A Q = NF(x*) (52)
x* depends on the statistics of uncertainty and both x* and Q are determined
in equilibrium by the activation condition and the free entry condition. Then
the number of new entrants N is determined in equilibrium by the last equa-
tion. If we assume that instead of A, N is exogenous, then the Dixit and
Pindyck general equilibrium model is equivalent to the multi-factor Markov
model introduced in this section, at least from an estimation point of view. In
our equilibrium model of heterogenous agents and in the Dixit and Pindyck
model of firm heterogeneity the exit rate is multiplicative in the number of
agents N. If the number of agents N follows a Markovian process (as implied
by the equilibrium) then taking the logarithm of Y, (Y = A - Q) the above
specification implies that there is a unique Autoregressive Moving Average
Process of order p, q1 (ARMA(p,q)) specification for the dependent variable
yt = ln(Yt). A rigorous proof of this result is given by Tong [59]. Having
specified the ARMA process we can then solve for the parameters of the state
variable Xt and the parameters of the population dynamics, consequently.
The dimension of the ARMA process depends on the number of factors that
determine the evolution of N; namely the exogenous factors in Vsiay, VIexit.
In our analysis, we shall assume four explanatory variables, namely the time
charter rate, the operating costs, existing fleet and the capital recovery rate.
Although the ARMA process could had been well specified beforehand (due
to Wold's Theorem [59]) this structural derivation provides a hintful insight
16
p q
Yt = arLj -ytj + X' -0 + E maLk -Etk, Et ~ N(O, o 2 ) (53)
j=1 k=O
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Table XVI ARMA(2,4) Eq.(53) Regression
Inscrap [ Coef. Std.Err. z p-0
tci -.0000327 .0000104 -3.16 0.002
opi .0002185 .0001097 1.99 0.046
crt .0093303 .0096151 0.97 0.332
fleet .0046969 .006889 0.68 0.495
cst -1.556678 2.856471 -0.54 0.586
arL1 -.0818781 .0874084 -0.94 0.349
arL2 .8449426 .0844727 10.00 0.000
maLl .3953347 .0959368 4.12 0.000
maL2 -.1644294 .1216234 -1.35 0.176
maL3 -.0225011 .1015424 -0.22 0.825
maL4 -.1701627 .1197236 -1.42 0.155
sigma .6212577 .1393909 4.46 0.000
into the structural interpretation of the parameters as well as to where the
volatility stems from and has an equilibrium interpretation in this setting.
After estimating several parametrizations we conclude to the specifica-
tion of an ARMA(p = 2, q = 4) (53) with tci, crt, opi and fleet included
in the regressors Xt. Under the ARMA(4, 4) specification, due to the rep-
resentation theorem, all the exogenous variables should appear statistically
insignificant, which is the case indeed. However, we choose to include them
in the regressors and include a smaller number of lags than population fac-
tors, since this allows us to control for their impact on the scrapping process
and test their significance. Results of the estimation of (53) are displayed in
Table XVI.
The Log pseudo-likelihood is L = -86.51 and the cumulative periodogram
white-noise test for the residuals has a Bartlett statistic B = 0.4732 and does
not reject for the 0.05 confidence level. The above specification is efficient,
if the selection of the MA terms is correct, but inconsistent if the number of
MA terms is different than q = 4, or if the errors are non-linear. To account
for a misspecification of the distribution of errors we proceed by estimating
the model with the Double Two Stage Least Absolute Deviations Estima-
tor (D2SLAD) as proposed in the seminal paper of Amemiya [4]. We use
as instruments for the estimation the fifth and sixth lag of the dependent
variable inscrap and the results are displayed in Table XVII. The coefficients
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Table XVII D2SLAD AR(2) Estimation [4]
Inscrap I Coef. Std.Err. z p-0
q1 -. 731826 .293291 -2.50 0.015
q2 1.184666 .2439871 4.86 0.000
tci -. 0000364 .0000205 -1.77 0.080
opi .00023 .0000809 2.84 0.006
crt .0120658 .0132641 0.91 0.366
fleet .0058475 .0060778 0.96 0.339
cst -2.253896 1.452131 -1.55 0.125
Pseudo R2 0.4004
of the exogenous variables appear to be in line with the ARMA estimation
and the Hausman specification test [36] is X2(4) = 0.03 which strongly sug-
gests we should not reject the null; namely the ARMA(2,4) specification.
Finally, from a theoretical point of view it seems particularly interesting to
examine the performance of the D2SLAD estimator for ARMA processes as
well as the optimal IV moment conditions for this estimator. In this setting
the Hausman specification test can provide us with a powerful tool for the
selection of the model.
Before concluding we estimate the model by using the classical Two Stage
Least Squares (2SLS) 17 estimator ([37]) with the fifth and sixth lag of the
dependent variable as instruments for the first and second lag. Results are
displayed in Table XVIII (where Lagl and Lag2 refer to the first two lags
of the dependent variable) and all coefficients are in line with the previous
estimates.
In line with our previous argument, 2SLS is consistent, as long as the
error term is uncorrelated with the instruments, namely the fifth and sixth
lag, but inefficient if the model is indeed ARMA(2,4). This leaves space for
a Hausman specification test that yields a value X 2(4) = 2.35 and slightly
rejects the null. Overall, different estimation methods are supportive to the
ARMA(2,4) specification. The ARMA(2,4) results suggest that the particu-
lar combination of lags is not a cause of endogeneity. We therefore perform
17
/2SLS = (X'Z(Z'Z)-'Z'X )-(X'Z(Z'Z)- 1 Z'y)
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Table XVIII IV 2SLS AR(2) Estimation
Inscrap Coef. Std.Err. z p-0
Lagi -. 152339 .329644 -0.46 0.645
Lag2 .8784917 .2319875 3.79 0.000
tci -.000023 .0000106 -2.17 0.033
opi .0001688 .0000859 1.97 0.053
crt .0073308 .0114263 0.64 0.523
fleet .0052652 .0041309 1.27 0.206
cst -2.139099 1.154969 -1.85 0.068
R2= .6244 Root MSE= .72939 F(6,78)=15.21
Ordinary Least Squares estimation of the model and perform a Hausman
test with the Instrumental Variable 2SLS ([37]) estimator and the test is
X2 (2) = 2.36 which slightly rejects the exogeneity hypothesis. Finally for
the OLS estimation the R2 =0.6819 and the Mean Squared Error is Root
MSE=0.656.
Having completed the specification and estimation of our model of scrapped
tonnage let us discuss the results. All coefficients of the exogenous variables
Xj are in line with economic theory. The level of time charter rates has a
negative effect on scrapping decisions, since higher rates provide less moti-
vation for scrapping a vessel, whereas operating expenses have an adverse
positive effect on scrapping decisions. Finally the total fleet appears to have
no impact on scrapping dynamics.
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4.4 Conclusions
In this section we have proposed structural models for the exit (scrapping)
data in the tanker market industry. Besides providing a good fit to the data
we have proposed models that are supportive to the following:
1) Under the existence of an organized market for the asset and conver-
gence of the expectations of heterogenous agents, heterogeneity has found to
have no direct impact on the specification of the model. On the other hand,
the evolution of the number of agents, considering scrapping decisions, has
turned out to be critical for the specification of the model.
2) Operating costs appear statistically more significant than operating
revenues for the exit decision. Furthermore, existing tonnage and pending
orders appear to have no significant effect on the scrapping process, which
implies that exit decisions in this industry are mainly not due to capital
replacement. This contradicts the earlier hypothesis of Koopmans and to
the knowledge of the author this is the first study that provides supportive
empirical evidence to the Zannetos assertion, discussed in the introduction.
3) Models with less structure than partial equilibrium models (like the
one derived in Dixit and Pindyck, Chapter 8 [28]) appear to have more
explanatory power. Simple Markov factor models seem more flexible and
sympathetic to exit dynamics, in this industry at least. However, all the
proposed models have a Markovian representation and correspond to the
existence of an equilibrium. This will be particular useful in the next section,
where these models will be employed in order to determine the transportation
supply function.
Concluding this section and having identified the underlying forces be-
hind exit and entry dynamics we may now proceed with our ultimate goal,
namely the identification and estimation of time charter rate models. In
summary we may verify one more of the assertions of Zannetos [64] in his
classical monograph: "Retirements of vessels are negatively correlated with
rates and for this reason are equilibrating. To the extent that they are quan-
titatively insignificant however, the retirements have not caused in the past,
and are not expected in the future to cause sufficient contraction in the supply
schedules to restore equilibrium in a depressed market." Although scrapping
and newbuilding dynamics are both stabilizing factors (in the contrast with
newbuilding prices, as it will be demonstrated later on) they do not suffice to
restore equilibrium and the task we will undertake in the following section is
the estimation and specification of a Lay-Up function that on the one hand
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will be consistent with Economic Theory and on the other hand will provide
us with a consistent "tool" for the modelling of time charter rates.
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5 Module 3: Structural Time Charter Rates
"Naturally, each owner hopes that all the others will tie up their vessels first;
but as soon as some major owner loses hope and starts extensive tie-ups, all
the rest take this as an indication of extended depression and, paradoxically,
do likewise, even though they originally started with a 'let someone else do
it' attitude. ", (Zannetos [64], p.144).
Having completed the estimation and specification of the mass of entry
and exit with heterogenous competitive investors, we can now proceed with
the most ambitious task: namely the determination of the transportation
supply framework and the market clearing equilibrium time charter rate.
The first study that determines a structural equilibrium rate is the 1971
model of Jack Devanney [20]. Devanney characterizes optimal marine in-
vestment decisions under uncertainty and using a representative agent, he
specifies a quantitative framework for calculating equilibrium rates. Both
the approaches we undertake are inherent in Devanney's work: the first one
is the Rational Expectations General Equilibrium approach and the second
one is the Engineering type approach or System Dynamics approach.
Taking the Rational Equilibrium approach with infinite living firms and
no entry and exit, we assume that entry and exit decisions "cancel off" and
have no impact on the formation of the time charter rates (prices). Al-
though our previous findings clearly contradict this assumption, new orders
and scrapped vessels constitute only a small fraction of the existing active
fleet. Therefore, by assuming they cancel off, we forego their non-linear effects
on the system, in order to achieve tractability and closed form solutions. Ad-
land [3] estimates non-Markovian specifications for the time charter process
and finds supportive evidence for such models. It is likely indeed, that the
non-Markovian nature in Adland's models is due to the non-linear feedback
effects of construction lags between new orders and deliveries. Furthermore,
from the early literature in Maritime Economics it is well acknowledged that
retirements do not cause sufficient contraction in the supply function ([64],
p.126), which is clearly not the case for new vessels. Solving for a Rational
Equilibrium with Lay-Up, Entry and Exit simultaneously, is very complicated
and we therefore assume that scrapping and newbuilding decisions "cancel
off" and propose a simple rational expectations framework with heterogenous
agents and no entry or exit decisions. The model is introduced in 5.2 and
corresponds to a Markov model for the innovation of prices. Specification and
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estimation follows in 5.3. The Rational Equilibrium approach is self-content,
since it does not rely on the previous modules and provides us with a simple
Markovian model for price dynamics, with a structural economic interpre-
tation for the parameters. Although Adland [3] finds supportive empirical
evidence for non-Markovian specifications, which result from the non-linear
effects on construction lags and other contraction factors, such as repairs and
slowdowns, there are two significant drawbacks in his approach: First, there
is no structural economic framework for these models and second they do
not allow us to control for exogenous events.
The Engineering or System Dynamics approach sacrifices some of the
structural assumptions and the rationality of expectations, in order to allow
for a better visualization of the supply function and provide us with more
tools for controlling exogenous events. In this setting we use the entry and
exit equations we estimated in the previous modules for the determination of
the transportation supply function. After estimating the Lay-Up function in
5.1 and 5.4 we bring supply to demand and derive the time charter rate. The
system dynamics approach allows us to control for several events and provides
a very intuitive framework for business applications. The main drawback is
that there is a "philosophical" inconsistency: Estimation of the previous two
modules has been performed on the assumption of an exogenous time charter
rate (price). We are now employing these equations in order to determine
the price we previously considered exogenous.
Although the second approach violates the principles of Economic The-
ory, one would think it is bound to provide a much better explanation to
price formation, due to its complicated structure. As it will turn out the
simple Markovian models that correspond to a Rational Equilibrium after
all, will provide a much simpler and better fit to price dynamics. This is one
more indication of the power of the ideas of Neoclassical Economic Theory
and suggests why these models have been so abundant the last 25 years,
enjoying far more success compared to any engineering type approach to the
modelling of complex systems. Although non-Markovian models [3] or com-
plex system dynamics models correspond to a more realistic representation
of non-linear phenomena, such as construction lags and scrapping, their over-
parameterization, on the one hand reduces the power of the model and on
the other hand increases the propagation of errors through the system. Sim-
ple Markovian models require estimation of very few parameters and have a
unique economic interpretation.
Before proceeding with the description and estimation of the models, we
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have to remind the reader of two crucial facts that are applicable in the
tanker market and reduce the complexity of the problem significantly. On
the one hand the tanker market is perfectly competitive, where "each ship
is the firm" and on the other hand, demand is derived from the demand
for oil and therefore it is completely exogenous. In this Module demand is
completely exogenous and once more, Marsoft was kind enough to provide
the necessary data for the period 1980-2002, quarterly.
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5.1 Lay - Up: A Feedback Mechanism
The Lay-Up process is a significant capacity adjustment mechanism that
operators can employ, when exercising their option of temporary suspending
operation. In periods of low economic returns, when the value from operating
the vessel is less than the cost of temporary suspension and the option to
wait, operators may Lay-Up some of their capacity. This gives them the
option to wait before deciding to commit their vessels at low rates for a
long period. The value of this option has not been recognized in the early
literature. In his classical monograph Zannetos ([64], p. 148) wonders "why
do they (owners) wait months before they decide to tie-up their vessels it is
difficult to understand. Many of the voyages undertaken during depressed
periods barely yield over out-of-pocket minus initial tie-up cost." In this
section we will specify a model for aggregate scrapping data. However, due
to lack of data we will not be able to test the Theory or the Model; instead
we will estimate an aggregate scrapping function and then employ the system
dynamics approach to calibrate the scrapping for each category.
The intuition behind the model we propose is the following: the value
of having vessels in Lay-Up status, stems from "the option of waiting"; in
periods of low returns, each agent decides to keep some capacity in Lay-Up
status with the expectation to achieve higher economic returns in subsequent
periods.
We proceed with our analysis within the basic assumptions of our model:
we assume that each owner decides the capacity in Lay-Up status optimally
and independently from his other actions, whereas the time charter process
is assumed independent and exogenous. We assume each agent maximizes
his value function at each period and following the discussion in our previous
two modules the result is the exponential specification model, using the same
reasoning as in 4.2 and 4.3 with the value of exiting Vexit replaced by the value
of waiting in Lay-Up.
Unfortunately there are no category specific data available for the ton-
nage in Lay-Up in each period. Since we do not need to determine the
Lay-Up function for the specification of time charter rates (prices) in the
general equilibrium framework (both prices and capacity will be determined
endogenously), we only need the specification for the system dynamics ap-
proach. Therefore, we will work backwards: instead of specifying the Lay-Up
function a priori (which is impossible, due to the lack of data) we will solve
the inverse problem: namely choose the function that optimizes the perfor-
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Table XIX-XX Module 3: Lay Up Sub-Module
lay Coef. Std.Err. z p-0
Linear (55) R2 = 0.9605 MSE= 2.6416
layl .3120859 .1163104 2.68 0.010
itci 1131.664 268.6553 4.21 0.000
opi -.6154064 .3903409 -1.58 0.121
fleet .1375468 .0449575 3.06 0.004
cons -32.51883 12.251 -2.65 0.011
Exponential (44) Log L= -136.21025 Pearson= 7.788
layl .0082943 .0024281 3.42 0.001
itci 28.96685 4.399429 6.58 0.000
tci -.009425 .0061836 -1.52 0.127
opi -.1183389 .0239284 -4.95 0.000
fleet .0051974 .0014438 3.60 0.000
cons 1.666984 .5313913 3.14 0.002
Poisson QMLE (43) Pseudo R2 = 0.6008 Log L=-136.37883
layl .014042 .0049969 2.81 0.005
itci 25.80664 8.833191 2.92 0.003
tci -.009425 .0061836 -1.52 0.127
opi -.1124957 .0227551 -4.94 0.000
fleet .0061776 .0016009 3.86 0.000
cons 1.062377 .5420046 1.96 0.050
mance of the system for each category. This will be our task in 5.4. We
now proceed with the econometric estimation and specification of aggregate
tonnage in Lay-Up and compare the exponential model with the quantita-
tive relationship proposed by Zannetos ([64], p.155), based on his 1945-1958
data set. The data set employed in this section is from Clarksons and from
1980 - 2003.
Following the same lines of argument with 4.2 we estimate the following
exponential specification, where Y is the tonnage in Lay-Up and Xt are the
exogenous variables:
(54)
For the estimation of (54) we use NLLS (44) and PQMLE (43). Finally, we
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E[Yt] = exp(Xt'-,3)
stay in line with the analysis by Zannetos and estimate his linear parametric
form; namely:
Y = X' - + Et, ct ~ N(0, oa2) (55)
Results of estimating (54) and (55) are displayed in TableXIX - XX
where we use as exogenous, explanatory variables the following X':
" lay is the dependent variable (tonnage in Lay-Up)
" layl the first lag
" tci and opi are the category weighted time charter and operating ex-
penses indices
" itci is the inverse square of tci
* fleet is the total fleet
The results are in line with the basic economic principles, since the ton-
nage in lay-up is decreasing in time charter rates and operating expenses and
increases with the size of the fleet. To verify our findings, we finally conduct
a Hausman specification test [36] between the Poisson QMLE and the Ex-
ponential Mean specification and the test is X6 = 1.60 and does not reject
the exponential mean specification. This analysis concludes this section and
having verified the exponential mean suggested in our previous two modules
and in the seminal monograph of Zannetos ([641, p.155), we proceed with
the estimation and derivation of structural time charter rates. At this point
we should remind the reader that as with the scrapping data, the lay-up
function has been derived based on aggregate data and it will be part of the
System Dynamics "calibration" to identify the appropriate shares of tonnage
in lay-up for each specific category.
5.2 Rational Expectations Equilibrium: A Structural
Framework for Time Charter Dynamics
The aim of this section will be to provide a structural framework for the
existing diffusion-type time charter models, in the framework of a competitive
general equilibrium. We remain in line with our basic assumptions, namely
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the exogeneity of the time charter process with respect to entry and exit
decisions.
The main task will be the derivation of the dynamics of the time charter
process in a Rational General Equilibrium framework that will allow us a
structural interpretation to the vast majority of statistical models employed
for the statistical modelling of the time charter rates.18 Let as assume n
agents, where each agent maximizes the discounted sum of his profits with a
discount factor 3:
00 00
max E ~1 7rit_1 = max Eptyit - c(yt - yt_1) 2  (56)
t=1 t=1
Hereafter, 7r denotes profits, pt is the time charter rate for period t, t + 1,
y denotes transportation capacity employed (which may be adjusted through
lay-up actions or velocity adjustments) and c is the cost of adjusting capacity.
Costs of adjusting capacity depend on the choice of speed, vessel utilization
ratio and the days spent at sea. They are clearly interrelated to the no-
tion of fleet productivity that we will explicitly define and estimate later on
in our analysis. However, as it will become apparent, the calculation of c
is not required in this framework and we will avoid plugging in any value,
by deriving a reduced parametric form for the price process. (The inverse
problem of backing up c from the parameters of the price process is what
economists name "solving for the competitive equilibrium", which is irrel-
evant to the pursuit of our goals and is left as a very interesting topic for
further research.) Finally Y stands for the aggregate capacity in this mar-
ket, which corresponds to the active fleet multiplied with the average velocity.
By assuming perfect foresight each agent solves his Dynamic Programming
Problem:
V(yit, Y) = max[pt+1yit+l -- C(Yit+ - yit) 2 + / V(yit+1 , Yt+ 1)] (57)
and we assume the following law of motion for the dynamics of aggregate
fleet capacity in this market:
Yt+1 = H(Y) (58)
Plugging into the Dynamic Programming Problem we get:
18This model is the same as the one discussed in [54], Chapter 6.
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V(yit, Y) = max[pt+jyit+1 - c(yit+i - Yit) 2 + / -V(yit+i, H(Yt))]
We then make the following assumption on pricing:
P = ao - a1 - Y (60)
By plugging in once more we obtain the optimal policy for agent i:
yit+1 = h(yit, Yt) (61)
And if we assume n homogenous operators with the same discount factors,
then:
n
Yt+1 yit+1 = nh(yt, Y) = H(Y) (62)
This implies the following structural equation for prices:
pt+i = ceo - a1H(ao - a1pt) (63)
What becomes apparent from this analysis, is that even in this relatively
simple Rational Expectations Equilibrium model, the resulting structural
time charter (price) process turns out to be very complicated and non-linear.
Before proceeding with specification and estimation of the time charter pro-
cess, it becomes apparent that the competitive equilibrium framework gener-
ates Markov processes, since pt+i depends only on pt. This contradicts recent
empirical findings in this field of research (see Adland [3] for non-Markovian
models), that one may attribute to non-linear dynamics in this industry, due
to construction lags and scrapping activity. Although non-Markovian mod-
els seem more realistic, it turns out that the equilibrium models proposed
in this section and estimated in 5.3, are far more powerful than complicated
models that allow for feedback, as the one estimated in 5.4 and finally, they
lack the structural economic framework. The main drawback of these statis-
tical models is that they do not allow for controlling external events in the
demand side and suffer from Lucas' critique: Let us assume that we use a
statistical model in order to evaluate a new policy. Under the new policy
agents have a different dynamic programming problem and consequently a
different optimal policy which results in a different process. Therefore, using
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the statistical model to evaluate the outcomes of new policies may eventually
result into biased outcomes.
At this point we should stress that the tanker market industry is a unique
paradigm that satisfies most of the assumptions of general equilibrium mod-
els. The ship is the firm, owners can adjust capacity instantly by Lay-Up or
speed adjustment and the demand is exogenous. These facts open the road
for a rational expectations equilibrium model and the associated specification
of price (time charter) dynamics.
The model we propose in this section is Townsend's [60] model, which
on the one hand allows for investors to make "forecasts on the forecasts"
of others and on the other hand allows us a structural interpretation to the
standard linear time series models for time charter rates. For an excellent
survey on these models in Maritime Economics see Kavussanos. [41]
We shall now enrich the structure of our model by accounting for het-
erogenous agents similar to the Townsend [60] model. The main implication
of this model will be that prices (the time charter process) follow an ARMA
process, which will correspond to a discrete time approximation of a diffusion
process and allows a structural interpretation of the ARMA parameters of
the process. However backing up the parameters of the process (or solving
for the general equilibrium) is beyond the scope of this thesis and is left for
further research. Solving for the structural parameters is crucial, since it
allow us to perform simulations and model policy shifts.
Following Townsend [60] we assume the set of i = 1, 1 for the different
tanker types and a continuum of firms in each market i, where each firm has
a transportation supply function of the form:
y = fok' (64)
kt is the capacity of the firm at time t after choosing Lay-Up or other ca-
pacity adjustments and we assume a linear "production function" that de-
termines transportation supply in terms of tonnes times miles. Each market
is confronted with an exogenous linear demand schedule, which is buffeted
by persistent shocks and transitory shocks with the transitory independent
across markets and the persistent component is common.
The decision problem confronting each firm is the neoclassical firm's prob-
lem, where profits are maximized over time and firms choose their optimal
levels of capacity in deadweight. Shipping firms choose a sequence of contin-
gent plans for their capacity and maximize discounted profits:
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S 2 - 2 (65)
t=O
Here E0 denotes the expectations conditioned on the information Qt,
available to each firm at time t. Firms maximize their expected profits,
namely transportation supply times charter rates Pt, minus a term for "long-
run" decreasing returns to scale and an adjustment cost, due to Lay-Up, slow
steaming or scrapping.
A typical firm solves the Dynamic Programming and determines its op-
timal policy, which is a mapping from the space of information to the space
of actions:
k = kT4 1(Q|) (66)
The information set includes current and passed values of capacity and
prices and the specification of the structure of information and information
sharing has a crucial impact on the model. The "difficulty" of solving for
the optimal policy is due to the fact that agents have to make assumptions
on the statistics of the price process. After making their optimal decisions
and undertaking optimal actions, the generated outcome of prices has to be
consistent with their assumptions. This is the notion of a Rational Expec-
tations Equilibrium; namely expectations converge to the true underlying
process and prices are endogenously determined. By skipping entry and exit
decisions we are confronted with solving for an equilibrium under capacity
adjustment costs. Once we include a more detailed transportation function
and account for entry and exit decisions (as it will be the case in 5.4) we lose
this property of the self-consistency of the price process, with the ultimate
hope to achieve a richer framework for our model.
Although it is beyond the scope of this Thesis to discuss the definition
of rational expectations equilibria and solve for the structural parameters we
give an informal definition of a dynamic linear equilibrium with rational, but
possibly disparate expectations, in line with the 1983 Townsend model [60].
Agents assume a linear relationship between time charter rates (Pt) and
total capacity (Kt) for each market i:
Pt = Ot + Et - b1f0Kt, Et - N(0, o2) (67)
and an aggregate law of motion for capacity (total fleet capacity) in each
market i:
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Kt+1 = h1K + h2 Mt
where 6 is the unobservable that generates uncertainty in demand:
Ot+j = P~t + ut+1, ut - N(0, o 2 ) (69)
and Mt = E(OtIQ) is the aggregate estimator of the unobservable parameter
0, conditonal on the set of available information at time t, based on which
agents form their forecasts.
Assuming linear forecasting formulas for 6 t+s in each market i and the firm
specific laws of motion for the capital stock in each market i:
k"= gikz + g2 Kt + g 3Mt (70)
Townsend [60] proves that (67), (68) and (70) are a solution of (65), which
implies that based on (67), (68) and (70), kt is an optimal policy that is
consistent to the laws of motion for Kt, Mt and Pt. It must be noted here
that the above definition is very sensitive to the specification of the state
space of the available information set Qt, with respect to which agents form
their expectations. Given statistically correct forecasts determining Mt it
turns out that the law of motion for aggregate fleet capacity is:
.fo-Y1#pMtKt+1 = 7K'1K + f2 (71)f2(1 - 71j#p)
At this point we have reached our goal. Combining (67) and (71) it be-
comes apparent that from the Markovian representation Theorem ([59]) the
price process admits an ARMA (53) representation, where the parameters
of the ARMA process have a structural interpretation. Regardless of the
formation of forecasts and the interaction of information structures, rational
expectations models have a Markovian state space representation. Following
the representation Theorem (see Tong for a proof [59]) it is well established
that these models have a finite ARMA representation. To account for richer
structures of learning and filtering we assume that volatility admits a Marko-
vian representation, too. As a result the entire specification of the process
belongs to the GARCH family.
In this section we have provided a structural framework for the iden-
tification and specification of Markovian models for time charter processes
(prices). The Tanker Industry satisfies most of the necessary assumptions of
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Rational Expectations Equilibrium Models, once we are prepared to forego
"feedback" effects of construction times and scrapping decisions. By propos-
ing a general equilibrium framework we provide a structural interpretation
into the estimated parameters and challenge Economic Theory with a unique
industry for the implementation of rational equilibria models. The full task
is left for further research in the field. We now proceed with identifying and
estimating GARCH models for the time charter process, in line with the
work by Kavussanos [41]. We take this work one step further by including
"control variates" in the volatility specification and compare the model with
the outcome of the system dynamics approach in 5.4.
5.3 GARCH Models for Time Charter Rates Revisited
GARCH [29] models for time charter rate modelling are not new in Mar-
itime Economics. Kavussanos [41] was the first to introduce these models
and has an excellent review in the recently published Handbook of Maritime
Economics and Business [41]. Adland [3] goes one step further and estimates
one factor diffusion processes for the time charter rates, using non-parametric
methods. Although he claims these models seem more appropriate for time
charter modelling, he does not really depart from the (G)ARCH [29] specifi-
cation, since it is well known that the limit of a (G)ARCH process is a diffu-
sion process. Furthermore, the diffusion specification does not allow control
for exogenous shifts and does not have a clear economic interpretation in
this setting. Adland [3] goes one step further by estimating non-Markovian
models. Although these models provide a better statistical fit, they have no
economic interpretation. Furthermore, Adland [3] employs these models to
derive option prices in this industry, which is inconsistent, since it is well
known that non-Markovian processes violate the "No-Arbitrage" principle.
The contribution of this approach is twofold. On the one hand we have
proposed a structural competitive equilibrium framework for an ARMA spec-
ification of the time charter rate and on the other hand we estimate an E-
GARCH specification [29], in order to compare it with the system dynamics
approach that follows in 5.4. In our model we include some exogenous vari-
ables in the mean, in order to allow for controls to exogenous shifts in the
transportation demand and structure patterns. Finally we estimate a full
model with common coefficients for all categories and a category effect and
perform specification tests to determine model choice and selection.
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Table XXIa EGARCH Eq.(72) Category Specific
D.tcrate 200K 140K 90K
D.dmd 141.2303 (5.41) 33.32992 (1.25) -54.07486 (-1.21)
D.oil -43.33327 (-1.50) 28.66992 (7.42) 17.54504 (1.03)
D.air 1.898793 (0.25) -4.968332 (-3.79)) 5.867934 (5.62)
cst 436.9023 (7.99) 329.041 (3.28) 213.2873 (2.79)
arLI -.1369706 (-1.41) .5913442 (2.64) -. 698012 (-3.34)
arL2 .7476088 (7.01) -. 191612 (-1.09) -.0507881 (-0.31)
maLl -.2789064 (-2.89) -. 3290286 (-1.33) 1.299079 (7.88)
maL2 -.6873644 (-8.85) .3033841 (2.24) .5481894 (4.64)
hetoil .0801924 (2.15) .2489624 (4.85) n.a.
hetair .0074299 (2.22) -.01578 (-2.65) n.a.
hetcst 14.9645 (85.22) 5.304335 (3.25) 1.836747 (1.44)
earchLl .2326598 (1.28) -. 6749507 (-2.92) -.0943001 (-0.46)
earchL2 .1197455 (0.85) 1.350995 (5.12) .3393986 (1.61)
earchaLl -.0904995 (-0.29) .7973006 (1.86) .5818458 (1.69)
earchaL2 1.851378 (6.78) .4256043 (1.07) .7703161 (1.60)
egarchL1 .2214109 (2.05) .1117651 (1.36) 1.002537 (3.39)
egarchL2 -. 1815302 (-1.83) .4925325 (4.91) -. 1315213 (-0.42)
Portmanteu (Q) Statistic= 25.4331 27.2467 38.5793
LogL -833.3258 -742.62 -761.1517
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Table XXIb EGARCH Eq.(72) Category Specific
D.tcrate 70K 30K
D.dmd 175.1661 (6.19) 30.46509 (1.31)
D.oil -40.81963 (-7.38) -13.90432 (-4.33)
D.air -5.432436 (-8.43) 3.237825 (3.56)
cst 105.8723 (6.34) 70.0575 (2.04)
arL1 .2650564 (2.47) .2743948 (2.68)
arL2 .0348373 (0.38) -.4471913 (-5.05)
maLl -. 1749011 (-1.61) .3277954 (4.19)
maL2 -.2299142 (-2.18) .6126087 (13.09)
hetoil .0149307 (0.67) -.008494 (-0.24)
hetair -.0165257 (-4.24) -.0034418 (-1.42)
hetest 14.45358 (72.42) 5.305832 (2.06)
earchLl .2758082 (1.95) .2195905 (0.87)
earchL2 -. 1695445 (-0.76) -.642163 (-1.76)
earchaLl .2771507 (1.31) -.446263 (-1.31)
earchaL2 2.456648 (9.04) 2.966821 (5.30)
egarchLl .2486424 (3.84) .2992776 (2.15)
egarchL2 -.3398756 (-4.88) .2637244 (1.48)
Portmanteu (Q) Statistic= 21.0528 46.0650
LogL -733.4231 -701.5889
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Table XXII EGARCH Eq.(72) Full System
D.tcrate Coef. Std.Err. z p-0
D.dmd 26.68532 9.859361 2.71 0.007
D.oil -6.114392 5.200239 -1.18 0.240
D.air 2.102692 .7528104 2.79 0.005
cat 2.381073 1.00944 2.36 0.018
cst 80.41757 103.1651 0.78 0.436
arL1 -.1741156 .2083539 -0.84 0.403
arL2 .3122444 .1346323 2.32 0.020
maLl .5392456 .2113437 2.55 0.011
maL2 .0092492 .1159338 0.08 0.936
hetoil -.0005653 .0069262 -0.08 0.935
hetair -.0030327 .0006501 -4.67 0.000
hetcat .0006398 .0001605 3.99 0.000
hetest .6729367 .1318034 5.11 0.000
earchL1 .198154 .0414593 4.78 0.000
earchL2 -.1886759 .0482094 -3.91 0.000
earchaLl .6155819 .0768264 8.01 0.000
earchaL2 -.3615577 .1097607 -3.29 0.001
egarchLl 1.75096 .0650815 26.90 0.000
egarchL2 -.8019969 .0604445 -13.27 0.000
LogL 1 -3856.066
The models we estimate hereafter are EGARCH 19 models as defined in
([29], p.10-11) where the dependent variable is the first difference (denoted
D. hereafter) of the time charter rate and the set of exogenous variables Xt'
19
p q
Yt = arLj -yt-j + X' - 3 + 1: maLk -Et-k, Et~ N(O, 0,)t
j=1 k=O
(72)
and
p q
In = earchLj -In o2 + Zt' . het actors + E egarchLk -Zt-k, Zt ~ N(0, U 2 )
j=1 k=0
(73)
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are the first differences of:
" dmd the demand for tonnage
" oil the price of oil
* air the air transportation index
In Tables XIa-b we estimate the above specification for each specific
category, whereas in Table XII we estimate the Full Model and account
for differences across categories, by using a deadweight dummy cat in the
regressors X'. At this point we should note that unlike Chapter 3 we do not
report standard errors in the parentheses, but t-statistics.
The Full System EGARCH specification implies that there is no endo-
geneity between the error and the endogenous lagged variables, since the
first lag of the endogenous variable and the second lag of the disturbance
appear statistically insignificant. In order to further test this specification
we perform linear regression on the factors (demand for oil, air and tonnage
demand) and the two lags of the endogenous variable and compare the results
with the instrumented variables estimator, which remains consistent under
the loss of exogeneity. We then perform a Hausman [36] test between the
two estimators that clearly does not reject the null. This provides us fur-
ther supportive evidence for our choice of the order of the model. We finally
perform a Hausman test between the efficient EGARCH specification (which
is inconsistent under a misspecified order of the error component) and the
Fixed Effects specification (Table XXIII), which is X'(4) = 2.85 and slightly
rejects the EGARCH specification. The power of the test is questionable in
this setting and although it rejects the null it is indicative that the discrep-
ancy between the two models is not totally inadmissible, from an empirical
point of view.
Although the Full System EGARCH specification provides a very good fit
to the data and the estimated coefficients are in line with economic theory,
there is still some doubt as to the specification of the model. We therefore
employ quantile regression, in order to perform a final specification test. Our
results are displayed in Table XXIV and are not supportive of the EGARCH
specification (equality of coefficients across quantiles is not rejected), but to
the ARMA specification, which is a subclass of EGARCH. This empirical
founding seems a contradiction, but might be attributed to finite sample
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Table XXIII EGARCH Specification Tests
D.tcrate I Fixed Effects. IV Fixed Effects
D.dmd 105.3288 (49.6602) 466.451 (429.961)
D.oil -12.95621 (42.07292) -115.0315 (214.0735)
D.air 1.449658 (4.60636) -15.20672 (26.67828)
cst 38.38965 (168.6543) 181.9107 (771.723)
arL1 -.1583706 (.0467406) -3.599837 (3.598272)
arL2 .1678794 (.0466096) -2.966071 (3.103768)
R2 Within 0.0727
R2 Between 0.7152 0.9611
R2 Overall 0.0723 0.0060
Hausman Statistic X x(5) 1.03
bias or the biased estimation of the bootstrapped standard errors. However,
since the EGARCH specification encompasses the ARCH class and since
the diagnostic tests reject the ARCH specification in favor of EGARCH,
we conclude our empirical modelling in this section and proceed with the
System Dynamics approach. Having estimated the statistical model for time
charter rates we proceed with an economic discussion of the results and the
differences between the category specific models and the full system model.
We will revert to the statistical specification in 5.7 where we will combine
all models, for the first time in System Modelling, in order to evaluate the
forecasting performance of mixed strategies.
The Full System specification is supportive of the fact that the market
for all tankers is not the same, as first proposed by Glen and Martin in their
recent chapter in the Handbook of Maritime Economics. What is partic-
ularly interesting is that the category variable is positive and statistically
significant, which implies that time charter innovations are higher for larger
categories. This finding indicates that returns are higher for larger cate-
gories, perhaps due to the higher level of concentration of market power in
larger categories. Glen and Martin attribute the distinctness to the nature
of ships as financial assets and the presence of some degree of differentiation
in the market. However it seems more appropriate to view the differences in
volatility and returns in different tanker sectors, due to the different levels of
market concentration in the different sectors. Intuition suggests that mar-
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Table XXIV Quantile Regression Specification Tests
dtcr I Coef. Std.Err. z p-0
Quantile 0.30 Pseudo R2 0.0354
dtcl .0155286 .2177214 0.07 0.943
dtc2 .1967912 .1742905 1.13 0.259
ddmd 64.79136 52.58403 1.23 0.219
doil -9.014069 14.00159 -0.64 0.520
dair -.2557242 4.633931 -0.06 0.956
est -336.2624 68.11856 -4.94 0.000
Quantile 0.50 Pseudo R2 0.0369
dtcl .0554697 .163911 0.34 0.735
dtc2 .1535424 .1521358 1.01 0.313
ddmd 48.54745 37.02594 1.31 0.190
doil -25.19109 11.90087 -2.12 0.035
dair -.8643211 3.956634 -0.22 0.827
cst 85.5907 41.37934 2.07 0.039
Quantile 0.70 Pseudo R 2 0.0352
dtcl .0405127 .1664556 0.24 0.808
dtc2 .1421057 .1702656 0.83 0.404
ddmd 32.45365 33.82148 0.96 0.338
doil -22.65734 11.99547 -1.89 0.060
dair -1.020277 3.29403 -0.31 0.757
est 484.8732 80.93843 5.99 0.000
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ket concentration is an increasing function of transportation capacity, due to
abundant capital requirements and wide-scale uncertainty on the outcome of
the investment. Our empirical findings, namely the positive category coeffi-
cient cat and the positive constant cst in TableXXII, support the assertion
that returns to larger categories are higher. Finally, the parameters of the
specification depend crucially on the structure of operating costs across dif-
ferent sizes. Another potential explanation is that higher returns for larger
vessels are due to economies of scale. It is now clear that heterogeneity
across categories is due to these two different forces and it still remains un-
clear where heterogeneity stems from. However, the final argument made by
Glen and Martin, that namely the segments of the tanker sector cannot be
viewed as independent, needs to be further investigated and is not supported
by the Full model.
5.4 Busdyn@: The System Dynamics Approach and
Implications for Structural Processes
In the previous section we discussed the strong implications imposed by gen-
eral equilibria on the dynamics of the price process. We discussed the problem
of self-consistency and presented rational expectations equilibria models,
that provide us with a consistent framework for the existing time charter
rate models, such as the statistical models in [41]. We went one step fur-
ther and re-estimated these models, allowing for some control factors. In
this section we take a different approach, by sacrificing the assumption of a
general equilibrium, where the derived price process is consistent with the
one rational agents assume. We maintain the assumption of independence of
actions; however, all the structural framework we employed for deriving exit
and entry decisions is not valid any more and requires some modification, in
order to allow us the usage of the structural equations derived in the previ-
ous sections. In our exit and entry analysis we assumed an exogenous time
charter process and derived the mass of newcomers and leavers, based on the
dynamics of this process.
In this section we shall use the mass of new firms and exiting firms, as
well as the lay-up dynamics, in order to determine the transportation supply
function, which determines the spot price and consequently the short term
time charter price once set equal to demand. From this highly nonlinear
approach it is obvious that the dynamics of the time charter process will be
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inconsistent with the process assumed, in order to derive entry, exit and lay-
up decisions in the partial equilibria. Namely, we pay the price of losing the
structural framework of our analysis with the hope to achieve more complex
feedback mechanisms, as well as a more realistic description of price dynam-
ics. This is a system theoretic approach that allows us some control on the
input of the system, which in this case is the exogenous demand for trans-
portation capacity. The drawback of this approach is that it is subject to
Lucas' critique: rational agents in equilibrium should respond to exogenous
shifts and update their supply of capacity. By using the equations of new
vessels, scrapped vessels and lay-up, in order to determine the transportation
supply function, we do not take into account optimal reactions of agents to
external shifts.
Although the framework of classic Economic Theory is very complicated
for the derivation of a Rational Expectations Equilibrium with ordering,
scrapping and lay-up decisions, we can still assume that the equations we
derived in our previous analysis, once coupled all together, may yield reliable
and more business oriented price estimates. Furthermore, not everything is
lost by the loss of our equilibrium framework: The close connection of the
birth and death of firms (ships) to the dynamics of populations, leaves still
some space open for the derivation of structural equations by using Laws
of Large Numbers and models used in Evolutionary Biology, similar to
the evolutionary models introduced in 3.10 . Finally, the partial equilib-
rium models with heterogenous agents resulted in an exponential specifica-
tion which was statistically verified in Module I and Module II, as well as the
Lay-Up specification in 5.1 and may still hold without strong implications
for the time charter process.
In this section we proceed as follows: We use the equations we derived in
the previous sections in order to determine the transportation supply func-
tion (with an adjustment for velocity and fleet productivity) and then use
as an input to the system the historical values of demand for 1980-2002. We
force the system to reach equilibrium and we calculate the equilibrium time
charter rate. We then compare in a probabilistic sense this result with our
results, as well as with the observed outcomes. Our main goal is to "com-
pare" the statistical models presented and estimated in the previous section
with the System Dynamics models we discuss hereafter. As it will become
apparent later on, the System Dynamics approach is a relatively determin-
istic approach, where uncertainty has no particular role. In section 5.7 we
evaluate hybrid models that combine System Dynamics with statistical mod-
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els. Finally we discuss filtering techniques that can make the system more
robust and incorporate the notations of learning and updating into the
system input-output approach.
Our main goal is to avoid the derivation of a competitive equilibrium,
where the whole stochastic process is determined endogenously as a fixed
point of the system, but preserve some structure that will justify the valid-
ity of our estimation in the previous two modules. In order to avoid the
search for a fixed point in the functional space of processes, we aim to the
derivation of structural equations that depend only on the current value of
the variable, which is then determined endogenously by the outcome of the
system. Furthermore, we want structural equations that take into account
heterogeneity and competition, without the restrictions imposed by rational
expectations competitive equilibria.
Before we proceed with the specification and estimation of the system let
us discuss some alternative approaches that will allow us to use the equations
that were derived based on an exogenous time charter rate, to determine the
rate expost. In order to use the equations for the mass of entry and exiting
firms we have to make some small changes in our analysis. Regarding the exit
decisions, we recall the assumption that in a competitive equilibrium each
firm can act myopically ([28], p.336). We further assume that each firm acts
myopically and that the premia offered by the shippers make the statistical
estimation non-degenerate, by introducing the structural error. We then stick
with the most efficient operator, but instead of using the Real Option formula
we simply assume a reduced form for the value function of the agent, which
is the outcome to the myopic solution of his dynamic programming problem.
Under the prisma of this approach, we may well then use as newbuilding
equation, the model we estimated in Chapter 3. If we are not satisfied with
the myopic action approach we may use the evolutionary approach proposed
in 3.10, which does not require the notion of an equilibrium and relies only
on Laws of Large Numbers. In line with our previous discussion we use as
scrapping equation the model estimated in Chapter 4.
In order to make this section as self contained as possible let us present
the newbuilding and scrapping equation we will use in our system for the
category of 200.OOODWT. In the working paper [26] Dikos et. al. present
the equations for all categories, which are available in the Busdyn@dExcellTM
version of the model upon request. For the period 1980-2002 we use the model
derived in Chapter 4 for the scrapped tonnage in each quarter:
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5 -yt = ao + aiyt1 + a2t-2 + 01tcrate + / 2opex +33f leet + 4new + nt (74)
Where yt is the In of the scrapped deadweight in each periods, Yt-1, Yt-2
are the two lags and tcrate is the time charter rate, opex the annualized op-
erating expenses, fleet the total deadweight of the fleet and crt the expected
capital replacement time. The structure of the stochastic innovation is:
77t = 'YOt + 71t-1 + 72t-2 + 73 6 t-3 + Vt (75)
The coefficients are estimated with the techniques we discussed in the
estimation of the scrapping module, where a structural interpretation of the
estimated parameters was provided. The coefficients are reported in the
Module 2: Scrapping Flow. We now proceed with modelling the orders in
new vessels. Instead of using the results of Chapter 3, we re-estimate the
model only for the category of 200.OOODWT, based on the specification we
derived in Chapter 3. The results are displayed in Module 1: Newbuilding
Flow. We now combine new orders and scrapped tonnage with the existing
fleet and bring the total supply function to demand; by equating both, we
determine the equilibrium time charter rate. We assume no specific functions
for construction lag, lay-up or velocity adjustments for the transportation
supply function. Later on we shall choose the parameters for these non-
linear correction mechanisms, in order to optimize the performance of the
system. Due to the absence of reliable data on construction lags, lay-up and
velocity adjustments, we shall take these effects into account, in a way that
will allow us to increase the performance of the system. We shall use the
functional forms proposed in 5.1, but determine the parameters that optimize
the performance of the system, endogenously. Let us now proceed with
some discussion on the system dynamics approach to the implementation
of equilibrium time charter modelling.
The most important task, before proceeding with the structural determi-
nation of the time charter rate, is the precise definition of the transportation
supply and demand function. In this section we shall follow very closely
the notation and discussion in the classical "Maritime Economics" [58] au-
thoritative tome by Martin Stopford. Stopford discusses a similar model for
the determination of the short term time charter rate, with perfect foresight
107
Table XXV Category 200K Module 1: Ordering Flow Eq.(27)
DWT200ships I Coef. Std.Err. z p-0
shipi .0523926 .0152012 3.45 0.001
ship4 .0268763 .0149868 1.79 0.073
Vopt .0105514 .0037807 2.79 0.005
VV -.0000118 .0000109 -1.08 0.281
tc2 -1.65e-10 3.90e-10 -0.42 0.672
accident -.939874 .284901 -3.30 0.001
Irate -.1256983 .06114 -2.06 0.040
oil .0033014 .0155313 0.21 0.832
cnst 2.115132 .5120404 4.13 0.000
alpha .3340101 .1061391
Table XXVI Category 200K Module 2: Scrapping Flow Eq.(74)
Inscrap I Coef. Std.Err. z p-0
tcrate -.0000327 .0000104 -3.16 0.002
opex .0002185 .0001097 1.99 0.046
crt .0093303 .0096151 0.97 0.332
fleet .0046969 .006889 0.68 0.495
alphao -1.556678 2.856471 -0.54 0.586
alphal -.0818781 .0874084 -0.94 0.349
alpha2 .8449426 .0844727 10.00 0.000
gamma0 .3953347 .0959368 4.12 0.000
gammal -.1644294 .1216234 -1.35 0.176
gamma2 -.0225011 .1015424 -0.22 0.825
gamma3 -. 1701627 .1197236 -1.42 0.155
sigmav .6212577 .1393909 4.46 0.000
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and no structural interpretation into submodules. However, once we have
derived the exit and entry equations from first principles under uncertainty
and derived the aggregate functions, the determination of the equilibrium
price is in the same spirit with the model discussed in Stopford. The most
crucial aspect is that demand and supply do not solely depend on the avail-
able deadweight or tonnage, but also on the average haul that goods have
to be transported. A ton of oil transported from the Middle East to West-
ern Europe via the Cape generates two or three times as much demand for
sea transport as the same tonnage of oil shipped from Libya to Marseilles.
This distance effect corresponds to the average haul which explains why
sea transport demand and supply is measured in ton-miles. Following the
definition by Stopford [58] it is "the tonnage of cargo shipped, multiplied by
the average distance over which it is transported." The effect of changes in
the average haul on ship demand is dramatic and significant movements in
spot and time charter prices are often due to political events that have a
direct effect on the average haul. A recent example with a severe impact on
the haul is the Iraq war.
On the supply side, although the fleet is fixed in terms of deadweight or
tonnage, the productivity with which the ships are used determines the
transportation supply function. Tanker productivity adds an element of flex-
ibility to the specification of the transportation supply function, but it is
impossible to measure it directly since there are no available data on pro-
ductivity. Most of our efforts in identifying the system will be devoted to
the specification of an appropriate productivity function. All the equations
and notation in this section are presented and discussed by Stopford [58]
in his "Introduction to Ship Market Modelling". ([581, p.515) Although the
equilibrium modelling of ship markets is inherent in the pioneering Zannetos
monograph, to the knowledge of the author, this Thesis is the first study
that derives the aggregate equations based on micro foundations and solid
economic assumptions. Although the specification of the specific submodels
depends crucially on the advances in Economic Theory, the key idea between
the supply and demand modelling of spot and short term charter rates, re-
mains unchanged. In the previous sections we have employed the most ad-
vanced methods for the specification and estimation of the entry and exit
submodules that determine the tonnage supply function; in this section we
combine all "isolated" decisions that determine the supply function and try
to identify the quantitative relation with demand. The philosophy of the
model is visualized in Figure 3, whereas a table of the inputs and outputs of
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each sub-module and the full system is attached.
In the previous sections and in 5.1 we have discussed specification and
estimation of the three sub-modules that constitute the active tonnage in
each period. In this section we shall discuss the main adjusting mechanism
of transportation supply in ton-miles; namely the notion of the average
productivity of the fleet. In the entire Thesis demand will be considered
exogenous and in this section, demand in ton-miles, is the input of the system.
Let us now proceed with the precise definition of the average productivity
of fleet, which will turn out to be a key factor for the modelling of the price
process. We will then devote the next two sections to the calibration of the
model and the estimation of the output. Staying consistent with Stopford's
notation let Pt stand for productivity at time t, St the average operating
speed per hour, LDt the loaded days at sea per annum, DWUt the deadweight
utilization and rt the time charter rate. Then:
Pt(rt) = 24 -St(rt) - LDt(rt) . DWUt (76)
Then the transportation supply function becomes:
SSt(rt) = AMF(rt) -Pt(rt)
The transportation supply function in ton-miles is denoted SSt, the active
merchant fleet AMF, the average haul AHt and the tons of cargo transported
in time period CT. The active merchant fleet is equal to the existing fleet the
previous period, plus any new deliveries, minus scrapped tonnage and ves-
sels in lay-up. Practically, leaving economics aside, the previous two sections
have been devoted the the estimation of the active merchant fleet. There-
fore, in the full system we shall use the equations derived in the previous
two Modules, in order to determine the active merchant fleet endogenously
as a function of the time charter rate. What complicates our analysis sig-
nificantly is that we do not have data both on productivity, as well as on
category-specific tonnage in lay-up. Finally the equilibrium time charter
rate is determined in equilibrium by equating supply SSt(rt) with demand
DDt, where demand is measured in ton-miles and is assumed completely
exogenous. Then:
SSt(rt) = DDt (78)
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We have now two options: We can make assumptions on the productiv-
ity and lay-up functions and solve for the time charter rate process or we
can use the time charter data and calculate the required productivity and
lay-up that keeps the system in equilibrium. In the System Dynamics ap-
proach we are facing a problem of system identification. In the next section
we solve the inverse problem. We assume that the system namely is in
equilibrium and solve for the theoretical productivity and lay-up required.
Let us now proceed with estimation, specification and identification of
the system. Before presenting the results we present a unified approach to
the "problem" of freight rate modelling.
5.5 System Identification
In the previous section we introduced the System Dynamics approach to
freight rate modelling and discussed the construction of the structural sup-
ply function, based on our earlier results. We then introduced the notion of
average productivity of the fleet and defined precisely the associated vari-
ables.
The key problem we are dealing with, once integrating each module to-
wards a complete system, is a problem of System Identification. Due to lack
of reliable data we are unable to construct the productivity adjusting mech-
anism and category specific Lay-Up module ex ante. We are facing a typical
problem of System Identification and Specification. Economic The-
ory and intuition has helped us reduce the dimensionality and complexity of
the problem. Furthermore it has provided us with valuable insight into the
parametric specification of the submodules. More specifically:
We suppress the time index and assume an exogenous demand
DD
in ton-miles, which has been kindly provided by Marsoft, (Boston) Inc. and
the demand data in the book of Martin Stopford [58]. Then, the key equation
that determines the time charter rate r is the one that relates supply
SS(r, x)
with demand (x stands for the vector of all exogenous variables hereafter,
such as operating expenses opex and all other "system inputs" described in
the previous sections and explicitly in Figure 3):
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T(SS(r, x), DD) = 0 (79)
Furthermore, supply is determined by the active merchant fleet (tonnes)
times the average productivity of the fleet, as defined in the previous section:
SS(r, x) = AMF(r, x) - P(r, x) (80)
And finally, the innovation of AMF each period is determined by the
new deliveries N(r, x), the scrapped levels Sc(r, x) and the tonnage in lay-up
Lay(r, x) :
AMFti (r, x) = AMF(r, x) + N(r, x) - Sc(r, x) - Lay(r, x) (81)
We are facing a non linear problem with three unknowns and three equa-
tions. What complicates the problem is that our unknowns are functions,
namely: the fraction of the lay-up function Lay(r, x) for each category20 7
the productivity P(r, x) and the functional relation T between supply and
demand. As it will turn out the complexity of the system will depend on the
dimensionality of the P function, whose order will determine the degrees of
freedom of the system.
Following our usual strategy we will start our analysis by employing in-
tuition and economic theory, in order to reduce the dimensionality of the
system. We will start with the lowest possible dimension, which in our case
corresponds to the simplest functional relationships.
Regarding the P function that determines the relationship between supply
and demand, we choose the simplest form, which stems from the neoclassi-
cal assumption that requires markets to clear and "demands" that supply is
equal to demand. This specification contradicts the discussion in the seminal
monograph by Zannetos ((64], Chapter 8), where Zannetos speculates that
the price (spot and time charter) generating mechanism is far more com-
plicated than equality, due to the "Cobweb" Theorem and the elasticity of
expectations. At this point the reader may question the ability of the system
to generate such volatile price outputs (hereafter price stands for the spot
and time charter rate), since the input of the system (demand) is far less
20 Although in 5.1 we derived the Lay-Up function for aggregate data the task of deriving
the fraction for each category lies still ahead
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volatile and relatively stable. As it will turn out, market clearing modelling
of prices will be sufficient for the specification of the system.
We now proceed with our second unknown, namely the lay-up function.
Using the principle of similarity we will assume that the parametric form of
the lay-up function is the same across categories. The optimal fraction of lay-
up assigned to each category is chosen by employing simulation techniques.
The algorithm we use in order to calibrate the system will be thoroughly
discussed, once we have addressed the final and most crucial unknown, which
is the average productivity of the fleet.
The final and most crucial unknown is the function of productivity. Stop-
ford ([58], Appendix 1) derives average fleet productivity based on the pre-
vious assumption of market clearing (supply equals demand). There are two
significant problems with the numbers presented by Stopford: on the one
hand these numbers are annual, which does not leave them enough space to
account for the volatility observed in each quarter, and on the other hand
they are averaged across categories. However, Stopford's data are not entirely
meaningless: we will use them to determine the parametric form between pro-
ductivity and prices and then choose the parameters that optimize system
performance for each specific category, by simulation.
Having discussed the assumptions and shortcuts we undertake let us now
present the "calibration" algorithm. First of all, we consider hereafter three
different categories, mainly due to data limitations: The first one is 10 -60K
DWT, the second 70 - 140K and the last one is 200 + K DWT. Based on our
previous discussion the average merchant fleet is determined by the recursive
state equation:
AMFt , (r,x) = AMFt,j(r,x) + Nj(r,x) - Scj(r,x) - Lay(r,x;3#) (82)
The newbuildings Nj (r, x) are given by the function determined in Chap-
ter 3 (Module 1), the scrapped tonnage Scj(r, x) by the equation derived in
Chapter 4 (Module 2) and the tonnage in lay-up status by the parametric
specification derived in Paragraph 5.1, which is known up to the parameter
13, where j stands for the three different categories. Furthermore, the produc-
tivity function is determined parametrically from the Stopford productivity
data set, up to some unknown parameter Oj. Since the productivity function
is the main "device" that adds the necessary volatility to the price generating
mechanism, estimation and specification of will be discussed thoroughly in
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the next section. Finally, the estimated F rate is determined in equilibrium
by solving the equation:
AMFj (F, x) - P(F, x, 0j) = DDt (83)
In order to choose the parameters /3 j, 0 optimally for each category and
calibrate the system (within the sample) we use as input the real prices ob-
served in our data set and choose the parameters that minimize the mean
squared error between supply and demand. Since it is very difficult to solve
the non-linear optimization problem we employ simulation methods to esti-
mate the unknown parameters. The simulation methods and the associated
calibration of the model are part of the PowersimTM and Excel1TM version
of the System Dynamics time charter model, which is available upon request.
The calibration process is essential but not particularly interesting. What
remains a little bit subtle, though has the highest impact on the outcome
of the model, is the specification of the parametric form of average produc-
tivity. The next section will be devoted to the derivation of the parametric
form of the average productivity and the presentation of the outcome of the
calibrated system.
5.6 Performance Evaluation across Categories
Having specified the three sub-modules that determine the active merchant
fleet we may observe that this variable is far less volatile than the observed
spot and time charter rates. Since we have based all our previous analysis
on short term time charter rates, we will remain consistent hereafter and
derive all our results on the basis of short term (six months to one year)
time charter rates. These rates do not differ significantly from the time
charter rate equivalent of spot rates. Preliminary research and the calibration
process have been supportive to expressing our forecasts in terms of short
term time charter rates, which have a very high co-movement and almost
perfect correlation with the spot time charter rate equivalent.
Demand, which is exogenous and the main "driving force" of the system,
is far less volatile, too and relatively stable. This observation implies that in
a market clearing model, average productivity of fleet is the only
mechanism that can generate the volatility observed in prices. On
the other hand this observation leads us to the logical consequence that
productivity has to be a function of the price, if there is any value in
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attempting to model the price process as the outcome of the interaction of
supply and demand. If productivity is exogenous, then any set of prices may
well satisfy the "request" that markets are in equilibrium, since for every r
there will be a P that satisfies Eq.(79) for any T; if it is to make the system
non-degenerate, then productivity has to be a function of time charter rates
and potentially of other variables, too.
In our market clearing specification the most important unknown is the
average fleet productivity function. In order to identify the parametric form
of the function and optimize accordingly we will use the following strategy,
which is the one introduced by Stopford ([58], Appendix 1). Stopford uses the
actual active merchant fleet and solves for the implied average fleet pro-
ductivity, that equilibrates supply with demand. In order to stay consistent
to our approach we may use the predicted active merchant fleet (which does
not depart significantly from the true active merchant fleet) and solve for
the implied average fleet productivity. The ability of the system to generate
accurate time charter estimates depends crucially on the level of corre-
lation between the implied average productivity and the observed
prices. To make this point clear, let us assume that average productivity
is totally random; then an infinite set of prices satisfies the three equations
presented in the previous section. If productivity is fully determined by some
(unknown) functional dependence with prices, then we may solve for the im-
plied productivity ( DD) = P(rt)) that brings the system in equilibrium
and has a straightforward solution, and then solve for the unknown price.
Stopford [58] follows this approach and derives average fleet productivity, by
dividing the demand in ton-miles with the average merchant fleet in each
period from 1980 - 1995 on an annual basis. Although his data are for the
total fleet, do not differ across categories and are quoted on an annual basis,
we use them as a benchmark, in order to generate a first estimate of the
parametric form of the average productivity function.
Using simple regressions between annual prices and levels of implied pro-
ductivity, we acquire a fit of 0.7869, which although remarkable, is not suf-
ficient enough to generate the rich patterns of spot and time charter rates.
However, the average fleet productivity function, derived on aggregate data,
has the following parametric form, which guarantees the non-negativity of
the time charter rate:
P(rt) = ij - ln(rt) - 0 2j (84)
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We now proceed with the presentation of the calibration algorithm that
will allow us to estimate the unknown parameters of the lay-up and pro-
ductivity function, 3 and 6 in Eq.(81) respectively, as well as, any "hidden"
functional relationships that will improve the system. This algorithm is in
a sense a typical learning algorithm that reduces significantly the dimen-
sionality of the identification problem. We start with the lowest possibly
parametrization and increase the dimensionality only when a higher perfor-
mance is accomplished.
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Calibration Algorithm
* Using the actual numbers for ships in lay-up, scrapped tonnage and
new orders we derive the average merchant fleet. We then divide the
exogenous demand with the AMFt and within the market clearing
approach, we derive the estimates of average fleet productivity Pt. We
start with the actual numbers for AMF and DD and not with their
structural models derived in the previous sections.
* We regress the implied productivity for each category with the actual
prices (time charter rates rt) and derive the unknown parameters 6, for
the productivity function, for each category. It is crucial to understand
that the performance of the system is fully determined by the level of fit
acquired in this step. We then obtain an estimate of the productivity
function P(rt,j, 0).
* We now repeat Step 1, but instead of solving for Pt we use P(rt,0)
(we supress the category index j) and solve for Ft. We then obtain
the mean squared error between the actual prices rt and the output of
the system, Ft. If this error is acceptable we proceed to the following
step; if not we try to improve the estimation and specification in the
previous step.
* Having an acceptable estimate of the implied productivity we proceed
now with full system estimation. Instead of using the actual active mer-
chant fleet AMFt, we now use the functions we derived in our previous
modules and solve simultaneously the highly non-linear equation:
(AAMFt_1 ,+Nj (rtj, xt)-Sctj(rtj, xt)-Lay(rtj, xt; 3))-P(rt,, xt, Oj) = DDtj
, where DDtj and xt are the exogenous inputs to the system. Solving
for the equilibrium rate -j we achieve all the goals set: We derive the
forecast for prices and fully determine the new orders and scrapped
vessels. We then calculate the mean squared error between the new
estimates and the actual prices and derive the new parameters 6O, /
that minimize the error. Note that at this point the estimates of 0,
may differ significantly from the estimates in the previous step.
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* If the mean squared error is acceptable we stop. If not, we go back
to Step 2 and add some of the exogenous variables to the specification
of the productivity function. We then repeat all the steps(we supress
the category j index once more), whereas instead of using P(rt, 6) we
employ P(rt, Xt, 0). If this action is insufficient then we abandon the
market clearing approach and search for a more sophisticated relation
between supply and demand.
We are now able to proceed as discussed in the calibration algorithm in
the previous section. We start with the most simple specification; namely we
start directly from Step 3 by replacing the parameters O1,j and 02,j with the
results implied by the annualized average productivity derived by Stopford
([58], Appendix 1) . To get a "touch" regarding the performance of the system
we start with a productivity function that does not differ across categories
and is a linear function of the time charter rate. The generated outcome
captures the main trend of the actual market prices, but is far below the
performance of the statistical models and is much less volatile that the real
market prices. Furthermore, especially in the region of low rates, the implied
productivity values do not guarantee the non-negativity of the price process
and the output of the system generates negative values for the estimated time
charter process. The results are displayed in Figure 4 and are representative
of the miss-performance especially for the larger categories. The failure of
the outcome may be attributed to two other basic reasons: Either the market
clearing assumption does not hold, or productivity differs significantly across
categories. We therefore abandon the aggregate annual productivity, and
proceed with the implementation of all steps of the calibration algorithm,
where productivity is derived endogenously for each category, as the ratio of
the demand in ton-miles with the active merchant fleet and the estimation
method accounts for heterogeneity across categories.
We implement the full algorithm and derive different parameters for the
productivity function across categories. The results are far more improved,
but they still lack the necessary volatility observed in actual market prices.
As discussed earlier, the dynamics of the actual merchant fleet and the ex-
ogenous demand, are far less volatile than the spot and time charter rates
observed in the markets. This means that we have two key expectations from
the productivity function, if we want to achieve an acceptable performance
for our system: we expect productivity to be a function of the price, as well
as to be able to attribute to the system the volatility observed in real data.
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We shall therefore proceed as discussed in the last step in the algorithm:
namely, add a set of exogenous variables that will hopefully "explain" the
pattern of the implied productivity.
In order to improve the performance of the system, without abandon-
ing the market clearing approach, we will derive the aggregate average fleet
productivity, based on microfoundations with the hope that the structural
approach will provide us the necessary insight in identifying the "missing"
variable, that will generate a sufficient outcome. As it will turn out there
will be one crucial variable that will totally "boost" the performance of the
system.
Let us start from explaining and understanding productivity for one spe-
cific vessel: On a ship basis, the ship has a non-zero productivity only if it
is in a non lay-up status. If the ship is in lay-up or is used for purposes of
storage (a recent example is the employment of VLCC's in the 1991 Kuwait
War) then it has zero speed and consequently zero productivity. Once rates
are sufficiently high, then the ship has a positive productivity. The speed
increases with the prevailing prices, but the loaded days at sea and capacity
utilization remain ambiguous. This observation implies that in the region
of low rates, only the younger and most efficient ships contribute to the
average fleet productivity. At higher rates even the more obsolete and old
vessels contribute to the average fleet productivity, which reduces the effects
of higher rates on the average speed of the fleet. Due to the adverse effects
we expect average productivity to remain relatively stable in the region of
high rates. Higher prices have a positive impact on the optimal speed
of each vessel and a negative impact on the quality and average
performance of the active fleet. Therefore, the implied productivity of
the system does not possess the necessary volatility we have hoped for and
cannot solely account for the volatile pattern observed in prices. In order to
model average productivity effectively we have to combine two adverse forces:
on the one hand, high rates have to contribute in a positive sense and on the
other hand, we must identify the necessary state variable that will account
for the negative contribution of high prices on the quality and age distribu-
tion of the fleet. We choose tonnage in lay-up as the associated quality state
variable for the following reason: High rates induce high productivity and
less tonnage in lay-up, whereas low rates reduce speed and potentially the
days spent at sea (owners are willing to undertake dry-docking and repair
activities in depressed markets), but increase lay-up. These two adverse fac-
tors that account for speed, days at sea and fleet quality seem more intuitive
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Table P: Implied Productivity Parameters
Categories 200K 90-140K 30-70K
thetal 5500 6150 6500
theta2 29050 19000 10300
theta3 2300 2000 1150
Mean Squared Error 6068.936884 3165.770878 2273.250296
Average Error -0.25072313 -0.198177452 -0.123558086
for modelling productivity. We now choose the following parametric form for
the P(rt, Lay) function:
P(rt) = Oij - ln(rt) - 02j + 0 3,j -Lay (85)
We now repeat all the steps of the calibration algorithm. We calibrate
the system with simulation methods instead of regressing the implied pro-
ductivity on the charter rate and lay up, in order to avoid complications, due
to endogeneity. The parameters 6 of the productivity function and the mean
squared error and average error between the system output and the observed
rate are presented in TableP. The results are displayed in Figure 5 and are
remarkable indeed. The outputs of the system are marked with arrows. In
the periods of low rates, the system output is below the actual market prices,
which implies that supply potentially exceeds demand, when the market is
in recession. In the period of high rates our forecast "marks" the true prices
even in the most brutal and adverse movements. The performance of the
system is not only optimized but follows the direction of the actual prices
with the utmost precision. We conclude this section with presenting Figure 6
with the implied equilibrium productivity and Figure 7 that summarizes the
System Dynamics approach we developed in this Section in an Input-Output
setting. The numbers for implied productivity are on a quarterly basis and
once multiplied by the factor of four (annualized) they resemble the Stopford
[58] data set. In the periods of very low rates the VLCC numbers are coun-
terintuitive, which is potential evidence that supply "overshoots" demand in
this region.
Having completed the specification and estimation of the model we will
now proceed with the discussion of the results. Although we have achieved
a remarkable fit, having derived the equations of the system in closed form,
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we are now able to understand the "mechanics" of the system.
Since the system is in equilibrium, average fleet productivity for each
category is P = I and using the final formula for productivity, we solve for
the rate and plug in the derived productivity. We then obtain the following
deterministic equation for the rate:
1 DDt
rt = exp( - (AMF. + 02 -03 -Lay)) (86)
Taking the partial derivatives with respect to demand DD, we expect the
derivative to be positive; whereas we expect it to be negative with respect to
the average merchant fleet, which is the case if and only if 01 > 0. Taking the
partial derivative with respect to the tonnage in lay-up Lay, we expect the
partial derivative to be negative, which requires 03 > 0. The derived param-
eters 0 are all positive and verify the requirements imposed by economic
theory and intuition. What is particularly interesting is that in the periods
of high volatility, the fit provided by the deterministic equation is more
than 0.93, which implies that a deterministic equation can provide the rich
price dynamics, that are very sympathetic to stochastic specifications. This
argument verifies the assertion of Chaos Dynamics Theorists, that namely
deterministic equations can generate patterns that resemble stochastic pro-
cesses.
In this section we used the full system approach to derive the equilibrium
charter rates. Using demand and some other exogenous variables (operating
expenses, oil prices, air transportation, etc.) we have fully determined prices
by plugging the newbuilding, scrapping and lay-up modules we derived in
the previous sections into our previous equation.
5.7 A mixed Busdyn@-GARCH Model
In this section we evaluate the performance of the system within a statisti-
cal framework. The results derived in 5.5 and 5.6 correspond to the output
of a deterministic system, whereas the Generalized Autoregressive Con-
ditional Heteroscedasticity models we derived in 5.2 and estimated in 5.3
correspond to statistical models. Both models have displayed a remarkable
performance. In this section we address the question, to which extent each
model can benefit from the other and proceed with the estimation of "hy-
brid" models that optimize the performance of our forecast, combining the
complex statistical modelling of volatility (uncertainty) with the structural
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Table XXVII Hybrid EGARCH Full System
D.tcrate Coef. Std.Err. z p-0
D.busp .5947561 .0048782 121.92 0.000
cat -. 0544945 .3609009 -0.15 0.880
cst 89.67948 39.91656 2.25 0.025
arL1 1.605983 .1200491 13.38 0.000
arL2 -.7344997 .1003696 -7.32 0.000
maLl -1.57367 .130966 -12.02 0.000
maL2 .6588982 .1171024 5.63 0.000
D.busp .0000316 3.67e-06 8.63 0.000
hetcat .0001946 .0005558 0.35 0.726
hetcst .7213303 .2043463 3.53 0.000
earchLl .2120146 .0515153 4.12 0.000
earchL2 .0765114 .041925 1.82 0.068
earchaLl .5955742 .0587514 10.14 0.000
earchaL2 .8173896 .056611 14.44 0.000
egarchLl .0493823 .036764 1.34 0.179
egarchL2 .9088119 .0315344 28.82 0.000
LogL -3856.066 1
output of the supply and demand
exogenous events.
approach, which allows us to control for
The first step towards the evaluation of our system dynamics outputs is
the following: Since the output of the system displayed in Figure 5 (busp
hereafter) incorporates all economic information on demand and prices, the
key assertion is that its should be a sufficient statistic for all the exogenous
variables used in the GARCH estimation and specification in Table XXII.
The output of our system, busp, is a sufficient statistic indeed, if it improves
the Log Likelihood function, once it replaces demand for transportation dmd,
oil prices oil and the index for air transportation air. We perform estimation
and specification of the model and report the results in Table XXVII.
The results verify our assertion that the output of the system aggregates
all economic information. The Log Likelihood has been increased with a
smaller number of variables, which results in a severe increase in the Akaike
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information ratio and the parameter of busp displays a huge t-statistic of
tb ,p = 121.92, which verifies the high impact of the system output on the sta-
tistical model. Finally, the category effect appears insignificant here, which
is intuitive, since all information aggregate or category specific is aggregated
in busp. Having estimated the GARCH model with the output of the Sys-
tem Dynamics model as an input to the (GARCH) specification, we have
accomplished two diverse, but complementary tasks: on the one hand we
have verified that the variable created in the previous two paragraphs, in-
deed aggregates all economic information and on the other hand this hybrid
model takes advantage of the dynamics of any information "left out" by the
System Dynamics approach, or simply by imposing statistical structure on
the deterministic market clearing model.
We now proceed with imposing some more structure on our hybrid model
and repeat estimation of the GARCH model for the logarithm of the time
charter rate, as indicated by the exponential specification we derived in 5.6
and display the results in Table XVIIL All inputs remain as defined in 5.3.
The mean squared error across each category ranges from 0.143611 to
0.22187 and the average error from 0.00675 to 0.018272, which is less than
two percent and is very low, given the small numbers of inputs used. In order
to test if any information is "left out" in the residuals we employ white noise
tests (which are typical in system identification) and the Portmanteu [59]
statistic is X40 = 26.7704 and does not reject the null, namely that residuals
are white noise. Having combined all available forces for the calibration of
the system this hybrid GARCH-System Dynamics model has achieved three
different tasks:
" It incorporates all economic theory and information in a market clearing
environment, since it uses as an input the output of a market clearing
system.
" It takes advantage of the rich character of GARCH models, by imposing
structure on the dynamics of the residuals.
" Finally, we have proposed a hybrid model and a calibration algorithm
that aggregates statistical models with engineering type models.
The results of the hybrid model and the actual prices are displayed in
Figure 8, which needless to say speaks for its own.
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Table XXVIII Hybrid EGARCH Full System
D.ln(tcr) [ Coef. Std.Err. z p-0
D.ln(busp) .4394877 .0085786 51.23 0.000
cat 8.68e-07 .000012 0.07 0.942
cst .0015319 .0016221 0.94 0.345
arLI .8382046 .5109495 1.64 0.101
arL2 .0170225 .4519416 0.04 0.970
maLl -.8280828 .5218845 -1.59 0.113
maL2 -.1203292 .5073313 -0.24 0.813
D.ln(busp) .1340466 .0789613 1.70 0.090
hetcat .000816 .0007054 1.16 0.247
hetest -.3673754 .1639719 -2.24 0.025
earchL1 -.0398744 .0413473 -0.96 0.335
earchL2 .0554082 .0363861 1.52 0.128
earchaLl .6983358 .057588 12.13 0.000
earchaL2 .8875543 .047151 18.82 0.000
egarchLl -.0305064 .0193224 -1.58 0.114
egarchL2 .9381737 .0149055 62.94 0.000
LogL 516.61382
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Figure 8: Hybrid GARCH-System Dynamics Output
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5.8 "Out-of- Sample" Performance Evaluation
All the analysis, identification and estimation has been carried out within the
full sample until now. There are two particular reasons supportive to this
specific approach: on the one hand our data consists with only 91 observa-
tions for each category and on the other hand, we have been mainly interested
in assessing the validity of our basic identification assumptions, such as the
equality between supply and demand and the exogeneity of the time charter
rate for newbuilding and scrapping decisions. Furthermore, we have been
particularly interested in the economic interpretation of the structural pa-
rameters, which have been in line with Economic Theory and supportive to
the integration of the three sub-modules.
Having verified the validity of the market clearing approach, as well as the
success of the integrated equilibrium price model, we now address issues in-
terrelated to the ability of the model to generate accurate forecasts. In order
to address potential concerns on over-fitting, we use the following training
rule: we split the sample and use a fraction of the available observations
in order to "train" the system (identify the parameters) and the remaining
fraction, in order to generate the forecasts with the parameters obtained
from the "training" sub-sample and compare the relative performance
of the system, with respect to the "full sample" performance.
Since the key input to the Hybrid model we presented in the previous
system is the System Dynamics output busp, which is the structural equilib-
rium time charter rate, we perform the training and forecasting approach for
the System Dynamics output. We consider several sub-samples (determinis-
tic and random) and perform parameter estimation "within the sub-sample"
and forecasting "out-of-sample". Finally we evaluate the performance of the
system by undertaking an adaptive learning approach: namely, we increase
in each step the training sub-sample by one observation and decrease the
remaining forecasting sub-sample by one observation.
Once we forego the first quarter of observations (which corresponds to a
"bear" market) the estimated parameters and the associated "out-of-sample"
performance display remarkable stability and appear to converge to the "full
sample" parameters and mean squared error. The results are indicative of
the stability of the system and provide supportive evidence for the "out-
of-sample" ability of the system to track changes, both in direction and
magnitude. In Figure 9 we display the estimates of the charter rate, once
60 out of 91 observations are used to calibrate the system. All changes
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of directions have been tracked successfully and the "out-of-sample" mean
square error does not differ significantly from the one achieved with the entire
91 observations. Results displayed in Figure 9 provide firm empirical evidence
that the system is not over-parametrized and that convergence of the system
is achieved within a relatively small fraction of the total sample. Results
for different ratios of fitting/forecasting data resemble very similar patterns,
especially after the first quarter of observations is used for calibration and
estimation.
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Figure9: Calibrated System Output with 60 Observations
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5.9 A Model for Prices of New Vessels
In this section we address one critical question that has been partially an-
swered, whilst performing the specification and estimation of the Module 3.
Namely, are nebuilding prices exogenous?. By explicitly addressing this ques-
tion we restore one crucial long-term fallacy of maritime economics. Early
authors have claimed that newbuilding prices are a stabilization mechanism
for the industry. Once demand is up, time charter rates are up and invest-
ment in new vessels picks up, too. Newbuilding prices rise and contribute
to the stabilization of the industry. Under complete markets, constructors
of new vessels should adjust their prices in order to eliminate any "excess
profit" opportunity for investor and make the real option value degenerate
and equal to zero. In our model we have claimed that the real option value is
non-degenerate, due to subsidization and imperfections in the market for new
vessels. Zannetos [64] in his pioneering monograph discussed the destabiliz-
ing role of shipbuilders, which contradicts the orthodox economic theory;
namely in periods of high time charter rates shipbuilders should respond
with quoting higher prices for constructing the vessels. Instead of "devoting
all their capacity to shipbuilding, they start employing part of their orga-
nization efforts to expansion, thus cutting their current capacity somewhat
for the purpose of building future capacity" (Zannetos, [64] p.80). He then
concludes by stating: "Prices, however, are neither explosive nor are they
perpetually establishing new lows, for reasons we expounded when we an-
alyzed the patterns of behavior.. .these shifts do not bring about a balance
in supply and demand, but are, instead disequilibrating." Strandenes [57]
has addressed this issue formally and claims that the strong presence of la-
bor unions in this market has led to lower flexibility and imperfections. By
offering vessels at subsidized prices "demand for new vessels increases other
things equal and so do transportation capacities when these vessels are de-
livered. Subsidization implies that new vessels are sold at lower then optimal
price", for example the price that makes the real option value equal to zero.
Strandenes concludes that "this introduces a distortion into the market for
ships." Formally made, the Zannetos-Strandenes argument can be tested by
testing the exogeneity of prices of new vessels, which corresponds to testing
if the reduced form supply function of new vessels depends on the ordered
deadweight. Before proceeding with this task let us restate the main goals
in this section.
In this section we perform three tasks:
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1. We test the exogeneity of prices of new vessels.
2. We derive a reduced form for the pricing of new vessels.
3. Finally we close the system and make all the statistics relative to
shipping investment decisions (newbuilding prices, time charter rates,
scrapped tonnage, ordered tonnage and transportation supply) endoge-
nous.
In order to test the exogeneity of prices of new vessels (new) we will test
whether the ordered deadweight (dwt) appears statistical significant in the
reduced form of the newbuilding pricing equation. Given a functional form
for the prices of new we will demonstrate that the ordered deadweight in
each period is statistically insignificant, which implies that pricing by ship-
yards is determined only in terms of production costs and market conditions.
This argument was discussed in the specification and estimation of the first
module, when we instrumented the price of new vessels, to account for endo-
geneity in the estimation of the demand for new deadweight in each period.
In this section we will estimate the following reduced form for the supply
equation of new vessels:
In new = Oo -X +3 1 In dwt + E (87)
Our assertion is that #1 = 0 and this implies that on the one hand, when
estimating the demand equation for the new vessels, there is no endogeneity,
due to the price of new vessels, whereas on the other hand, the newbulding
pricing equation is inelastic with respect to demand for new tonnage.
This is the main reason, why the shipyards are a destabilizing force in the
market.
We now proceed with the estimation of the reduced form of the supply
function of the shipyards, where Inn is the logarithm of new, Inn1 the lag
of inn, ld the logarithm of the ordered dwt and the other variables are as
defined in the estimation of the previous two modules. We proceed with the
estimation of a linear model with fixed effects for category and instrument
for the lag of the exogenous variable, due to autocorrelation, as well as the
potential endogeneity of ld. Results are displayed in Table XXIX and the
associated R2 is very high, which eliminates any concerns regarding weak
instruments. The assertion of exogeneity is verified, since the coefficient of
the ordered deadweight appears statistically insignificant.
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Table XXIX IV FE Newbuilding Supply Equation
Inn I Coef. Std.Err. z p-0
Inni .8687464 .1139409 7.62 0.000
Id .0388136 .1255464 0.31 0.757
tcrate 2.50e-06 2.93e-06 0.85 0.393
spoil .0000619 .001041 0.06 0.953
oil -. 0018181 .0006588 -2.76 0.006
air -. 0001718 .0001634 -1.05 0.293
accident -.004832 .0302455 -0.160 0.873
const .4866336 .3260659 1.49 0.136
sigmau= .03719431 R2within= 0.9537
sigmae= .06052779 R2between= 0.9991
rho= .27410513 R2overall= 0.9816
We now repeat estimation and treat the logarithm of the ordered dead-
weight ld as exogenous. Therefore we instrument only the lags of the loga-
rithm of the price of new vessels. Results are displayed in Table XXX and we
finally perform a Hausman specification test, which is X 2(5) = 0.05 and veri-
fies the exogeneity of the logarithm of the ordered deadweight in the reduced
form of the newbuilding pricing function.
As discussed in the estimation and specification of the first module, the
inelastic supply with respect to demand, has a strict implication on the
demand for new vessels; namely the price of vessels is exogenous in the
demand function. The exogeneity of prices was verified in the first module
and in our previous discussion. We will now perform a final verification of
our assertion by using the demand function for new vessels. We estimate
the demand function derived in the first module without instrumenting for
the endogeneity of prices and then proceed with using the instruments dis-
cussed previously for the estimation. We perform a Hausman test that is
X 2(5) = 0.41 distributed and this is the final verification for the exogeneity
of newbuilding prices. Results of the instrumented and non-instrumented
estimates are displayed in Table XXXI.
Having performed this task, namely the specification, estimation and
identification of the three modules, the determination of the transportation
supply function has come to an end. Performing this task we have addressed
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Table XXX IV FE Newbuilding Supply Function
Inn Coef. Std.Err. z p-0
Inni .8845232 .0850922 10.39 0.000
Id .0118831 .0113928 1.04 0.297
tcrate 3.03e-06 1.56e-06 1.94 0.052
spoil -.0001076 .0006647 -0.16 0.871
oil -.0018894 .0005552 -3.40 0.001
air -.0001421 .0000853 -1.67 0.096
accident -.0098461 .0188302 -0.52 0.601
const .4429625 .248965 1.78 0.075
sigmau= .03132392 R2within= 0.9560
sigmae= .05900241 R2between= 0.9997
rho= .2198754 R2overall= 0.9828
Table XXXI IV FE Newbuilding Demand Functior
Inn Coef. Std.Err. z p-0
newprice -.0070655 .0030988 -2.28 0.023
Idi .283371 .0444305 6.38 0.000
1d4 .0885015 .04217 2.10 0.036
tcrate .0000407 8.10e-06 5.02 0.000
opex -.0000131 6.97e-06 -1.87 0.061
Irate -.0033797 .0044578 -0.76 0.448
tes -2.72e-10 9.84e-11 -2.76 0.006
accident -.0933811 .0599515 -1.56 0.119
const .184054 .0982438 1.87 0.061
sigmau= .12783805 R2within= 0.4634
sigmae= .26003523 R2between= 0.8482
rho= .194645 R2overall= 0.5185
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Table XXXII FE Newbuilding Demand Function
Id Coef. Std.Err. z p-0
newprice -.0053505 .0015845 -3.38 0.001
Idi .287755 .0438478 6.56 0.000
1d4 .0867193 .042023 2.06 0.040
tcrate .000037 5.75e-06 6.44 0.000
opex .000037 5.75e-06 6.44 0.000
Irate -.003153 .004438 -0.71 0.478
tcs -2.34e-10 7.88e-11 -2.97 0.003
accident -.0742882 .0520459 -1.43 0.154
const .1493451 .0820473 1.82 0.069
sigmau= .11224943 R2within= 0.4648
sigmae= .25968816 R2between= 0.9062
rho= .15742464 R2overall= 0.5391
some key questions of Economic Theory, we have restored fallacies that have
prevailed for decades in the Maritime Economics Literature, derived the Sup-
ply Transportation function based on structural foundations and heteroge-
nous agents and have extended the seminal 1971 Devanney [201 model to
account for heterogeneity and actions under uncertainty and irreversibility.
This study integrates the research cycle initiated by the seminal monograph
of Zannetos [64], almost fifty years ago. Zannetos determined qualitatively
the factors that determine the short-run and long-run transportation func-
tion, whereas Devanney derived supply and demand for transportation, based
on microfoundations. In this study we have proposed aggregate models con-
sistent to the "bottom-up" approach, which on the one hand allow some
insight into the mechanics of the supply function and on the other hand pro-
vide us a consistent framework to test some key economic hypotheses in this
market and determine the stabilizing and destabilizing factors. In the early
studies not much attention has been given to the specification of the model;
however, any conclusions drawn on statistical inference depend heavily on
model selection and specification. Using the "Decisionmetric" approach in-
troduced by Spyro Skouras we have been particular careful and consistent
with selecting structural models that are sympathetic to aggregate data and
do not fail key specification tests.
Assumptions of market completeness and rational learning have
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eliminated the importance of uncertainty on aggregate decisions, whereas
the methods proposed are suitable for performing this exercise in any type
of competitive markets (Real Estate markets, Cattle Cycles) . Following
Strandenes 157] classification of Real Markets and Auxiliary Markets in the
shipping industry, we have completed the task of estimating the dynamics
of the Real Markets. We may therefore proceed with a complementary, but
essential task; namely the estimation and specification of the Second Hand
Market Term Structure that determines Auxiliary Markets.
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6 A Partial Equilibrium Model for the Valu-
ation of Second-Hand Vessels
Strandenes [57] classifies the market for second hand vessels as an auxiliary
market, as it has no impact on the transportation supply function and the
real markets we analyzed in the previous three modules. In this section we
follow the complete market argument and derive a partial equilibrium model
for second hand prices that is not directly related to the previous model,
but complementary indeed. Let us now proceed with the specification of the
model.
6.1 Introduction
After the early supply and demand analysis, which set the foundations of
Maritime Economics from a microeconomic or Industrial Organization point
of view, very little has been done in using financial tools to identify "pricing
links" between the different markets that constitute the shipping industry.
Using the terminology of Strandenes [57] our main objectives in this chapter
are two: On the one hand we want to price assets that belong to the auxiliary
markets in terms of assets that belong to the real markets and on the other
hand, we aim to developing a pricing model for second hand vessels in the
complete market framework, as introduced at the beginning of our analysis.
As demonstrated in our analysis, the dynamics of the freight rates are de-
termined by the supply and demand for transportation and the same applies
for the orderings of new building vessels and scrapping decisions. However,
since the second hand vessels do not affect the supply and demand patterns,
their value should be determined by their payoffs and the opportunity or re-
placement cost. In fact, it is now well established that the value of any asset
is determined only by its associated payoff. Therefore, the value of a vessel is
fully determined by its associated revenues from optimal chartering decisions.
This observation will be the leading motivation for our analysis and the link
that will allow us to integrate our approach towards the different shipping
markets, by using intuition from finance. Shipping economics has suffered
from the same ideas that option pricing suffered before the seminal paper by
Black and Scholes [12]. Before their paper it was well believed that the value
of an option contract should be determined by the supply and demand for
such contracts in the market; therefore its price was simply the equilibrium
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market price. The same arguments have been used in Maritime Economics.
However, it is well established in modern finance that the value of an asset
is determined by its risky payoff. This rule applies for both the new vessels,
as well as the second hand vessels. The decisions of scrapping the vessels,
time-chartering, chartering the vessel under a time charter or bare-boat do
not constitute different markets, but simply different policies or "optimal
decisions" for an investor that determines the expected payoff from his asset
under optimal chartering policies. Using the modern finance approach we
shall derive equilibrium prices for vessels in the second hand market, and we
shall demonstrate the Real Option (or "asset play" value in the literary vo-
cabulary of maritime economics) hidden in second hand vessels. Even if the
market is not transparent and huge transaction costs are associated to each
trade, the Real Option value that exists in a complete market framework,
may always be considered as a significant pricing benchmark. Since the mar-
ket for second hand vessels doesn't depend on supply and demand ideas and
given that ships exist in order to provide demand capacity, ideally it should
not exist. However, not only it exists, but it is also one of the driving forces
of shipping business cycles and shipping investment and financing decisions.
This implies that it functions, on the one hand as market for assets and on
the other hand (and this is the key idea) as a proxy for the market value of
a vessel compared to the replacement cost, given by the price of new vessels.
The first part of this observation is not new in maritime economics.
Beenstock and Vergottis [6] came up with a model in order to explain
the prices of second hand values. This model, which was a Capital Asset
Pricing Model, relied on quadratic utility functions for shipping investors and
the assumption that markets are complete. Since then, no other significant
effort has been made to understand the financial aspects of the market for
second hand vessels and their role in the shipping industry. Without the
strict assumptions required in a CAPM type approach, we know that the
value of the asset is determined by the value of its expected payoff, for which
time charter rates are a sufficient statistic.
Furthermore, decisions in the second hand market depend on the com-
parison between market values (second hand prices) and new building prices
(replacement costs). If these two factors are sufficient statistics for invest-
ment/replacement decisions in the second hand market, then they should
also be sufficient statistics for the pricing of second hand ships. This was the
main intuition in the seminal paper by Marcus [44] et.al. Furthermore, the
intuition behind the relationship of second hand prices and new vessels has
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close connections to Tobin's q-theory [28].
From an empirical point of view, 10 years later after the "Buy Low - Sell
High" approach, Haralambides et.al [34] conducted an excellent econometric
analysis for the determination of the factors that affect second hand prices.
Once these factors are identified empirically, one has good estimates about
the sources of risk involved in pricing the uncertain payoffs. Then, by as-
suming that we are able to trade continuously in a portfolio that spans the
payoffs of the second hand ship (which is the case under complete markets)
we may use "arbitrage" arguments to derive the value of the second hand
ship, contingent on the factors of risk. Throughout our entire analysis
the assumption of market completeness has reduced the dimen-
sionality and complexity of estimation and has provided valuable
"shortcuts" to issues of aggregating individual actions to aggregate
data, without depriving our analysis from solid economic founda-
tions. In the analysis of models of entry and exit (Module 1 and Module 2)
the completeness assumption provided excellent empirical results and avoided
the cornerstones of heterogeneity and asymmetric information. Therefore, we
aim to carry out the same program in this paragraph.
The assumption of completeness is interrelated to the existence of portfo-
lios that replicate the payoffs of second hand ships. If this is the case, we then
can construct portfolios that diversify the risks associated to the underlying
risk factors. This assumption and its validity will be discussed later on be-
fore the specification of the model. As we discussed in the specification and
estimation of the entry models, the introduction of continuous time methods
and contingent claim valuation methods in shipping is not new: Goncalves
[30] used future contracts as an underlying instrument and Dixit and Pindyck
[28] derived threshold ratios that trigger investment in the tanker industry.
As we furthermore observe from the empirical analysis in Haralambides et.
al. [34], the functional relation between second hand values is highly non-
linear. This non-linearity provides significant evidence for a hidden "real
option" value in the second hand market asset play. The introduction of
contingent claim methods and the justification for these methods is the main
idea in our analysis and will lead to closed form pricing formulas for vessels
in the second hand market.
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6.2 The Contingent Claim Valuation Approach
In their seminal paper Marcus et. al. [44] identified the link between prices
of vessels in the second hand market, prices of newbuildings and time charter
rates, and identified these two risk factors as the main "sufficient statistics"
for shipping investment considerations in the shipping asset play. In their
excellent empirical paper, Haralambides et. al. [34] conducted an economet-
ric analysis of the prices of vessels in the second hand market and concluded
the same results regarding the significance of time charter rates and new-
buildings. In a similar econometric analysis Dikos et. al. [27] concluded that
newbuilding prices and EBITDA/CAPEX ratios are the main factors that
drive prices of vessels in the secondary market and proposed a stochastic
model for the depreciation of vessels with respect to these factors.
Maritime economics have based the derivations of the empirical literature
on the interrelation of newbuildings, time charters and second hand prices
on the basis of supply and demand. Other models for the interaction of these
markets have been derived on the basis of Capital Asset Pricing Models. At
this point we need to stress that any approach taken on this basis is de facto
misleading: Shipping Investors do not have quadratic utility functions, since
they potentially accept Net Present Values, below the real option "invest-
ment threshold", for the potential extreme profits they may gain in a bullish
market. Furthermore, returns are far away from normal and the market is
asymmetric and non-frictionless. Thus, any Capital Asset Pricing Model ap-
proach to Shipping (see Beenstock and Vergottis, [6]) is only an application
of modern corporate finance theory, (which is anyway rejected in numerous
studies for highly integrated and efficient markets) in a very specialized mar-
ket. On the other hand, we have significant evidence for a highly non-linear
relation between second hand prices, newbuildings and time charter rates.
One of our goals is to demonstrate that the non-linear pricing relation may
be explained by the real option approach to shipping investment decisions.
Staying consistent to our basic underlying assumptions of complete markets
that allow us to combine solid economic foundations and intuition, without
addressing complicated aggregation problems, we shall proceed with the con-
tingent claim valuation approach. Unfortunately, the completeness assump-
tion does not come totally free: Although we avoid complicated aggregation
issues, we cannot explain the dynamics of trading volumes in this market,
neither why agents trade. Namely, if the value of a real asset is uniquely
determined and all agents agree on it, what is the motivation to trade? This
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observation opens the door to models of heterogenous expectations or asym-
metric information and such models are absolutely necessary, provided we
are willing to understand the evolution of trading volumes; this is beyond
the scope of this analysis and it is left for further research. In the next two
paragraphs we will outlay our model and empirical findings and finally we
will wrap up our conclusions and propose topics for further research within
this direction. Before proceeding with estimation and specification we need
to readdress the limitations of our basic assumption in the specific market
and touch upon one more essential assumption that is an absolute necessity
for any hope regarding the validity of the completeness assumption.
Trading continuously: How feasible is it in Shipping?
One of the basic assumptions in the risky payoff valuation literature is
our ability to trade continuously the asset. Even if we are not able to trade
continuously the underlying risk factors, we have to be able to trade the asset
we want to evaluate. For example, when valuing an option on a stock we
are able to trade continuously on both the underlying stock and the option.
Due to obvious reasons it is impossible to trade continuously in second hand
ships. However, it suffices that there exist enough instruments in financial
markets that allow us to replicate the risky payoffs of the asset. For example,
shares of shipping companies listed on stock markets as well as bonds of
shipping companies may provide us some very good instruments, which may
allow us to replicate the payoff of ships in the second hand market. Trading
continuously is not the important issue in the pricing formulas. The derived
pricing bounds would be exact if we could find portfolios that could replicate
the freight risk and newbuilding risk. Even if this is not the case, still the
derived pricing formulas are an indicative pricing benchmark. On the other
hand, had we been able to replicate the payoffs of ships by other instruments,
then ships wouldn't really need to be traded for capital gains from a financial
point of view. Thus there is some hidden value, in not being able to replicate
the payoffs of a vessel exactly and perhaps this hidden value is interrelated
to the informational asymmetry between bankers and owners. Bankers lend
on the same rate, regardless if the owner is hedged against freight rate risk or
credit risk. Not being able to replicate the payoff of the vessels is interrelated
to disclosing information; therefore by assuming continuous trading, we are
always in the safe side in the terms of our valuation analysis.
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6.3 A Two Factor Valuation Model
Valuation in an incomplete market.
Let us now determine the value of the second hand vessels as a function of
the capital expenses associated to a new vessel (the price of the vessels plus
the overheads incurred when ordering a vessel) and the ratio of time charter
earnings and capital expenses. Then if F(CX, r, t) stands for the price of a
vessel at time t, with remaining life T - t.
Price = F(CX, r, t) (88)
Hereafter r will stand for EBITDA/CAPEX and CX will stand for the
price of the new vessels, capital expenses added. We propose the following
model for the evolution and the dynamics of r and CX:
dCX = p(CX, t)dt + O(CX, t)dZc (89)
dr = v(r, t)dt + -(r, t)dZ' (90)
ZC, Z' are two independent Brownian motions defined on the standard
filtration. We now assume that the price of the vessels in the second hand
market is a function of these two risk factors, namely: F(r, CX, t)
The empirical findings in Haralambides et. al. [34] suggest that the
second hand pricing function should have the following form:
F(r, CX, t) = X(CX, t) -Y(r, t) (91)
Since the value of the vessel in the second hand market is a function of
these two state variables, we may use the multi - dimensional form of Ito's
Lemma and assuming that one can trade continuously in second hand vessels
we can derive the following differential equation (see Yue-Kuen Kwok [43] for
a more detailed derivation):
F + 0.5O2 Fec +0.5rFr, + (i - AcO)F, + (v - Ar-)Fr - rF + rCX = 0 (92)
We have made the standard assumptions that the risk free portfolio yields
the EBITDA/CAPEX ratio and that we are allowed to trade continuously
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values in the second hand market. Although this assumption may seem
unrealistic due to the huge transaction costs in this industry it should hold
for shares of shipping companies listed on organized markets. Thus there
exist assets that allow us to replicate continuous trading strategies in the
second hand market. There is one more significant observation related to
our pricing differential equation: Having used as state variables the capital
expenses to invest in a new vessel and the EBITDA/CAPEX ratio, we are
allowed to model the payoffs received from chartering a ship continuously,
simply as the product of these two variables. Finally the two terms Ac, A,
that appear in the pricing differential equation are the market price of risk
and correspond to the Girsanov transformation of the specification of the two
processes with respect to the local martingale measure. In this setting we
have two factors of risk and one asset. The market is therefore incomplete
(see Biais et. al. [11]) since there are more risk factors than traded assets
and an infinite number of (no-arbitrage) local martingale measures exist. The
prices of risk in the above model are simply determined by the market.
If we now plug into our equation the separable empirical form we derive
the following two differential equations:
Y(Xt + 0.502 Xcc + (p - Ac6)Xc - rX) = 0 (93)
X(Y + 0.5U 2 Yr,+ (v - Ara)Y + r(CX/X)) = 0 (94)
If we set X(CX, t) = CX we obtain the following equation:
Ac rCX (95)0
If the evolution of the prices of new vessels are a simple log - Ornstein -
Uhlenbeck process the above specification is reduced to Ac= - , and it is
sensitive to technological advances that affect the mean of the prices of new
vessels. Technological advances that affect the market price of risk may be
the explanation for the formation of two patterns of depreciation curves in
the bulk industry for data from 1976 until 2002 (Figure 10).
Having specified the market price of risk for a new vessel investment that
is consistent to the specification X(CX, t) = CX we now may derive the
following equation for Y:
(Y + 0.5U 2Yrr + (v - Ar U) + r) = 0 (96)
146
We have now a complete characterization of the second hand price func-
tion and once we specify the terminal conditions of this set of differential
equations we have a theoretical model that integrates prices of new vessels,
prices of vessels in the second hand market, the demolition market and time
charter rates and is consistent to the empirical findings, as well as our analy-
sis in the previous chapters. Having identified the two explanatory variables
(factor risks) in the industry we will be able to extend these results in the non
continuous trading case in the form of good deal versus bad deals and relative
pricing. Before proceeding with the empirical results, it is worth mentioning
that the EBITDA/CAPEX ratio is the inverse of the expected investment re-
covery period and is similar to the P/E ratio which is a common risk factor for
shares. EBITDA/CAPEX is specified exogeneously in this industry, due to
the competitive nature of the industry. Although one could argue that the re-
sulting EBITDA/CAPEX is an output of the equilibrium due to the demand
and supply for transportation, as well as the investment decisions of the play-
ers in this market, since bulk shipping is an extremely competitive market,
this process may be considered as exogeneously specified. In their seminal pa-
per Hansen et. al ([33]) consider an exogeneously "dividend ratio" process for
robust control in a Ramsey-type model. Introducing the EBITDA/CAPEX
as a sufficient statistic to characterize the uncertainty of investment decisions
in this industry has close links to q-theory. EBITDA/CAPEX is not only
an inverse P/E ratio and an approximate measure of the required capital
recovery period, but an equivalent q-ratio. EBITDA is a statistic for the
market value of the asset, whereas CAPEX is a proxy for its replacement
or construction cost. Since no agent can acquire sufficient power to control
this market, instead of deriving the q-ratio as an output of a dynamic model
we specify it exogeneously. Finally, the specification of time charter rates
as a risk factor has been a drawback for the understanding of shipping in-
vestment dynamics, due to the fact that it is not invariant to size, type and
cost parameterizations, whereas EBITDA/CAPEX is cost and size invariant.
Furthermore, time charter rates are only a proxy for the market value of the
asset and not the renewal value. Equivalently, given the rent for a real es-
tate property you cannot conclude if you should invest or not, unless you
are given the construction costs at the specific time period. We shall now
proceed with the empirical findings regarding the above results.
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6.4 Empirical Results
There are several difficulties in constructing precise tests for the above model.
First of all the market prices of risk A are not observed in the market and
possibly change over time. Furthermore the number of data is limited and
restricted to specific ages of vessels, whereas in the above model a continuum
specification of vessel prices is required. However we can test still the above
specification. As implied by the above model the depreciation of vessels, or
the ratio:
D(rt,T) CXt - F(CX, r, t) _ 1 - Y(r, t) (97)
CXt (T - t ) T - t
We observe that in this model the term structure of depreciation does not
depend on the price of new vessels and since it has to preserve positivity we
make the following exponential specification for D(r, t, T) = exp(A(t, T) -
rB(t, T)). We will now test our model by using annualized depreciation data.
For two different categories of tankers and using data from 1993-2002 we shall
plot the depreciation against the EBITDA/CAPEX ratio for three different
ages: 5, 10 and 15 years. The dispersion of the observed data around the
main trend will be due to the time variation of the market price of risk. We
are now going to fit the empirical model for the depreciation curves with
true data. We are going to carry out the following program: For a fixed age
t = 5,10,15 and economic life T = 25 we are going to fit the depreciation
curves implied by our two factor model with respect to EBITDA/CAPEX
and for different categories of ships from the tanker industry and the dry
bulk industry. We have used data from five consulting firms and we have
carefully ruled out any inconsistencies among the different sources. As a
proxy for the long term time charter ("risk free freight rate"), we have used
the one year time charter rate and as operating expenses we have used an
estimate from different sources. With these two inputs we calculated the
EBITDA/CAPEX ratio and given the prices for new buildings and vessels in
the second hand market we calculated depreciation. By fixing the age of the
ship at t = 5, 10, 15 years we are able to collect data from 1993-2002 for the
tanker sector and from 1976-2002 for the dry bulk sector. For each month
we observe the prevailing EBITDA/CAPEX ratio and the depreciation ratio
for ships five, ten and fifteen years old for the ships in different categories.
Fitting the observed data into the exponential depreciation curves, namely:
D(t, T) = exp(A(t, T) - rB(t, T)) is equivalent to fitting the depreciation
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function for each type of ship and age with respect to the prevailing ratio. In
the case of the tanker industry and specifically for VLCC's and SUEZMAX
this type of exponential fitting has yielded an R2 = 0.90 and the character-
istics of the observed depreciation curves are consistent to our model. The
derived curves and the depreciation curves are plotted in Figures 11 and 12
respectively.
Following the same procedure for the category of SUEZMAX we achieve
a very high fit and consistency of our model with market data. The observed
non - linearity implies strong evidence for the hidden real option or asset
play value in the prices of second hand vessels.
6.5 Conclusions: The Market Price of Shipping Invest-
ment Risk and Future Research Directions
There are several assumptions that may seem strong regarding our previous
discussion. Most of them, such as the assumption of the same interest rate
for borrowing and lending, or of an arbitrage portfolio that yields instanta-
neously the one process may be relaxed. Making the setting more realistic
might result in a system of forward - backward differential equations and in
advanced computational complications. However the strongest assumption
remains the one of continuous trading that seems unrealistic, especially in
a thin and illiquid market such as the market for second hand vessels. For
our good luck we can cut corners to this problem once we have identified the
factors that determine the value of the asset and the payoff it generates, by
introducing the optimization analogous problem. This problem is far more
general and applies to identifying good and bad deals for the pricing of risky
payoffs. Dixit and Pindyck [28] and Cochrane [18], in his seminal paper,
have first addressed this problem. Intuitively we are interested in determin-
ing "good deals" and "bad deals" for risky payoffs, given we have identified
the factors that determine the payoff and the value of the asset. The specifi-
cation of the risky payoff allows on the one hand the modelling of the payoff
of the asset ship and simultaneously its value as an asset traded in the second
hand market. We shall now proceed with the general setting of the problem.
In order to be in line with our setting and our empirical findings let us as-
sume that the value of the vessel is determined by the following two factors:
The one factor is the ratio of EBITDA/CAPEX, which may be considered as
a proxy to the required investment recovery period and is close to the P/E
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ratio that is a common factor for stock returns. The reason why freight rates
are not a good factor (to the contrary of the beliefs of shipping economists)
is because it is not scale or type invariant. The second driving factor is the
price of new vessels. This process incorporates new technical advances as
well as the economic conditions (or political conditions, such as subsidies).
For example a productivity improvement will result in a decrease of the drift
term of the process, whereas an increase in political uncertainty will be re-
flected on a higher volatility term. Having specified these two factors, the
payoff of a ship is simply the product of these two factors and shall be de-
noted by xc = r -CX and the terminal payoff or scrap value shall be denoted
XT. Then the problem we are interested in solving is stated in Cochrane [18]
as following:
F = minEr f PS xcds + EP(PT Xi) (98)
Js=t PA PAT
The problem is to specify a discount factor process p, that minimizes the
above equation, namely the discounted value of the payoffs and the scrap
value of the vessel. The expectation is taken under the P-dynamics (sta-
tistical dynamics) of the process. However, from the risk neutral valuation
theory we can restate the minimization problem under the equivalent mar-
tingale measure (a consequence of the absence of arbitrage) as following:
F = min exp(-r(T - t))E j xcds + EQ(XC) (99)
This is the equivalent risk neutral formation of the problem: If contin-
uous trading were possible and the underlying assets were traded then the
martingale measure would be uniquely defined and the market price of risk
processes would be unique. However, since continuous trading is not pos-
sible and the market is incomplete the market prices of risk processes are
not uniquely defined. The above risk neural specification of the problem has
the advantage that if we extend the underlying processes beyond diffusions,
we have analytic specifications for the moment generating function of the
wider class of affine processes. Thus, there are advantages when the problem
is posed under the Q-dynamics, especially when one includes jumps in the
processes. The solution of the above problem for a wider class of processes
than the ones considered by Cochrane [18] remains still an open and essential
problem since it allows the valuation of risky payoffs in incomplete markets,
where continuous trading might not be possible. The extension to the dif-
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ferential characterization of the 'good deal' bounds for wider processes than
Ito [28] diffusions is essential to the valuation of risky payoffs in incomplete
markets.
Before concluding, there is an important comment to be made: In our
empirical derivations we stacked pairs of (EBITDA/CAPEX, Depreciation)
observations in a graph. We observed however that at different times snap-
shots for the same EBITDA/CAPEX different depreciation values were doc-
umented. This implies strong evidence for a time varying market price of
risk. Unfortunately, if we do not make some assumptions about the nature
of the market price of risk, we cannot find the closed form solution to the
depreciation curves and we cannot extract the time varying risk from market
data. We are faced with an open loop problem: If we do not specify some
characteristics for the market price of risk, we cannot extract it. This implies
that we are not only questioning our assumptions about the model but also
about the market price of risk. An alternative approach to this philosophical
problem that limits substantially our ability to make any inferences on the
time varying prices of risk can be overcome in a robust control setting, as
the one introduced in the seminal work of Hansen et. al. [33].
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7 Conclusions
7.1 Empirical Limitations
Before proceeding with a discussion of the main conclusions of this Thesis, as
well as some topics for further research we shall discuss some of the limitations
of our analysis, particular due to the nature of this industry and the data
available. 21
In all three modules we have derived models that are consistent to the
notation of partial or general equilibria. However, the character of the data
is illiquid and the time charter rates quoted are averages, mainly based on
the time charter rates quoted by modern ships, since older ships are usually
not reported. Furthermore, there is a term structure charter rates, with the
spot market exhibiting persistently higher volatility than the time charter
volatility. Due to the unavailability of data on the term structure, it has not
been feasible to introduce term structure decisions in our analysis.
Furthermore in all markets, (especially the Sale and Purchase market)
there are unreported transactions, which implies that there might be a sig-
nificant selection bias when performing an econometric analysis in these mar-
kets.
Finally, there are significant policy issues which are clearly not included
in our analysis. Governments can create uncertainty through the prospect
of policy change. This is particularly relevant in the Tanker Industry, since
the potential phase out of all mono-hull tankers is suggested and discussed.
Expectations of shift of policy can have a powerful impact on entry and
exit decisions. Accidents and the proposed phase out of tanker vessels clearly
affect the newbuilding and scrapping process by introducing a jump in the
time charter process and the price of new vessels, which clearly violates the
assumption of market completeness and distorts the value of the option to
wait. Furthermore, tax credit policies and uncertainty about the enactment
of stimulus policies and packages have a profound impact on the investment
and production process. Although it is possible to model such events as in
Dixit and Pindyck ([28] p.303) this task is left for further research. [25]
2 1This section draws heavily on a personal communication of the author with the Pres-
ident of Marsoft, Dr. Arlie Sterling. I once more express my thanks and appreciation to
Marsoft for all the support.
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7.2 Summary of Results
This Thesis has been devoted to the derivation of the Transportation Supply
Function for the Tanker sector, based on quarterly data from 1980-2002. We
have followed precisely the seminal monograph of Zannetos [641, where many
of the qualitative arguments made by Zannetos have been proved quanti-
tatively, based on theoretical foundations. Whilst performing this task we
have restored some of the oldest fallacies in Maritime Economics. Finally we
have identified the stabilizing and destabilizing forces in the process of time
charter rate formation.
There are three main markets surrounding agents in the Tanker Industry.
The first one is the Real Market that determines the transportation supply
function. The transportation supply function is determined by entry, exit and
lay-up decisions, which have been analyzed in Chapters 3, 4 and Paragraph
5.1. The issue of interrelating these three different actions that determine the
supply of transportation capacity, as well as the necessary assumptions, have
been derived based on the classical model by Devanney [20]. The calibration
of the system has been performed in Chapter 5, where both statistical and
deterministic price models have been derived and compared.
The second one, is the Auxiliary Market for second hand vessels, which
has no impact on the supply and demand process. Therefore we may consider
the price process for this particular market as exogenous and derive a partial
equilibrium model for second hand prices. This task has been successfully
performed in Chapter 6.
The last one is the Risk Sharing Market, where the term structure of time
charter contracts is determined. The theoretical framework for undertaking
this task is exogenous to both the Real and Secondary Market. The market
for contracts satisfies the need for risk sharing among agents and has been
addressed in the recent work by Adland [3].
7.3 Applications of the Model in Policy and Business
During the estimation and specification of the submodules that constitute
the supply function we have performed the interim task of addressing several
assertions of Economic Theory. The particular structure of the tanker market
industry (perfect competition, "the ship is the firm") has provided us with
a unique framework for the empirical testing of the Real Option markup hy-
pothesis and other count models of entry and exit, derived in an equilibrium
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framework. Although several questions of the utmost importance have been
thoroughly addressed, we have basically employed Economic Theory, in order
to reduce the dimensionality and complexity of the system and in some sense,
these two tasks (of reducing the dimensions of the problem and test theory)
have been interrelated. Advanced econometric methods have not only served
the task of identification; they have also provided us with a consistent tool
for simultaneously testing theory and the power of each submodule, helping
us choose the specification that "squeezes out" all information contained in
the data. Once we have chosen a specific class of aggregate models, any em-
pirical test has been conducted on the conditional knowledge that this model
is a valid approximation of reality within an admissible subclass of models.
From a theoretical point of view we have accomplished far more beyond
our initial tasks. The ultimate goal of this project has been the development
of models that will allow policy makers and investors to improve the quality
of their decisions. This has been the applied goal and results in 5.7 have
(hopefully) justified our initial expectations to undertake the derivation of
a Devanney-type model with aggregate data, based on the "Bottom-Up"
approach.
Policy makers may employ the model in order to simulate the effects
of policies on the market. Although (following Lucas's critique) new poli-
cies will have a profound impact on the value functions of entry and exit
and consequentially, on the aggregate models of entry and exit, it is really
doubtful if they will have a significant effect on the aggregate Lay-Up and
productivity function. It therefore becomes apparent that policy simulations
can be performed within this framework. For example, there is significant
uncertainty on the impact of the new European Union "phase out" policies
on the tanker industry. By specifying the effects of the proposed regulations
on the scrapping and newbuilding functions the system will generate the
equilibrium prices, the price of new vessels, as well as the capacity required
to restore equilibrium in the market. Given these estimates, regulators may
then conduct a more efficient and quantitative assessment of their proposed
regulations and measure consumer surplus, social welfare or even the loss of
the "option to wait" before imposing new regulation. Overall, this model
provides policy makers with a quantitative tool that allows them to simulate
the effects of their policy and assess the short term and long term effects of
different policies on time charter rates, the dynamics of prices of new vessels
and the long term stability of the tanker industry.
On the other hand, investors will have different objectives than policy
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makers. The General Equilibrium (5.2-5.3) approach provides them some
additional insight into the effects of economic factors on the parameters of
statisitcal models, whereas the System Dynamics approach (5.5-5.7) is a con-
sistent tool that allows them to project their expectations regarding future
demand patterns, on future prices and evaluate alternative demand patterns.
Since the only exogenous required input to the system is demand, each owner
has to have some a priori belief on future demand, which once inserted in
the system will generate market clearing rates, prices of new and second
hand vessels, as well as fleet capacity and productivity. These forecasts will
improve the ability of investors to evaluate business decisions and narrow
down uncertainty in terms of their ability to predict demand within an ac-
ceptable level of tolerance, rather than extrapolating their forecasts (and the
associated uncertainty of the forecast) on all the inputs and outputs of the
system.
7.4 Topics for Further Research
In terms of the time charter rate dynamics we have not touched upon any
issues of the term structure of charter rates. This has been done in an
advanced statistical framework by Adland [31, who identifies and estimates
alternative specifications for the stochastic specification of time charter rates.
In some sense Adland's work is complementary to the work undertaken in
this Thesis, since it addresses the issue of the term structure of charter rates.
One drawback of Adland's approach is that he imposes no economic structure
on the problem. A utility based framework seems a promising candidate for
resolving this issue. However, from the view of economic theory there should
be no difference whether supply is quoted in spot rates or the time charter
rate equivalent. However, due to risk preferences and uncertainty a utility
based approach to the term structure seems an interesting topic for further
research. Given the structural process St for the time charter rate equivalent
of the spot rate and F(T) the time charter rate at time t, with "maturity"
T, the expected utility from employing the ship in the spot market should
be equal to the utility acquired from fixing the ship.
dSt = ps(St)dt + as(St)dBt (100)
dFt(T) = F,(T)(Ft(T))dt + UFT(T)(Ft(T))dB' (101)
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EU(j Stdt) = U(F(T)) (102)
And in a competitive equilibrium the process St has to be derived en-
dogenously for j = 1, N competitive agents:
Sods = /FT(dj) (103)
However, the issue of the term structure can only be addressed once a
structural process has been specified that brings markets to equilibrium, as
is the case in this Thesis. Once this process is either apriori or structurally
specified and issues of risk sharing are specified, then the competitive equi-
librium time charter term structure may be easily derived. This task is left
for further research in the field and it completes the trilogy of markets in
Maritime Economics.
Many unanswered questions also remain about dynamic entry, exit, tem-
porary suspension, duration of chartering and capacity choice decisions both
on a firm specific level, as well as on an aggregate level. In this Thesis we have
imposed Economic assumptions that have reduced the parametric space of
the model. Complete markets and reduced value functions in a partial equi-
librium setting have been very helpful towards the derivation of the modules
in the previous chapters.
On a firm specific level a dynamic analysis of firm specific choices seems
necessary for the determination of the variables that agents take into consid-
eration when forming the decisions, as well as a comparative tool of perfor-
mance evaluation. The choices of entry, exit, duration of the contract and
capacity choice can all be addressed on a firm-specific level, given data from
a panel of firms. Given the associated profitability of the firms, studies of
performance evaluation seem challenging.
On an aggregate basis it still remains open to forgo the independence of
actions assumption and consider the Full Dynamic Programming Problem
as introduced by Devanney [20]. This will allow the simultaneous derivation
of optimal policies. It then remains open to determine aggregate equilibrium
models on an integrated framework. Standard approaches to this problem as
in Pakes et.al. [7] seem inappropriate, because on the one hand the market
has a satisfactory proximity to perfect competition and on the other hand
the number of agents is very big in this market.
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Entry, exit, duration of commitment and temporary suspension are all
discrete choice decisions which can be addressed by using the artillery of
modern econometrics, simply by replacing the associated utility functions
by value functions. It seems challenging indeed to carry out a dynamic
analysis both on firm specific data, as well as on aggregate data in a general
equilibrium framework.
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A Glossary
Chapter 3
" A: intensity of the Poisson process P(A)
* Peji: probability of action of the most efficient operator
" V., I,: value and investment cost of a project
* 7rinvest: probability of entry
* Vpt: excess Real Option value of entry [28]
" mup: the Real Option markup [28]
" ships: number of vessels ordered each quarter (source: Marsoft)
" dwt: tonnage of new ships ordered each quarter (source: Marsoft)
" lnp: the log of 7r
* NLLS: Non Linear Least Squares
* PQMLE: Partial Quasi Maximum Likelihood
" NB: Negative Binomial
" OLS: Ordinary Least Squares
" const: constant of the regression
" shipk: lags of ships of order k
" tcrate: one year time charter rate (source: Marsoft, Clarksons, RoarAdland
[3])
* newprice: the price of new vessels (source: Clarksons)
" accident: a dummy for the Erika accident
* lrate: the FED lending rate (source: Datastream)
" V0yt, lag: lags of the Real Option value
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" opex: operating expenses (source: Clarksons, Marsoft, etc.)
" VV: V,
" tcs: tcrate2
" dwg: a deadweight dummy variable
" Inn: logarithm of newprice
" oil: prices of crude oil (source: Datastream)
" spoil: Standard and Poor's oil price index (source: Datastream)
" air: Standard and Poor's index of air transportation (source: Datastream)
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Chapter 4
" lrOexit: probability the most efficient operator does not exit the market
* Vstay,scrap: the value to stay in the market or scrap, respectively
* scr: aggregate scrapped tonnage each quarter (source: Marsoft)
* scrk: lags of scr of order k
" crt: capital replacement time calculated in equilibrium
* tci, opi: tcrate and opex category weighted indexes
* ARMA(p,q): Auto Regressive Moving Average process of order p and
q
* D2SLAD: Double Two Stage Least Absolute Deviations Estimator
* AR(p): ARMA(p,O) process
* 2SLS: Two Stage Least Squares Estimator
* TARCH: Threshold Auto Regressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity
process
" (E)GARCH: (Exponential) Generalized Conditional Heteroscedasticity
process
" QR: Quantile Regression
Chapter 5
* lay: aggregate tonnage in lay-up (source: Personal communications)
" layk: lag of lay of order k
* itci: inverse of tci
* fleet: total fleet in tonnage (source: Marsoft)
" QMLE: Quasi Maximum Likelihood Estimator
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" D.: takes first difference
" arLk: coefficient of the Auto Regressive term of order k
" hety: coefficient of the conditional heteroscedasticity variable y
" earchLk: coefficient of the EARCH term of order k
" dmd: demand for tanker transportation capacity (source: Marsoft)
* DD: equals dmd
" busp: the forecasted time charter rate from the System Dynamics out-
put
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B Appendix B
Let X be a random variable with Poisson distribution; namely:
X ~ P(X = xIA) = exp(-A)
The associated Moment Generating Function of the Poisson distribution
is:
Mx(t) = exp(A(exp((t) - 1))
If d is an integer then Y = d - X = N=d X., where X, - P(A), irn.i.d..
Then the Moment Generating Function of Y is the following:
d d
M, (t) = E exp(-t EX) = J7 exp(A(exp(t) - 1)) = exp(A -d(exp(t) - 1))
j=1 j=1
This Moment Generating Function implies that Y P(A - d)
The above derivation can be generalized for the case where Xj are irn.i.d.
distributed with Xj ~ P(Aj).
Then, following the same argument:
d d
Y = ( Xj ~ P(E Aj)j=1 j=1
Now let Bj, j = 1, N denote in.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with B~
B(p). Then the Moment Generating Function of Y is:
N N N
My (t) = E exp(-t ( Bj) = E exp(f exp(-tBj) = ENEyNexp(H ep(-tBj)IN
j=1 j=1 j=1
= EN((1 - p) + p exp(t))N
Now set 13 = (1 - p) + p - exp(t) and:
EE _ AkeXp(- k(J.A) exP-A) exp(-A-) exp(-A-3) = exp(A(3-1
k= k! k=O k!
Combining the previous two results we get the following specification for
the Moment Generating Function:
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My(t) = exp(A -p - (exp(t) - 1))
This implies that
Y ~ P(A -p)
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C Appendix C
1 DDt
rt = exp( - (AMF. + 62 - 63 -Layt))
AMF = AMF_ 1 + Newt(rt, xt) - Scrt(rt, xt) - Layt(rt, x)
Layt (rt, x) = aL
-y! + /3t
Newt(rt, xt) ~ P(A(rt, xt))
ln(Scrt(rt, xt)) ~ ARMA(2,4)
(104)
(105)
(106)
(107)
(108)
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D Appendix D
We assume n heterogenous agents, who consider exiting the market. Given
the assumption of independent actions, each of them solves his own Dy-
namic Programming problem and determines his optimal threshold of exit,
as well as his own value function Vjt, where j stands for the j - th agent
and t stands for time. Each agent determines his value function from choos-
ing optimally to remain in the market and operate the vessel, which will be
denoted Vt,,tay hereafter and his associated value function from optimally
deciding to exit the market as VYjt,exit. We assume that each agent assigns a
Markovian specification to the process, which implies that all value functions
are determined by the variables at time t and the parameters of the process.
We furthermore assume that the number of vessels each agent scraps follows
a Poisson process with intensity Ajt and the probability of no exit for each
agent is: 22
Pjt,o-exit = exp(-Ajt) (109)
By assuming that the risk premia offered by shippers (observed by the
owners, but not by the econometrician) or scrappers belong to the family of
Extreme type errors, the above probability is also equal to:
exp(-Ajt) = exp(Vtstay) (110)
exp(Vt,exit) + exp(Vt,stay)
This specification implies that the probability of zero exit (or the prob-
ability to remain in the market) is a monotonic function of VYjt,stay; the cor-
responding value derived from market presence. Solving for the intensity Ajt
we get the following equation:
Ajt = ln(exp(Vjt,exit) + exp(Vjt,stay)) - ln(exp(Vt,stay)) (111)
Hereafter we supress the time index t and set: Zi = V,exit - VYj,stay; then
the first order Taylor expansion for A) has the following form:
exp(zj)
A = n 2 + exp(zj)- Z (112)1 + exp(zj)
or:
221t seems interesting to investigate if we can derive this specification in a utility-based
structural framework.
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Aj = ln 2 +pexit,j -zj => A, = In 2 +per.tj -Vexit +Pstayj Vjstay - Vstay (113)
Now we observe that the expected value of operating or exiting this market
optimally is:
Ej [V] = pexitj V,exit + Pstayj Vstay (114)
Plugging into our previous equation we get the following specification for Aj:
Aj = In 2 + pexit, - z => Aj = In 2 + Ej[V] - V,stay (115)
The following specification of the intensity is valid as long as In 2 + E [V] -
V,stay > 0, which implies that the specification for the aggregate intensity A
is the following23
A = 1n2 -n+ ( +n 2 Ej[V]- V,stay)+-( S In 2+ E[V] - Vj,stay) (116)
j=1,n j=1,n
Taking a closer look we observe that E [V] corresponds to the value of owning
a second hand vessel for a risk neutral investor. Since an organized market
exists for second hand vessels we assume that under risk neutrality E [V] is
the same for all agents and it corresponds to the market or second hand price
of the vessel. It includes the value of operating the vessel and the option to
wait and therefore exceeds V,stay. Our final assumption is the following:
n
plim "s - Vstay (117)
3=1
which implies that heterogenous beliefs converge to an average, which is in-
variant to the number of agents, namely to the value an agent would assign
if he had perfect knowledge of the process. This implies that heterogenous
beliefs for the value function converge to the unique value function that corre-
sponds to a rational expectations equilibrium. Convergence to a competitive
equilibrium requires convergence of beliefs to the equilibrium process. Persis-
tent deviations from equilibrium would either result in breaks in the intensity,
or under the prisma of complete markets, in arbitrage opportunities. The
23(X)+ = max(0, x)
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intuition behind this assumption is that otherwise some players could persis-
tently outperform the market, by taking advantage of the inability of other
agents to converge towards the true process. The above specification implies
that to first order at least, the mean conditioned on the number of agents
is multiplicative in the number of agents n and coincides with the specifi-
cation of the complete market model. This implies that the source of extra
volatility needed is either due to the remaining terms of the approximation
or the dynamics of the population n. The basic claim of our model is that
heterogenous beliefs do not distort the multiplicative mean speci-
fication, at least in the long run. The only extra source of volatility is
now due to the evolution of agents.
One more implication from the above specification is that there could be
breaks in the intensity of the Poisson process of aggregate scrapping data,
arising from disequilibrium and heterogeneity. We obtain the following spec-
ification for the intensity, for these values that result in an indicator function
equal to one:
n
bear = 1n2 - n + E[Ej[V] - V,stay] = (1n2 + (E[V] - Vstay)) -n (118)
j=1
In a "bullish" market the indicator function is "to first order" equal to
zero, since the value of remaining in the market is high enough to offset any
expected value added by the option to scrap. This is a rather simplistic
approach, which however provides us with a good motivation for considering
a Poisson process with structural changes, as a result of the interaction of
heterogenous agents.
To complete our model specification we have to determine the intensity
of the Poisson process for the number of the n heterogenous agents that is
mainly determined by capital replacement decisions and physical deprecia-
tion, as well as a reduced form for E[V] - Vstay. At this point we should note
that if one of the assumptions of our model fails, the population dynamics
are exogenous and cannot be uniquely determined in equilibrium.
Regarding the specification of the dynamics of the population of agents
n, we assume n follows a Poisson process with intensity determined by the
total existing tonnage and the ordered tonnage for new vessels. This spec-
ification captures the effect of capital replacement, as well as physical
depreciation. A high number of pending orders implies a higher number of
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scrapped tonnage, due to capital replacement purposes, whereas the higher
the existing tonnage, the higher the effect of physical depreciation.
The above specification manages to capture the three different effects
that contribute to the scrapping process: The number of agents interested in
potential scrapping activity due to capital replacement and physical depre-
ciation are determined by the existing fleet and the pending orders, whereas
the pure exit decision is determined by the payoffs and risk-adjusted returns
in this market. More specifically
n P(ptn)
with pn = exp(X'#), where X are the following explanatory variables: Pend-
ing orders for new vessels (ord), the total tonnage of the existing fleet (fleet)
and the ratio of the price of a new vessel (newprice) divided by the annu-
alized net earnings (ebitda), having assumed a log-normal process. The last
variable crt is similar to an inverse P/E ratio and gives an approximation to
the time needed to recover the capital.
Regarding the specification of A we assume the following reduced form,
that ensures non-negativity:
A = exp((X'ae) - (X'o)+) (119)
And combining both we have the following specification for the intensity
of the aggregate quarterly scrapped tonnage:
At,t+T = exp(ln(r) + X'0 + X'a - (X'oz)+) (120)
The above specification resulted from the interaction of heterogenous
agents and implies that there is a structural change in the process, depending
on the market conditions. Our basic claim however remains: to first order
at least, agents heterogeneity does not distort the multiplicative in n condi-
tional mean specification. Before proceeding with the estimation of a Poisson
model with a structural break we shall discuss the following variation on the
previous model.
Let us now reconsider the solution in 4.2 that will result in the same
multiplicative specification of the intensity without implying the existence
of breaks. We assume n heterogenous agents with exponential utility and
we supress the index j hereafter. We assume that each agent has a value
Veq for which he is willing to scrap his vessel or sell it in the second hand
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market. The utility from this value is then equal to the expected utility from
remaining in the market and operating the vessel:
- exp(-Ve) = EU(V) = pexitU(Vexit) + pstayU(Vtay) = (121)
exp(-Veq) = exp-(Vext) exp(-Vexit)+ exp(Vstay) exp(-V
exp(Vxit) + exp(Vtay) exp(Vexit) + exp(Vstay) stay)
(122)
exp(-Ve,) = 2 - exp(-A) -exp(-Vtay) 4
A = ln 2 + Ve - Vtay (125)
This result is interesting: the intensity determined by an agent with an
exponential utility coincides with the intensity we derived previously by using
a first order approximation. Since there exist organized markets for the
second hand price of vessels, we assume that Veq is the price of the vessel in
the market and it is the same for all agents. Furthermore, by assuming:
n
plim z Vistay =E1 - stayj=1 n
we obtain the same specification for the aggregate intensity; namely the
conditional mean is multiplicative in the number of agents.
The key conclusion of this simple model of heterogenous agents is that un-
der the existence of organized markets and convergence of beliefs, investor
heterogeneity does not have a significant impact. In section 4.3 we demon-
strate that unlike investor heterogeneity, the evolution of the population of
the number of agents n is crucial to the specification of this model.
Before concluding this section we present the results from estimating the
Poisson model with a structural break in the intensity of the Process. It is
well known that if the separation function (the function that assigns each
observation to a specific regime) is known in advance, then we may simply
estimate the model by separating the data. If the separating function is
unknown or endogenous, then estimation can become complicated, especially
given the small number of observations available in our case.
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Table D1 Appendix D
Model I PQMLE (Boom) PQMLE (Recession)
scr -.0834 (.0781) .0287 (.0385)
scr2 -.0280 (.0864) .0983 (.0269)
tci -.000141 (.000055) -. 0000971 (.000028)
opi .0002791 (.000258) .0003061 (.000059)
crt -.6250 (.2461) .0036 (.0046)
cons 8.037 (4.417) .1969 (.3411)
R2 .0892 .2497
We assume that the separation variable is crt which is the Marshalian
rate of return and corresponds to an estimate of the capital replacement
time. We estimate the model for crt < 10 (boom period) and for crt > 10
(recession period). We then perform a generalized Chow test. Results are
displayed in TableD1. The generalized Chow test is a special case of the
Hausman [36] specification test. Under the null that coefficients are equal in
both regimes, we obtain efficient and consistent estimators, when imposing
the restriction of equality, but inconsistency under the alternative, under
which our restriction is invalid. If we estimate the model taking into account
the two regimes, then our estimation is consistent, but inefficient under the
null. Thus, the generalized Chow test is a special case of the Hausman
specification test and in our case it is a X( 6 ) = 22.78, which clearly rejects
the equality of coefficients in both regimes. One major limitation of this
test is that it is very sensitive to the a priori knowledge of the separation
function.
The results are displayed in Table D1. By inspecting the residuals it
becomes apparent that very little has been gained by assuming a structural
break, whereas the main deficiencies of the specification are still present. This
finding provides additional motivation to our key conclusions in Chapter 4.
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